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U.S. Naval and Marine Corps planners desire to maintain an amphibious fleet of 33 
ships to sustain a 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) lift capability and to support 
Combatant Commander (COCOM) tasking. To support this effort, the Systems Engineering 
Analysis Cohort 18A was tasked with a recapitalization and analysis of alternatives for the 
Whidbey Island (LSD-41) class and Harpers Ferry (LSD-49) class ships for its Capstone 
Project Report. The team was comprised of ten US Navy students, one US Army Intelligence 
Officer, and 21 civilian and military personnel from the Singaporean Temasek Defense 
Systems Institute. The team utilized a systems engineering process to investigate the problem 
space, identify requirements, develop alternative solutions, and compare these alternatives 
with respect to performance, cost, and risk.  
Following the initial research, stakeholder analysis, and functional analysis the team 
developed six alternative solutions to analyze and compare. The six alternatives posited the 
replacement of the 12 decommissioning LSD-41 and 49 class ships with: 
1. Eleven LPD-17 class ships to take advantage of the existing construction line 
and learning curves. 
2. Eleven LSD(X) clean sheet design ships comparable in size to the existing 
Whidbey Island class ships.  
3. Eleven LSD(XB) clean sheet design ships roughly 30% larger than the 
existing Whidbey Island class ships. 
4. Eleven LPD-17 Flt(X) ships based on the existing San Antonio class hull and 
modified to increase vehicle capacity and decrease cargo capacity. 
5. 4 LHA-8 class ships in addition to the six planned for procurement. This 
alternative considered an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) composed of two 
big-deck ships to evaluate alternative ARG architectures. 
6. 19 LPD-17 class ships. This alternative considered an ARG composed of five 
small-deck ships to evaluate alternative ARG architectures. 
These six alternatives varied the ship size, the fleet size, and vehicle capacity against cargo 
capacity to investigate identified trade spaces. 
The alternatives were compared with respect to performance by evaluating lift 
capability and modeling throughput delivery rates. The six alternatives included seventeen 
different ARG architectures which were compared against a standard for Marine 
xx 
 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) lift capability. The amphibious fleet as a whole was analyzed for 
its ability to lift 2.0 MEBs over a thirty year span. Two amphibious missions were modeled to 
compare throughput performance of the alternatives. A Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 
Relief (HA/DR) simulation measured cargo transfer rate and an assault scenario measured 
troop transfer rate. All options, with the exception of the LSD(X), improved upon the current 
standard with a significant improvement noted in the all big-deck alternative. 
A life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) was developed for each alternative. A five 
parameter regression model was developed to determine lead-ship cost for clean sheet 
designs. The model was validated by comparing predicted costs to actual costs for five 
previous amphibious class ships. The regressors used were ship beam, crew size, troop 
capacity, cargo capacity, and landing craft air cushion (LCAC) capacity. Learning curves was 
applied for follow-on ships and operating and support (O&S) costs added to develop a LCCE. 
The costs of the six alternatives fell into four tiers with the LSD(X) being the least expensive 
option and the 19 LPD-17 being the most expensive.  
The risk analysis sought to evaluate for threats to ARG and fleet performance, 
procurement cost, and procurement schedule of the six alternatives. Eighteen risk factors 
distributed across these three areas were identified and examined. A quantitative value was 
determined for comparison by assigning subjective likelihood probabilities and consequence 
factors. Risk mitigation strategies were identified and a best path risk mitigation strategy 
proposed. The LSD(X) was deemed the riskiest option as it was the least capable ship and 
represented an unproven, untested design. Alternative 6, the 19 LPD-17 option, was deemed 
the least risky largely because it increased the size of the amphibious fleet. 
By comparing the options with respect to performance, cost, and risk, the team 
determined the LPD-17 and LSD(XB) to present the most robust alternatives as replacement 
class ships. However, the analysis also supported the implementation of alternative ARG 
architectures, and subsequent fleet architecture, apart from the current standard. There is no 
immediate threat to the 2.0 MEB lift capability or to fleet inventory for COCOM tasking. 
Further study is recommended to determine the most robust amphibious fleet architecture to 






The American amphibious force has a long and proud history from the Continental 
Marines’ raid of Nassau in the Bahamas in 1776, through the island hopping campaigns of 
World War II, up to the nation’s most recent conflicts in the War on Terror. The vast majority 
of the world’s population lives within 200 miles of the sea and the amphibious force has 
continuously assured access to these critical coastal areas to support the nation’s interests. 
Though the last large scale amphibious assault occurred during the Korean War, examples of 
the full range of amphibious missions can be found much more recently. The following cases 
represent a small sample of the over 100 amphibious operations in the last 20 years:
1
 
 The amphibious assault of November 25, 2001, where Task Force 58 composed of 
two Amphibious Ready Groups / Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG/MEUs) inserted 
Marines from amphibious ships over 400 miles into southern Afghanistan. 
 The amphibious raid of September 9, 2010, by the USS PELELIU ARG/15th MEU 
which rescued the crew of the MV Magellan Star from armed pirates. 
 The amphibious demonstration prior to ground operations in Operation DESERT 
STORM in which two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) were staged off the 
Kuwaiti coast to distract and deceive Iraqi Forces of the potential for an amphibious 
assault. 
 The amphibious withdrawal in May 1995 of 6,200 United Nations troops from 
Somalia conducted by a USMC led Task Force. 
 The Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief (HA/DR) mission to provide assistance 
and relief to the Haitian earthquake victims which was conducted in 2010. 
While a large-scale forcible entry amphibious assault has a low likelihood of 
occurrence in the foreseeable future, the amphibious ship force and its missions remain 
relevant today as demonstrated by their consistent use in the Navy’s taskings. 
The amphibious fleet is currently comprised of 29 ships divided among seven ship 
classes. Various criteria have established a target inventory of 33 ships for the force 
nominally composed of eleven dock landing ships (LSDs), eleven amphibious assault ships  
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(general purpose (LHA) and multi-purpose (LHD)), and eleven amphibious transport docks 
(LPD). The thirty-year plan for the force prepared by the Congressional Budget Office is 
displayed in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.   Amphibious Force Inventory (From 2) 
 
The eleventh and final LPD-17 San Antonio Class ship will be completed this year 
(FY2012) to replace the retiring LPD-4 Austin Class ships. LHA(R) ships are scheduled for 
procurement beginning in FY2015 with LHA-8. The first of the LSD-41 Whidbey Island 
class ships is scheduled to leave the service in FY2022 and all Whidbey Island Class and 
LSD-49 Harpers Ferry Class ships will be retired by FY2039. A replacement class ship, 
commonly referred to as the LSD(X), is being considered to maintain the desired 33 
amphibious ship inventory, however the characteristics of that ship are yet to be determined. 
This study investigates solutions to the problems posed by the retiring LSD-41 and 49 class 
ships. 
A. TASKING 
The tasking statement defined a broad analysis through which to approach the 
problem. The fundamental assignment is to, “Conduct a recapitalization analysis, including 
an analysis of alternatives (AoA), for the follow-on ships to LSD-41/49.” To this end the 
following additional tasks were assigned: 
 Develop and challenge assumptions concerning amphibious fleet architecture. 
 Develop a system-of-systems approach to provide for all amphibious lift 
missions commensurate with current and reasonably anticipated future needs 
of the US Navy. 
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 Develop concepts of operations for the examined range of missions. 
 Develop alternative fleet architecture for ships, manning, command and 
control, communications, logistics, and operational procedures. 
 Enumerate and evaluate the anticipated technology gaps. 
 Produce a coherent vision of amphibious lift missions. 
 Identify requirements for support and collaboration with coalition forces and 
meeting multiple missions. 
 Provide a feasible roadmap to improve the effectiveness of amphibious lift 
ships. 
B. APPROACH 
The project team rooted the analysis in systems engineering tools and methods. The 
course of the study was guided by the following questions: 
 What are the required capabilities of the amphibious fleet? 
 What alternatives provide the needed capabilities?  
 Are the alternatives operationally effective and suitable?  
 Can the alternatives be supported?  
 What are the risks associated with each alternative?  
 What are the life-cycle costs for each alternative?  
 How do the alternatives compare to one another?  
To accomplish the required tasks, the project was organized into three teams. The 
bulk of the initial effort was dedicated to a Systems Engineering (SE) Team, which 
performed the requisite work to produce materiel and non-materiel solutions to the problem. 
A Cost Team and Performance and Effectiveness Team developed models and simulations to 
be used for the comparison of the alternatives produced by the SE Team. Finally, each team 
contributed to a composite risk analysis. The final recommendation is the product of a 
comparison of the team outputs. 
C. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
The problem space was formed through an extensive review of pertinent literature as 





publications, official guidance, and previous governmental studies and reports. Stakeholder 
analysis was accomplished through correspondence and participation in various professional 
conferences.  
An important aspect of problem formulation comes from the realization that the LSD 
class ships are approaching the end of their service life and that this fact presents a substantial 
threat to amphibious capability. This threat is of significant consequence as demonstrated 
before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection of Forces of the House Armed Services 
Committee: 
Failure to maintain adequate amphibious capability and capacity presents a 
grave risk to our national security. Without it the United States: loses 
credibility among both friends and foes; forfeits opportunities to establish and 
maintain influence; relinquishes the ability to operate in austere environments 
or overcome damaged infrastructure; divests itself of a critical means of 
responding to crises and protecting our citizens and interests; and ultimately 
surrenders its only sustainable entry capability, becoming reliant on the 




Based on an initial view of the problem space, the project tasking was refined into an 
initial problem statement: Amphibious operations capability gaps will be created by the 
decommissioning of the Whidbey Island class and Harpers Ferry class ships. This problem 
statement reflects the real deficiency that will exist and leads to some specific need to 
respond to that deficiency. Further review of this problem statement through the 
implementation of an iterative systems engineering method of needs analysis resulted in this 
revised problem statement: 
Potential alternative solutions must be analyzed and compared with respect to their 
cost, performance, and risk in order to support future amphibious force requirements.  
This problem statement represents the crux of the need communicated by the stakeholders 
and opens the study to the comprehensive analysis defined in the SEA-18A Capstone.  
D. BACKGROUND 
Pertinent to the investigation of the problem space described above is an 
understanding of this amphibious force, the ships of which it is comprised, the missions to 
which it is tasked, and the Marine Corps force which it carries. A brief discussion follows on 
these areas.  
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1. Amphibious Ships 
Amphibious ships make up just over 10% of the Navy’s planned 313-ship battle force 
inventory base-lined in the Force Structure Analysis of 2005.
4
 The Navy desires to maintain a 
force of approximately 33 ships for two purposes. Foremost is to satisfy the high demand for 
traditional ARG operations; and second is to satisfy the increasing demand for deployments 
on independent operations to conduct presence, irregular warfare, maritime security, 
humanitarian assistance, and partnership building missions.
5
 
At the end of FY2011, the Navy’s amphibious force included 31 ships. They are 
divided by class as follows: 
 8 Wasp (LHD-1) class ships 
 2 Tarawa (LHA-1) class ships 
 5 San Antonio (LPD-17) class ships 
 4 Austin (LPD-4) class ships 
 12 Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry (LSD-41/49) class ships 
These amphibious landing ships can be more generally divided into two groups. “Big 
deck” amphibious ships include the LHD and LHA classes and look akin to small aircraft 
carriers. The “small deck” amphibious ships include the LPD and LSD classes, which do not 
have the same capacity for flight operations as the larger ships. LSDs have larger well decks 
and can carry more landing crafts air cushion (LCACs) than other types of amphibious ships, 
but they cannot house helicopters. The Whidbey Island class (LSD-41) can carry four LCACs 
while the Harpers Ferry class (LSD-49) can carry only two but has ten times the cargo 
capacity of the LSD-41.The Harpers Ferry class is commonly referred to as the cargo variant 
LSD. The ships and their homeports are identified in Table 1. 
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Ship’s Name Home Port 
Hull 
Number 
Ship’s Name Home Port 
LSD-41 USS Whidbey Island Little Creek, VA LSD-49 USS Harpers Ferry San Diego, CA 
LSD-42 USS Germantown Sasebo, Japan LSD-50 USS Carter Hall Little Creek, VA 
LSD-43 USS Fort McHenry Little Creek, VA LSD-51 USS Oak Hill Little Creek, VA 
LSD-44 USS Gunston Hall Little Creek, VA LSD-52 USS Pearl Harbor San Diego, CA 
LSD-45 USS Comstock San Diego, CA 
LSD-46 USS Tortuga Sasebo, Japan 
LSD-47 USS Rushmore San Diego, CA 
LSD-48 USS Ashland Little Creek, VA 
Table 1. LSD Hulls and Homeports (Follows 6) 
The mission of the LSD is to “…transport and launch loaded amphibious craft and 
vehicles with their crews and embarked personnel in amphibious assaults by landing craft and 
amphibious vehicles.”7 
The ships are typically forward deployed as part of an ARG consisting of one LHA or 
LHD, one LPD, and one LSD. These three ships are capable of lifting a MEU consisting of 
around 2,200 Marines, their combat equipment, aircraft and vehicles, and 15 days of supplies. 
An example ARG configuration is shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Example ARG Formation (Follows 8) 
The driving force behind the naval amphibious force is the military’s need to provide 
sufficient lift capacity to deliver two Marine Expeditionary Brigade Assault Echelons (MEB 
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AEs) for forcible entry operations.
9
 Navy and USMC leadership have agreed that a 38 ship 
amphibious force is necessary to provide this capability but have accepted the operational 
risks of a fiscally constrained lift capability of 33 amphibious ships. A 33-ship force 
comprised of 11 LHA/D amphibious assault ships and a mix of 11 LPD-17 amphibious 
transport docks and 11 LSD dock landing ships would be sufficient to support forcible entry 
operations with acceptable risk in the speed of arrival of combat support elements of the 
MEB.
10
 This plan would allow for 15 ships allocated to each MEB with as many as three  
ships in an overhaul status at any one time. The Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range 
Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2011 shows the strength of the planned 
amphibious fleet as shown in Table 2. 
 
FY Ships FY Ships 
2011 29 2026 36 
2012 30 2027 35 
2013 30 2028 36 
2014 30 2029 34 
2015 31 2030 33 
2016 33 2031 33 
2017 33 2032 32 
2018 33 2033 31 
2019 33 2034 33 
2020 33 2035 30 
2021 34 2036 30 
2022 34 2037 29 
2023 35 2038 29 
2024 36 2039 29 
2025 35 2040 30 
Table 2. Projections of Amphibious Ships (Follows 11) 
This force structure is not only a factor of the MEB lift requirement for major combat, 
but also of other objectives including presence and contingency operations in support of the 
Combatant Commander (COCOM) operational plans and their daily demands.
12
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flexibility of amphibious ships, their demand continues to increase. ARG/MEUs are typically 
forward deployed for Theater Security Cooperation and Irregular Warfare operations and 
then sent as first responders to crises events.
13
 
2. Amphibious Missions 
Their impressive capacity for lift of personnel and equipment make amphibious ships 




1. Amphibious Assault - The principal type of amphibious operation that 
involves establishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore.  
2. Amphibious Raid - A type of amphibious operation involving swift incursion 
into or temporary occupation of an objective followed by a planned withdrawal.  
3. Amphibious Demonstration - A type of amphibious operation conducted for 
the purpose of deceiving the enemy by a show of force with the expectation of 
deluding the enemy into a course of action unfavorable to him.  
4. Amphibious Withdrawal - A type of amphibious operation involving the 
extraction of forces by sea in ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore.  
5. Amphibious Support - A type of amphibious operation which contributes to 
conflict prevention or crisis mitigation.  
Each of these mission areas is critical to the wide range of national interests. 
Amphibious Demonstration offers a significant example in that the mere capability of these 
forces helps shape world events. In time of crisis, the positioning of an amphibious force in 
proximity to some particular area allows the nation’s decision makers to indicate US 
concerns without prematurely deploying forces ashore.
15
  
These five mission areas of the Navy differ slightly from those of the USMC. The 
USMC defines four Amphibious Operations:
16
 
1. Conduct Amphibious Assault: The principle type of amphibious operation that 
involves establishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. 
2. Conduct Amphibious Raid: A short-duration, small-scale deliberate attack, 
from the sea, involving a swift penetration of hostile or denied battlespace. 
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Amphibious raids are conducted in order to secure information, to confuse the enemy, 
or to seize, destroy, neutralize, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated sea-
based or shore-based targets. Amphibious raids end with a planned withdrawal upon 
completion of the assigned mission. 
3. Conduct Maritime Interception Operations (MIO): Operations contained in 
this task include Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS), seizure of a static maritime 
platform and selected maritime security missions. These operations may be conducted 
in order to counter piracy, enforce international agreements, enforce international 
resolutions or sanctions, confiscate contraband, or as directed in accordance with 
current execution orders. 
4. Conduct Advance Force Operations: To shape the battlespace in preparation 
for the main assault or other operations of an amphibious or Joint force by providing 
battlespace awareness and conducting such operations as reconnaissance, seizure of 
supporting positions, preliminary bombardment, and air support. 
The Navy’s fifth mission area of ‘Amphibious Support’ is closely related to the 
USMC ‘Expeditionary Support to Other Operations / Crisis Response and Limited 
Contingency Operations.’17 These include: 
1. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) 
2. Humanitarian Assistance (HA) 
3. Stability Operations (SO) 
4. Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) 
5. Joint and Combined Operations 
6. Aviation Operations from expeditionary shore-based sites 
7. Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) Activities 
8. Airfield/Port Seizure 
The “other operations” discussed by the Navy and USMC highlight the flexibility of 
these ships, which allows for their implementation in nation-building operations, maritime 
security operations (such as anti-piracy operations), and counter-terrorism operations.
18
 The 
Navy’s 30 Year Shipbuilding Plan further captures this sentiment stating: 
Amphibious ships are proving to be one of the most flexible battle force 
platforms, as indicated by the high demand for both traditional Amphibious 
Readiness Group operations and deployments of independent amphibious 
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ships for a variety of presence, irregular warfare, maritime security, 
humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and partnership building missions.
19
 
3. USMC Organization 
The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is the principle organization of the 
force across the spectrum of conflict for conduct of every mission or operation. MAGTFs are 
balanced, combined-arms forces with organic ground, aviation, and sustainment elements.
20
  
Each MAGTF, regardless of size or mission, is composed of a command element (CE), 
ground combat element (GCE), aviation combat element (ACE), and combat service support 
element (CSSE). These MAGTFs provide a scalable capability as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.    MAGTF Scalability (From 21) 
The principal war-fighting organization is the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).
22
 
There are three permanent MEFs: I MEF based in Southern California and Arizona, II MEF 
based in North and South Carolina, and III MEF based in Hawaii and Japan. 
Operationally, the Marines are no longer needed to storm beaches against hardened 
targets, and have shifted focus to 21st Century Marine doctrine such as “Operational 
Maneuver From The Sea” (OMFTS) and “Ship to Objective Maneuver” (STOM). A Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) supports this doctrine. A MEB is a MAGTF constructed  
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around a reinforced infantry regiment, a composite Marine aircraft group, and a brigade 
service support group.
23
 The 33-ship amphibious force is designed to fulfill the lift capability 
required to deliver two MEB Assault Echelons. 
The principal forward-deployed organization is the Marine Expeditionary Unit, or if 
they are deployed with the added capability, a Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations 
Capable (MEU(SOC)). There are seven permanent MEU(SOC) commands: I MEF holds the 
11th, 13th, and 15th MEUs(SOC), II MEF holds 22nd, 24th, and 26th MEUs(SOC), and III 
MEF holds the 31st MEU(SOC). The mission of the MEU is to: 
Provide a forward-deployed, flexible sea-based Marine Air Ground Task 
Force (MAGTF) capable of conducting Amphibious Operations, crisis 
response and limited contingency operations, to include enabling the 
introduction of follow on forces, and, designate special operations, in order to 
support the theater requirements of Geographic Combatant Commanders 
(GCC).24  
An ARG must be capable of deploying with a MEU, its vehicles, aircraft, and 
equipment. This lift requirement is why current operating procedure defines an ARG as one 
big deck (either LHA or LHD), one LPD and one LSD, vice smaller combinations. 
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II. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING ANALYSIS 
An iterative systems engineering process was used with the ultimate goal of ensuring 
proposed solutions truly satisfied the source requirements. The process was modeled after 
that presented in the second edition of Decision Making in System Engineering and 
Management and shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.   Systems Design Process (From 25) 
 
It describes four steps: Problem Definition, Solution Design, Decision Analysis and Solution 
Implementation.
26
 This research effort completed the first three phases of the process. The 
fourth phase is beyond the scope of this project and would be completed subsequently by the 
US Navy, DoD and Congressional decision makers.   
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The tailored systems engineering plan developed by the team is displayed in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Systems Engineering Process 
The following sections detail the method, tools, and analysis utilized by the project 
team, focusing first on problem space with stakeholder interviews, research and literature 
reviews, and functional analysis. This effort produced a list of requirements which were 
associated with measures of effectiveness and performance. Solution space analyzed various 
trade-spaces to develop alternatives. The alternatives were then compared to each other 
according to performance, cost and risk. 
Problem     
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III. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
A. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
The systems engineering process began with the proper identification and ranking of 
stakeholders. Stakeholders include all interested parties in the project and its recommended 
solution, from the project sponsor to the future user. The stakeholder analysis conducted 
sought first to identify as many stakeholders as possible and then to identify those that would 
be most critical to the project. Criticality was determined by a need for communication, be it 
requirement solicitation or a request for assistance in a particular area. 
The list of critical stakeholders is shown below: 
 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
o OPNAV N8F (Warfare Integration)  – Project Tasking Originator 
o OPNAV N85 – Performed the LSD(X) CBA. 
o OPNAV N81(Assessment) 
 USMC Planners 
 USMC Users 
 Navy Users, from the COCOMs to the wardrooms and crews of the 
amphibious class ships 
 Navy Cost Estimators 
 Shipyards (Huntington Ingalls and NASSCO) 
 
Throughout the project, N8F (as of April 2012, renamed N9I) remained the primary 
stakeholder and helped to guide the direction and scope of the analysis. 
B. PROBLEM SPACE 
The strength of the systems engineering method is the up-front effort placed on 
understanding the problem in all its facets and dimensions. The investigation of the problem 
space involved a thorough review of pertinent literature to include Joint Publications, Navy 
and Marine Corps Doctrine, and other related official future planning documents. 
Additionally, interviews with Navy and Marine Corps stakeholders were conducted with 
respect to current and future operations. Of particular value were the stakeholder inputs 
received at National Defense and Industry Association’s annual conference held in Panama 
City, Florida, and the Surface Navy National Symposium held in Washington, D.C. 
16 
 
With the initial understanding of the amphibious picture as a whole, and a focus on 
the specific tasking of the project, the problem space was further defined with three 
compulsory tools: assumptions, constraints, and scope. These three tools established the 
overarching rules to govern the analysis of the project team. 
1. Assumptions 
Assumptions describe the conditions presupposed for the analysis. Numerous 
assumptions were made throughout the project and documented according to their associated 
area. Each was deemed necessary and reasonable by the team. The following list represents 
the assumptions considered crucial to the study and encompassing all areas of analysis: 
 Platforms in development will remain unchanged, specifically designs for the 
America Class (LHA-8) ships. 
 The Marine Corps force structure is defined by MCO 3120.9C and will not be 
presupposed in any manner.
27
 
 Only the LSD is a candidate for redesign if a material solution is warranted. 
This includes an LSD(X) based on the LPD-17 hull form. 
 The need for amphibious missions described above will continue. 
 Doctrine describing ARG composition, which is currently 1 LHD/LHA, 1 San 
Antonio class LPD and 1 LSD-41/49 class ship, can be changed if necessary. 
Alternatives will be compared to this baseline. 
 An ARG will be complemented with a Surface Action Group (SAG) if 
deployed to a hostile environment, one in which a credible anti-ship weapon 
system threat exists with a reasonable expectation that the enemy will employ 
it.  
 A SAG consists of at least 3 Cruiser/Destroyer ships. 
 The risk associated with current lift capability shortfalls represents an 
acceptable level. Current ARG architectures, one LHA/D, one LPD, and one 
LSD, are unable to lift the entire MEU Equipment Density List (EDL). 
However, a recent report for OPNAV N81 based on post deployment briefs 
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 Funding for future construction will not increase beyond current projections, 
but funding will not decrease below a point that would prevent new ships from 
reaching their expected service life. 
2. Constraints 
Constraints are limitations or restrictions imposed upon the project team. Typically 
defined by the stakeholder, constraints may be physical, as the LSD(X) may not exceed some 
number of tons, or programmatic, as the first LSD(X) unit cost may not exceed some value. 
The following list includes examples of the constraints the analysis operated within: 
 The alternatives must address the Navy’s desire to maintain a 33-ship 
amphibious force. 
 Cost estimating regressions limit proposed solutions with respect to size 
between the LSD class and LHA/D classes. This avoids extrapolating outside 
the bounds of the model. 
 MEU and MEB lift requirements are defined by USMC. 
3. Scope 
The intent of this project was the generation of materiel solutions and mitigating 
strategies to address the capability gaps and requirements of the amphibious force. Requisite 
capabilities and system recommendations are defined and justified but not included in any 
blueprint of a ship design. 
Of the five mission areas that comprise amphibious operations only Amphibious 
Assault and Support Operations, specifically Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
(HA/DR), are analyzed in this study. These two missions are representative of the full range 
of missions. The forcible entry by the USMC upon a hostile shore is the primary reason for 
the existence of the amphibious force and drives the most stringent requirements. HA/DR 
represents the flexibility of the amphibious platforms for unconventional and independent 
operations. Furthermore, if the capability exists for assault, it follows the lesser requirements 
to support Demonstration, Raid, and Withdrawal are satisfied. Finally, HA/DR offers clear 
throughput modeling opportunities for independent ships as well as ARG/MEU operations, 
while Amphibious Assault allows for modeling of the amphibious force as a whole. 
The decision to focus on these two mission areas is also supported by MEU(SOC) 
Mission Rankings prepared for OPNAV N81 in 2010. The review prioritized probable MEU 
missions based on the MEU(SOC) order, historical MEU utilization, and the Steady State 
18 
 
Security Posture (SSSP) scenarios.
29
 As shown in Table 3, an amphibious assault represents 
the least likely but most stressing task compared to Humanitarian Assistance which 
represents and highly likely but low stressing task. 
 
Most Likely MEU Mission Essential Task Most Stressing 
1 
Conduct/Support Theater Security Cooperation Activities 
(MCT 5.5.5) 14 
2 Conduct Humanitarian Assistance (HA) (MCT 1.6.6.7) 13 
3 
Conduct Noncombatant Evacuation Operations            
(MCT 1.6.6.6) 8 
4 Conduct Joint and Combined Operations (MCT5.5) 4 
5 
Conduct Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel 
(TRAP) (MCT6.2.1) 9 
6 Conduct Stability Operations (SSTRO) (MCT1.6.6.9) 5 
7 
Conduct Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) 
Operations (MCT1.3.2.9) 11 
8 
Conduct Aviation Operations from expeditionary shore-
based sites (MCT1.3.3.3.2) 12 
9 Conduct Special Reconnaissance (JP1-02) 10 
10 Conduct Advance Force Operations (MCT1.6.10) 6 
11 Conduct Airfield/Port Seizure (MCT1.6.5.6) 3 
12 Conduct Amphibious Raid (MCT1.3.2.2) 2 
13 Conduct Direct Action Operations (JP 1-02) 7 
14 Conduct Amphibious Assault (MCT1.3.2.3) 1 
Table 3. MEU Task Ranking (From 30) 
A more complete understanding of the lift capability gaps of the force could only be 
achieved through extensive analysis, through war-games and simulations, of Marine Corps 
battles on the beaches and shores of the enemy. This project has bound the problem at the 
delivery of men and equipment to the beach but not their utilization thereafter. Any lift 
capability that can deliver more troops and equipment faster is assumed to increase combat 
effectiveness on the shores and vice versa.  
Notably absent from the above discussion is the force structure definitions for the 
various amphibious force compositions. This requirement, though present in previous 
analyses of the problem, is specifically challenged. For example, what architectures are 
possible other than the Navy standard below?
31
 
 A MEU is supported with an ARG comprised of 3 amphibious ships (1 Big Deck, 1 
LPD, and 1 LSD or 1/1/1). 
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 MEB AE lift is supported with 15 amphibious ships (5/5/5). 
 2.0 MEB AE lift requirement is supported with 30 amphibious ships (10/10/10). 
C. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) 
1. Operational View (OV-1) 
The picture below displays the various means by which the LSD and future LSD(X) 
may be employed. It is taken from the LSD Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) Gate 1 
Review delivered by OPNAV N85 in March 2011. Specifically it presents the three distinct 
formations in which the ship can expect to be deployed. These three formations depict one 
LSD in a three-ship ARG, as five of the ships of a fifteen-ship Amphibious Task Force 
(ATF), or as a lone ship conducting independent operations. In any of the three formations, 
the ship can expect to be deployed with Marines, their equipment and vehicles, and can 
expect to debark these Marines, their equipment and vehicles via LCAC and rotary aircraft. 
The emphasis of the project is a cost-performance analysis of these three formations circled 
in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Operational View (OV-1) (From 32) 
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LSD(X) in Independent 




2. Mission Description for HA/DR and Assault 
Two scenarios were developed for analysis, simulation, and alternative evaluation. 
The following are Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) for the amphibious missions of 
HA/DR and Amphibious Assault. These CONOPS give the necessary background for a more 
complete understanding of the modeling efforts described later in the report. 
a. Amphibious Assault CONOPS 
Current Situation: A hostile nation has invaded and currently occupies the 
island of Natuna Besar with a brigade-sized force and has begun setting up Surface to Air 
Missiles (SAM), Surface to Surface Missiles (SSM) and Dong Feng-21 sites. Additionally, 
they have stationed two squadrons of SU-33 at Ranai Airport and 6 Beagle MMA. They 
announced that all traffic through the South China Sea would henceforth be subject to 
inspection and control by their forces. Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines have 
requested U.N. support, specifically calling on the United States and Japan to act. In 
response, the hostile nation has warned Japan and the United States that any interference in 
their policy enforcement will lead to war. 
Mission: Using forces assigned to an Amphibious Expeditionary Strike Group 
(ESG) conduct an amphibious assault on the hostile nation’s forces located on Natuna Basar. 
Gain air and sea superiority first and then take the island by conducting an amphibious 




1) ESG arrives in OPAREA 
2) Preparation of the landing area by supporting arms: Naval Surface Fire 
Support Ships (NSFS) and Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) Ships 
3) Ship to shore movement of landing force  
4) Air/surface assault landings  
5) Link up to operations between surface and air landed forces 
6) Provision of supporting arms and logistics and/or combat service support 
7) Landing of remaining force elements 
8) Conduct land missions to take over hostile nation forces 
The LSD: The USS Tortuga (LSD-46), located in its homeport of Sasebo, 
Japan, is tasked to join the assembling Amphibious Task Force. The ship will deploy to the 
hostile area and conduct its mission. The ships will be escorted by a SAG consisting of 
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surface combatants capable of defending the ATF from surface, subsurface, and air threats 
while conducting the assault. Once on station, the USS Tortuga is capable of conducting 
amphibious operations consisting of the following: communication, coordination, 
surveillance, command and control, limited self-defense, defense of delivery vehicles, Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) insertion, delivery of troops and equipment, extraction of troops and 
equipment. The primary effort will be the transfer of troops and equipment from the ship to 
the shore while on station. Transfer of troops and equipment will be conducted by sea via 
LCACs and air via rotary aircraft.  Replenishment of fuel, cargo, supplies will be provided as 
necessary in order to allow the ship to remain on station as long as required. Once the mission 
is complete, the ship will redeploy as necessary for follow-on tasking. 
b. HA/DR CONOPS 
Current Situation: An earthquake measuring 7.0 on the moment magnitude 
scale (Mw)  occurred with an epicenter near the town of Leogane just 16 miles west of Haiti’s 
capital Port-au-Prince. The effects were felt across the entire country with massive damage to 
industrial, commercial, and residential structures. Millions of Haitians were affected by the 
quake and it is feared the death toll will reach into the hundreds of thousands. Air, land, and 
sea transport facilities, electrical and communications infrastructure, and hospitals and 
government buildings were all severely damaged or out of commission. The government of 
Haiti has asked for international assistance. 
Mission:  A ship is to be sent from Little Creek to respond within 72 hours. 
The purpose of the HA/DR mission is to relieve or reduce the impacts of the earthquake. 
COMPACFLT and COMTHIRDFLT have tasked the ARG with the following objectives: 
 Understand the situation. 
 Determine where the supplies need to be delivered. 
 Provide logistical support. 
o Sealift 
o Airlift 
o “Ship to shore” maneuver 
 Conduct / Maintain Situational Awareness. 
o Provide situational updates to Higher Headquarters. 




o Coordinate with external agencies (Host Nation government, 
military, other aid organizations, etc.). 
o Utilize communication means to develop and share awareness 
of the situation with other services. 
 Provide command and control decision support. 
 Operational Tasks: 
1. Plan for all required resources including manpower, supplies and 
equipment necessary for a successful mission, perform a risk analysis of 
the situation in the affected region to include the ingress routes, and 
develop deployment and contingency plans for any unforeseen 
circumstances.  
2. Liaise with other organizations to consolidate the overall effort.  
3. Transport all required manpower, supplies and equipment to the affected 
region as quickly as possible to include the end-to-end transportation from 
Little Creek to the disaster region.  
4. Aid and equipment are to be delivered to affected parties in the region, 
including the rebuilding of necessary infrastructure to return the affected 
region to normal operation. 
5. Recover and return from the affected region. 
The LSD: The USS Ashland located in its homeport of Little Creek will be 
tasked to respond to a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief effort. The ship will deploy 
to the affected area in order to provide support. The ship may be independently tasked, or 
deployed/re-deployed as a component of an ARG. The ship will transit to its assigned area of 
responsibility and establish the requisite command and control organization necessary to 
conduct its mission. Operations could consist of one or more of the following; 
communication, evacuation, delivery of goods, receipt of goods, regional support, 
surveillance, medical assistance, coordination, search and rescue, security, or liaison 
operations. The primary effort of response will be command and control and the transfer of 
cargo and personnel to and from the ship while on station. Transfer of personnel, equipment, 
and supplies will be conducted by LCACs and rotary aircraft. Replenishment of fuel, cargo, 
supplies will be provided as necessary in order to allow sustainment of ships stationing as 





D. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
The functional analysis began with a decomposition of “Amphibious Operations.” 
This facilitated a clearer understanding of the problem space by focusing on discrete actions 
necessary to complete the objective requirements. The analysis asked what needs to be done 
to complete the amphibious missions not how it is to be done.  
The top-level functions requisite to the accomplishment of the amphibious operations 
are the verb phrases “lift, command, and employ forces.” Each of these top-level functions is 
then further divided into the necessary lower level functions. The top-level functional 
decomposition diagram is displayed in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Amphibious Operations High Level Functions 
This decomposition is dependent upon specific definitions to avoid ambiguity or 
confusion. The intended meaning of each function is defined below. Amphibious vessels 
referred to are the LHA, LHD, LPD, and LSD class ships. 
1. Lift: This function refers to the capability to hold and transport personnel and 
equipment over the sea.   
2. Command: This function describes the ability to command and control the 
operations, and assets with respect to the amphibious mission.  
3. Employment of Forces: This function requires the utilization of those forces and 
equipment deployed on or assigned to the amphibious fleet. This includes, but is 
not limited to, USMC and naval personnel, SOF forces, and the crews who 
operate LCACs, small boats, rotary and fixed-wing aircraft utilized in the 














Figure 8.   Functions of Lift 
The function Lift, shown in Figure 8, includes the ability to perform the following 
sub-functions:  
1.1 Embark/Debark: This function describes the loading of personnel and equipment 
aboard a vessel and their subsequent unloading or launching. 
1.2 Store: This function describes the securing and containment of embarked 
equipment.  
1.3 Berth: This function describes the housing of embarked personnel. 

















Figure 9.    Functions of Command 
The function Command, shown in Figure 9, includes four sub-functions: 
2.1 Communicate: This function describes the ability to convey and receive 
information internally and externally both organically and non-organically.  
2.2 Direct: This function describes the ability to manage, exert control, or dictate 
actions internally and externally both organically and non-organically. 
2.3 Observe: This function describes the ability to receive information with sensors or 
personnel. 














Figure 10.   Functions of Employ Forces 
The function Employment of Forces, shown in Figure 10, was divided into five lower-
level functions with sub-functions below them.  
3.1. Air Operations include all aircraft operations on the flight decks of amphibious 
ships.  
3.1.1.  Launch – Ability to have aircraft take-off from the ship. 
3.1.2.  Recover – Ability to have aircraft land on the ship. 
3.1.3.  Refuel – Ability to provide additional fuel to aircraft. 
3.1.4.  Load – Ability to transfer personnel and equipment onto and off of vessels 
and surface craft.   
3.1.5.  Strike – Ability to employ weapons from an aircraft. 
3.2. Surface Operations refers to all amphibious vessel actions necessary for the 
completion of amphibious missions. This includes the maneuvers of amphibious 
vessels as well as the small boats and LCACs launched from those vessels. 
3.2.1.  Launch – Ability to have surface craft debark from the ship. 
3.2.2.  Recover – Ability to have surface craft embark on the ship. 




























































3.2.4.  Load – Ability to transfer personnel and equipment onto and off of vessels 
and surface craft.   
3.3. Medical Operations include all efforts to aid, treat, and attend to the medical and 
dental needs of embarked personnel or personnel of interest in a given area of 
operation. 
3.4. Maintenance Operations refer those efforts to repair or prevent damage to the 
equipment embarked on an amphibious ship necessary for the employment of 
forces. This includes maintenance of LCACs, aircraft, and embarked vehicles 
and equipment, but does not refer to the maintenance of the amphibious vessel 
itself. 
3.5. Defensive Operations refers to amphibious force protection and surface craft 
deployed in operations.  
If a specific ship, for example an LSD(X), was to perform the functions necessary for 
amphibious operations, it would result in a new and distinct list of functions. A HA/DR 
mission does not require the maintenance of ships systems however, given the context of an 
LSD performing a HA/DR mission over some period of time, the need to maintain ships 
equipment becomes a functional necessity. A functional decomposition for the LSD(X) is 
contained in Appendix A and would lend insight during the design of a future ship.
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E. REQUIREMENTS GENERATION 
The previous sections were for the purpose of determining what it is precisely that 
needs to be accomplished. The literature review, stakeholder elicitation and the generation of 
constraints and assumptions led to an initial description of the problem space. CONOPS 
analysis and functional decompositions lead to an approach of the problem statement from 
distinctive angles. The product of the analysis thus far was the requirements generation. 
These requirements were divided into two general categories. The first requirements are 
clearly defined for the Navy and Marine Corps in doctrinal publications. These requirements 
include Marine Corps lift requirements and mirror the amphibious mission set of the Navy. 
Listed second are requirements taken from Navy leaders and planners that describe more 
general operational needs for amphibious ships and their procurement. 
1. Doctrinal Requirements 
1. The amphibious force must be able to lift two Marine Expeditionary 
Brigades (MEBs) as defined in Table 4. 
2. An Amphibious Readiness Group must be able to lift a Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) as defined in Table 4. 
 
Footprint MEU 2.0 MEB  
LCACs (Spots) 6 54 
Troops (Bunks) 2,578 24,342 
Vehicle (Sq. Ft Total) 88,640 930,488 




JP-5 (Gal) 1,592,344 16,690,930 
Table 4. MEU/MEB Footprints (Follows 34) 
An important note to this MEU lift requirement is that MEU Commanders are not 
required to deploy with the complete Equipment Density List (EDL) as defined in Marine 
Corps Order 3120.9C Policy for Marine Expeditionary Units. Instead, the EDL serves the 
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3. The amphibious force must be able to perform an amphibious 
demonstration, defined as a type of amphibious operation conducted for the 
purpose of deceiving the enemy by a show of force with the expectation of 
deluding the enemy into a course of action unfavorable to him.
36
  
4.      The amphibious force must be able to perform an amphibious raid 
defined as a type of amphibious operation involving swift incursion into or 
temporary occupation of an objective followed by a planned withdrawal.
37
  
5.      The amphibious force must be able to perform an amphibious assault 
defined as the principal type of amphibious operation that involves 
establishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore.
38
  
6.      The amphibious force must be able to perform an amphibious 
withdrawal defined as a type of amphibious operation involving the extraction 
of forces by sea in ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore. 
39
 
7.      The amphibious force must be able to provide amphibious support to 
other operations defined as a type of amphibious operation which contributes 
to conflict prevention or crisis mitigation. Amphibious support to other 
operations includes such operations as foreign humanitarian assistance, 
noncombatant evacuation operations or disaster relief.
40
 
2. Stakeholder Requirements 
8.      The amphibious force must be flexible, which is defined as the ability to 
independently perform the range of maritime operations (ROMO) in addition 
to the amphibious mission set. 
9.      Amphibious ships must be capable of independent operations defined as 
the ability to perform operations alone without the direct support of other 
naval ships excluding replenishment ships. 
10.  Fiscal restraints require that the alternatives be consistent with expected 
future defense budgets, the Department of the Navy’s annual shipbuilding 
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construction (SCN) budget must average no more than $15.9B per year FY10$ 
throughout the period of this report.
41
  
F. MOE/MOP GENERATION 
Measure of effectiveness (MOE) generation was rooted in the ten doctrinal and 
stakeholder requirements and addressed the functional analysis in that each MOE can be 
traced to at least one function, with the exception of the fiscal MOE which traces directly to a 
requirement. Each MOE is associated with at least one MOP, typically a rate or quantity.  
This list of MOEs and MOPs is representative, but not all-inclusive, of the list that should 
drive the design of any materiel solution. Those measures in italics were analyzed for in this 
project’s simulations.  
1. MOE and MOP List  
Troop Support 
  MOE: Ability to lift troops 
   MOP: Troop capacity 
   MOP: Troop Transfer Rate 
 Vehicle Capacity 
MOE: Ability to lift various USMC vehicles 
MOP: Vehicle square footage 
Cargo capacity 
MOE: Ability to carry cargo 
MOP: Cargo cubic footage 
MOP: Cargo Transfer Rate 
LCAC Capacity 
MOE: Ability to carry LCACs 
MOP: LCAC spots 
MOE: Ability to sustain LCACs  
 MOP: LCAC maintenance capacity 
 MOP: JP-5 capacity 
Aircraft Capacity 
MOE: Ability to carry aircraft 
MOP: Flight deck spots 
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MOP: Hangar spots 
MOP: Storage capacity 
MOE: Ability to sustain aircraft  
 MOP: Aircraft maintenance capacity 
 MOP: JP-5 capacity 
Medical Facilities 
MOE: Ability to provide medical/dental care 
MOP: Number of beds 
MOP: Number of operating rooms 
Command and Control 
MOE: C2 sufficient to perform the ROMO independently, as part of a larger 
task force including coalition forces 
 MOP: Number of available C2 paths 
 MOP: Percentage of interoperability with current systems. 
Self-Defense 
 MOE: Probability of Survival against selected threats 
MOP: Probability of kill (PK) of self-defense systems against air and 
surface threats 
Flexibility 
MOE: Ability to perform ROMO 
MOP: Number of missions able to perform 
MOE: Mobility and endurance to operate and sustain operations etc. 
MOP: Speed sufficient to operate and sustain operations as part of an 
ARG or ATF. 
MOP: Unrefueled range sufficient to operate and sustain operations as 
part of an ARG or ATF. 
Fiscal Constraint  
MOE:  Ability to procure ships at a cost not to exceed Navy planned budget. 
MOP:  Price per ship 
MOP:  Prospective O&S cost 
The project created models and simulations to analyze performance and focused on 
system throughput. Throughput was defined as either of the MOPs troop transfer rate or 
cargo transfer rate. 
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2. Traceability and Mapping 
The systems engineering process used was iterative and the functional definitions, 
requirements, and measures of effectiveness and performance evolved as the project 
progressed. A traceability matrix was developed to show the relationships between these 
fundamental products of the analysis. The matrix shown in Figure 11 illustrates the direct 
relationship the functional decomposition of amphibious operations has with the ten 
requirements. Every requirement relates to at least one function. The fiscal requirement is an 
exception as the total cost is the result of every decision made concerning a materiel solution. 
The end result of this phase of the project was the MOEs and MOPs that fed into the models 




























































































































Functional Decomposition of Amphibious 
Operations
X X X 1.0 Lift                                        X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X 1.1 Embark/Debark         X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X 1.2 Store                 X X X X X X X X X
X X X 1.3 Berth X X
X X X 1.4 Maneuver X X X
X X X X X X X X 2.0 Command X X
X X X X X X X X 3.0 Employ Forces X X
X X X X X X X X 3.1 Conduct Air Ops X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X 3.2 Conduct Surface Ops X X X X X X
X X X 3.3 Conduct Defensive Ops X X X X
X X X 3.4 Conduct Maintenance Ops X X X X X X X
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IV. SOLUTION DESIGN 
A. TRADE-SPACE 
Trade-space describes the realities wherein all requirements cannot be met because 
they are to some degree mutually exclusive. Either one requirement may preclude another or 
one requirement dictates another through some correlation. The measures against which the 
various alternatives were evaluated were determined in the previous section. The next step 
was to decide to what extent design parameters could be synthesized into a feasible solution. 
This required a deeper analysis of the need. The introduction to this report discussed the 
Navy’s desire to maintain an amphibious fleet of 33 ships. This number is partially based on 
the need to lift 2.0 MEBs utilizing equal numbers of the three types of ships (10 big decks, 10 
LPDs, 10 LSDs, and up to 3 unavailable). The following gap analysis examined the 2.0 MEB 
lift requirement with respect to the six lift footprints in order to determine where the greatest 
need existed. 
1. Gap Analysis 
The specific lift elements of a MEB can be defined in 6 footprints:  
 Troop berthing spots 
 Vehicle storage space square feet 
 Cargo storage cubic feet 
 JP-5 gallons 
 VTOL aircraft operating spots expressed in CH-46 equivalents 
 LCAC operating spots 
Each of these categories is more specifically defined in the Amphibious Ship 
Recapitalization Capabilities Based Assessment dated June 21, 2010. Troops include the total 
number of personnel, Marines and Naval Support Element (NSE) that require berthing. 
Vehicle square footage includes the footprint of vehicles, equipment, and cargo intended to be 
stowed in vehicles stowage areas. Cargo cubic footage includes the actual volume of the unit 
equipment, excluding equipment stowed with the vehicles, and sustainment and maintenance 
supplies associated with the units. Aircraft spots include the aircraft footprint on the flight 
deck/hangar bay and aviation logistics space required for aircraft maintenance and stowage. 
Aviation spots were measured in CH-46E equivalents. LCAC spots include the well deck 
spots for LCACs. Its replacement ship-to-shore connector (SSC) has the same footprint. JP-5 
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includes the fuel necessary for the MAGTF and NSE operations for a 5-day assault and 10 
days of sustained operations; it includes the LCAC, aircraft, and ground vehicle consumption. 
The amphibious classes of ship have the capacities for these footprints as displayed in Table 
5. 
Classes LHA 1 LHD 1 LHD 5 LHD 8 LHA 6 
LCAC 
(Spots)  
1 3 3 3 0 
Troops 
(Bunks) 
1,895 1,697 1,697 1,697 1,687 
Vehicle     
(Sq. 
Feet) 
23,227 17,674 17,674 17,674 10,328 
Cargo         
(Cu. 
Feet) 




68.41 81.15 81.15 81.15 87.15 
JP-5   
(Gallons)  
407,970 478,872 478,872 478,872 1,300,000 




LPD 4 LPD 17 LSD 41 LSD 49 
LCAC 
(Spots)  
2 1 2 4 2 
Troops 
(Bunks) 
1,462 659 698 403 406 
Vehicle     
(Sq. 
Feet) 
16,000 11,074 20,880 17,266 17,599 
Cargo         
(Cu. 
Feet) 




97.08 5.2 8.91 0 0 
JP-5   
(Gallons)  
585,000 299,997 318,308 52,160 53,230 
Table 5. Class Capacities (Follows 42) 
The following charts are the result of the combination of the Navy’s 30-year 
shipbuilding plan and the lift footprint capacities of the various classes shown above. The 
total lift capacity of the amphibious fleet was determined by summing individual ship 
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capacities for the number of ships defined by the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan. The 
charts illustrate the lift capability gap that occurs over time. To show the lift gap that will 
exist as a result of the LSD-41 and 49 class decommissioning, the analysis ignored a 
replacement class ship. Changes in the total lift capability are the result of all classes 
decommissioning per the schedule and the procurement of the LPD-17 San Antonio Class 
and LHA-8 America Class ships. For reference, three horizontal lines are illustrated to 




Figure 12.   LCAC Lift Gap with LSD Phase-out 
 
The LCAC lift capacity of the amphibious fleet is well above the requirement into the 
2030s. LCACs are a vital component of amphibious ship effectiveness, as demonstrated in 
the recent failures and subsequent redesign of LHA-6. Figure 12 shows the design of the 
Harpers Ferry Class with well-deck space for two LCACs may be preferred to the Whidbey 




































Figure 13.   Troop Lift Gap with LSD Phase-out 
 
The Troop lift capacity of the amphibious fleet is well above the requirement until 
2040. The amphibious fleet exists primarily to deliver Marines onto hostile shores, but Figure 
13 shows no great need exists to improve upon the current troop lift capabilities.  
 
 
Figure 14.   Vehicle Lift Gap with LSD Phase-out 
 
The Vehicle lift capacity of the amphibious fleet never meets the threshold to lift even 
1.5 MEBs as shown in Figure 14. Any new-construction materiel solution should address this 


































































Figure 15.   Aviation Lift Gap with LSD Phase-out 
 
The Aviation lift capacity of the amphibious fleet is currently just beginning to meet 
the requirement. Figure 15 shows that even with the retirement of the LSD-41 and 49 class 
ships, this lost lift capacity is more than made up for with the planned procurement of six 
LHA-8 class ships. 
 
 



































































Similar to the Aviation lift capacity, the Cargo lift capacity of the amphibious fleet 




Figure 17.   JP-5 Lift Gap with LSD Phase-out 
 
The JP-5 lift capacity of the amphibious fleet shown in Figure 17 never meets the 
threshold to lift 1.5 MEBs. This is mitigated by the existence of at-sea refueling assets, but 

































Figure 18.   O&S Decrease with LSD Phase-out 
 
Operating and Support (O&S) costs are not one of the six amphibious lift footprints 
but were analyzed for general comparison purposes of proposed alternatives. Figure 18 shows 
that over the next ten years, the annual O&S costs of the amphibious fleet are expected to 
hover around $3 billion. 
2. Identified Trade Spaces 
The following two major trade-spaces were identified investigating design parameters 
for potential alternatives: 
 Lift Capability vs. Size of Ship vs. Cost of Ship 
 Cargo Capacity vs. Vehicle Capacity 
The first is larger ships typically cost more money. Fulfilling the entirety of the 
defined lift requirements, particularly for vehicle square footage, would require either a ship 
of proportions closer to LHAs and LHDs or a greater number of small ships. To address this 
tradeoff, new construction solutions of various sizes were considered. The second major 
trade-space involved the utilization of interior ship space, looking specifically at what 
percentage of the ship should be dedicated to cargo cubic footage and what percentage to 
vehicle square footage. It is also important to note that vehicle square footage may be used 
























Total O&S Cost 
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B. ALTERNATIVE GENERATION   
In determining alternatives, the project team sought to satisfy many criteria to include 
using creative thinking to address this very complex problem. These criteria include but were 
not limited to: 
 Is the alternative feasible, meaning does it meet the primary requirements of 
the amphibious fleet? 
 Is the alternative clearly distinct from the other alternatives? 
 Does the alternative appear to address all the functions? 
 Do the alternatives investigate the trade-spaces? 
The following six alternatives, or options, were evaluated: 
 Option 1- LPD-17: This alternative would maintain an open San-Antonio class 
production line open and replace the decommissioning LSD class ships with 
11 LPDs.  
 Option 2 - LSD(X) clean sheet design: This alternative would be comparable 
in size to the current Whidbey Island (LSD-49) class and would replace the 
decommissioning class with 11 new LSD(X) ships. 
 Option 3 - LSD(XB) clean sheet design: A new ship larger than the current 
classes, but smaller than an LPD would mitigate lift capability gaps to a 
greater extent than the LSD(X). It would replace the retiring class with 11 
LSD(XB) ships. 
 Option 4 – LPD(17) Flt X: This alternative would take advantage of the 
construction line for LPD-17s but would redesign the LPD utilizing the same 
hull while investigating the trade-space between cargo and vehicle capacity. It 
would replace the decommissioning class with 11 LPD(17) Flt X ships. 
Each of these four alternatives would maintain a 33 ship amphibious fleet. Two other 
options were analyzed to challenge the notions of current fleet architectures. A “Big Deck 
Solution” and “All LPD-17 Solution” analyze the feasibility of ARG or ATF architectures 
drastically different from today’s model. 
 Option 5- LHA-8: This alternative would procure 4 America class ships, in 
addition to the 6 planned for procurement. It posits the possibility of an ARG 
composed of two big decks. More LHDs could also be procured in the future. 
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 Option 6 – All LPD-17: This alternative supposes a procurement of 19 LPDs. 
It supposes turning away from the procurement of future big deck ships to 
analyze the performance of a fleet composed of only small deck ships. 
The chosen specifications for the new design alternatives, Options 2, 3, and 4, are 
defined in Table 6: 
 
Footprints LSD(X) LSD(XB) LPD(17) Flt X 
LCAC     2 2 2 
Troops  200 530 400 
Vehicle       20,000 23,000 28,000 
Cargo          5,100 66,000 15,000 
Aviation  4.91 6.91 8.91 
JP-5    100,000 150,000 318,308 
Table 6. Alternative Specs 
Defining the lift capacities of the proposed LSD(X), LSD(XB), and LPD(17) Flt X 
displayed in Table 6 was completed as follows: 
1. The LSD(X) design was based on a ship similar in size to the LSD-49 with added 
aviation capability. It explored the trade-space between cargo and vehicle capacity. 
LSD(X) = (Beam/Length/Displacement)(90 ft. / 602 ft. / 17,500 tons) 
a. LCAC Spots - Nominal modeling solution. 
b. Troops – Decreased to eliminate excess troop capacity shown in gap analysis. 
c. Vehicle – Same as LSD-41 class; deemed acceptable due to current gap.  
d. Cargo – In between LSD-41 and 49 classes in attempt to close expected gap. 
e. Aviation – Increased from 0 of current LSD-41 and 49 classes; necessary to 
support independent operations. 
f. JP-5 – Increase of 46,770 gal from LSD-49 to support increase in Aviation 
capacity and decrease current JP-5 gap. 
2. The LSD(XB) design was based on a 30% increase similar to that observed between 
the LDP-4 and LPD-17 classes. 
LSD(XB) = (Beam/Length/Displacement)(94 ft. / 678 ft. / 21,600 tons) 
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a. LCAC Spots - Nominal modeling solution. 
b. Troops – Increase based on 30% historic ship size increase. 
c. Vehicle – Increase based on 30% historic ship size increase. 
d. Cargo – Increase based on 30% historic ship size increase. 
e. Aviation – Increase to 6.9 from 0 of current LSD-41 and 49 classes; necessary 
to support independent operations and larger platform. 
f. JP-5 – Increase of 50,000 gal from LSD(X) to support increase in Aviation 
capacity and decrease current JP-5 gap. 
3. The LPD(17) Flt X design was based on the hull design and measurements of the 
current San Antonio class and explored the trade-space between cargo and vehicle 
capacity 
LPD(17) Flt X = (Beam/Length/Displacement)( 105 ft. / 684 ft. / 25,000 tons) 
a. LCAC Spots - Nominal modeling solution. 
b. Troops – Decreased to eliminate excess troop capacity shown in gap analysis. 
c. Vehicle - Increase from LPD-17 class to support closing Vehicle capacity gap. 
d. Cargo – Decrease from current LPD-17 class to support increase in Vehicle 
capacity. 
e. Aviation – Same as LPD-17 Aviation capacity. 
f. JP-5 – Equal to current LPD-17 JP-5 storage capacity. 
The six options also defined seventeen alternative ARG architectures that were 
analyzed separately where appropriate or collectively within their respective options. Each 
option contains multiple ARG architecture possibilities based on the current and future 
amphibious ship classes.  Three ship combinations were selected for Options 1 through 4 to 
match current practice. Possible ARG architectures for Options 5 and 6 were limited to those 
with annual Operating and Support costs equivalent to or cheaper than current costs. This 
resulted in two-ship combinations for Option 5. Only a five-ship combination for Option 6 
was analyzed. Each of the seventeen ARG architectures is listed below.  
1. LSD phase out 
o Replace LSDs by building more LPD-17s (Option #1) 
 LHD, LPD-17, LPD-17 
 LHA (R), LPD-17, LPD-17 




2. LSD (X)  
o Build a clean sheet LSD (X) (Option #2) 
 LHD, LPD-17, LSD (X) 
 LHA (R), LPD-17, LSD (X) 
 LHA-1, LPD-17, LSD (X) 
3. LSD (XB)  
o Build a clean sheet LSD (XB) (Option #3) 
 LHD, LPD-17, LSD (XB) 
 LHA (R), LPD-17, LSD (XB) 
 LHA-1, LPD-17, LSD (XB) 
4. LPD(17) Flt X 
o  Build a modified LPD-17, to replace current LSDs (Option #4) 
 LHD, LPD-17, LPD(17) Flt X 
 LHA (R), LPD-17, LPD(17) Flt X 
 LHA-1, LPD-17, LPD(17) Flt X 
5. All Big Deck 
o Build more LHA  (Option #5) 
 LHD, LHD 
 LHD, LHA-1 
 LHD, LHA (R)  
 LHA (R), LHA-1 
6. All Small Deck Option 
o LPD-17s only (Option #6) 
 LPD-17, LPD-17, LPD-17, LPD-17, LPD-17 
Noticeably absent are the first two America Class ships LHA-6 and 7, which were 
designed and built without a well deck. Despite the tremendous lift capacity of these two 
ships, the project team did not analyze them for inclusion in future ARG architectures. LPD-4 
class ships are retired before these six options come into effect and were thus disregarded in 
the analysis. 
The six options and seventeen ARG architectures are the product of the systems 
engineering process. They were compared and evaluated against each other with respect to 
lift capability and performance in accordance with the defined MOEs and MOPs, and then 
later compared with respect to cost and risk. 
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V. PERFORMANCE DECISION ANALYSIS  
A. ARG AND MEU ANALYSIS 
To allow for comparison, the capability gaps of each of the alternatives were 
measured against a standard. This standard was a mix of the MEU requirement and current 
best lift capabilities of the baseline architecture. The lift requirements for LCACs and Troops 
remained at the USMC lift requirement to avoid any biasing or reward for exceeding the 
MEU lift requirement. The Vehicle, Cargo, Aviation and JP-5 standards were all set below 
the MEU lift requirement at the current capability of today’s best baseline architecture. The 







Vehicle     
(Sq Ft) 
Cargo        
(Cu Ft) 
Aviation 
(MH 60 Eq) 




6 2578 88640 227048 104.22 1592344 
LHD, LPD 17, 
LSD 49 
7 2801 56153 209700 90 850410 
Table 7. ARG/MEU Comparison Chart 
The footprint lift capacities for the seventeen alternate ARG architectures according 




  ARG Configurations  LCAC Troops Vehicles Cargo Aviation JP-5  









LHD, LPD-17, LPD-17 7 3093 59434 193000 98.97 1115488 
LHA(R), LPD-17, LPD-17 6 2858 57760 198000 114.9 1221616 









LHA-1, LPD-17, LSD(X) 5 2793 64107 145000 82.23 826278 
LHA(R), LPD-17, LSD(X) 6 2360 56880 169100 110.9 1003308 









LHA-1, LPD-17, LSD(XB) 5 3123 67107 205900 84.23 876278 
LHA(R), LPD-17, 
LSD(XB) 6 2690 59880 230000 112.9 1053308 









LHA-1, LPD-17, LPD(17) 
Flt X 5 2993 72107 154900 86.23 1044586 
LHA(R), LPD-17, LPD(17) 
Flt X 6 2560 64880 179000 114.9 1221616 
LHD, LPD-17, LPD(17) 








 LHD, LHD 6 3394 35348 250000 162.3 957744 
LHD, LHA-1 4 3592 40901 230900 149.56 886842 
LHD, LHA(R)  5 3159 33674 255000 178.23 1063872 
LHA(R), LHA-1 3 3357 39227 235900 165.49 992970 
#6 LPD-17 x 5 10 3490 104400 170000 44.55 1591540 
Table 8. MEU Lift Comparison 
The comparison of each ARG architecture to the developed standard is shown in 
Table 9. Negative numbers highlighted in red show a deficiency with respect to LCACs and 




  ARG Configurations  LCAC   Troops Vehicles Cargo  Aviation JP-5  









LHD, LPD-17, LPD-17 17% 20% 6% -8% 10% 31% 
LHA(R), LPD-17, LPD-17 0% 11% 3% -6% 28% 44% 









LHA-1, LPD-17, LSD(X) -17% 8% 14% -31% -9% -3% 
LHA(R), LPD-17, LSD(X) 0% -8% 1% -19% 23% 18% 









LHA-1, LPD-17, LSD(XB) -17% 21% 20% -2% -6% 3% 
LHA(R), LPD-17, LSD(XB) 0% 4% 7% 10% 25% 24% 








 LHA-1, LPD-17, LPD(17 
FLX) -17% 16% 28% -26% -4% 23% 
LHA(R), LPD-17, LPD(17 
FLX) 0% -1% 16% -15% 28% 44% 








 LHD, LHD 0% 32% -37% 19% 80% 13% 
LHD, LHA-1 -33% 39% -27% 10% 66% 4% 
LHD, LHA(R)  -17% 23% -40% 22% 98% 25% 
LHA(R), LHA-1 -50% 30% -30% 12% 84% 17% 
#6 LPD-17 x 5 67% 35% 86% -19% -51% 87% 
Table 9.  MEU Lift Comparison by Percentage 
These percentage comparisons were then compiled into rankings according to each 
footprint. For example, each of the seventeen ARG architectures has capacity of 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
or 10 LCACs. The architecture with ten was assigned a ranking of 1 and those with four all 
tied for 2nd. JP-5 was not considered a significant factor for this portion of the analysis and 
was removed from consideration. Rankings across the footprints were added to give a rank 
sum category for each ARG architecture. The lowest score identified the architecture with the 




ARG Configurations LCAC Troops Vehicles Cargo Aviation 
Rank 
Sum 
LHD, LHD 3 3 16 2 3 27 
LHD, LHA-1 5 1 14 4 4 28 
LHD, LHA(R)  4 6 17 1 1 29 
LHA(R), LHA-1 6 4 15 3 2 30 
LPD-17 x 5 1 2 1 13 15 32 
LHD, LPD-17, LSD(XB) 2 10 7 5 9 33 
LHA-1, LPD-17, LSD(XB) 4 7 3 7 13 34 
LHA(R), LPD-17, LSD(XB) 3 14 8 4 6 35 
LHD, LPD-17, LPD-17 2 8 9 9 8 36 
LHA(R), LPD-17, LPD-17 3 11 11 8 5 38 
LHD, LPD-17, LPD(17), FLT X 2 13 4 11 8 38 
LHA-1, LPD-17, LPD-17 4 5 5 12 12 38 
LHA(R), LPD-17, LPD(17) FLT X 3 16 5 10 5 39 
LHA-1, LPD-17, LPD(17) FLT X 4 9 2 15 12 42 
LHD, LPD-17, LSD-49  2 12 13 6 11 44 
LHD, LPD-17, LSD(X) 2 15 10 14 10 51 
LHA(R), LPD-17, LSD(X) 3 17 12 13 7 52 
LHA-1, LPD-17, LSD(X) 4 13 6 16 14 53 
Table 10. Un-weighted MEU Lift Rank 
The average sum rank for each option was calculated for the final MEU lift 
comparison. The two top performers were Option 5: the all Big Deck alternative, and Option 
6: the all Small Deck LPD-17 alternative. These ARG architectures do not currently deploy 
in the fleet. The entire rankings are shown in Table 11: 
 
Alternative # Rank 
Big Deck 5 28.50 
Small Deck 6 32.00 
LSD (XB) 3 34.00 
LPD-17 1 37.33 
LPD (17) Flt X 4 39.67 
Baseline   44.00 
LSD (X) 2 52.00 
Table 11. MEU Lift Un-weighted Ranks 
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As all lift footprints are not perfectly equal to one another, a weighting factor 
developed by the project team was assigned to each. LCACs were deemed the most important 
as they represent the fundamental method of amphibious delivery. The other weighting 
factors are shown in Table 12. 
 
Footprint LCAC Troops Vehicles Cargo Aviation 
Weighting 1.00 0.85 0.75 0.90 0.60 
Table 12.  Footprint Weights 
These weighting factors were applied to the original percentage differences as 
compared to the standard thereby placing greater emphasis on meeting the LCAC 
requirement than the vehicle requirement and so forth. The weighted rankings are shown in 
Table 13. 
ARG Configurations  LCAC   Troops Vehicles Cargo  Aviation Sum 
LHD, LPD-17, LPD-17 2 8 9 8 8 35 
LHA(R), LPD-17, LPD-17 3 11 11 7 5 37 
LHA-1, LPD-17, LPD-17 4 5 5 10 11 35 
LHA-1, LPD-17, LSD(X) 4 12 6 14 13 49 
LHA(R), LPD-17, LSD(X) 3 16 12 11 7 49 
LHD, LPD-17, LSD(X) 3 14 10 12 10 49 
LHA-1, LPD-17, LSD(XB) 4 7 3 6 12 32 
LHA(R), LPD-17, LSD(XB) 3 13 8 4 6 34 
LHD, LPD-17, LSD(XB) 2 10 7 5 9 33 
LHA-1, LPD-17, LPD(17) 
FLT X  4 9 2 13 11 39 
LHA(R), LPD-17, LPD(17) 
FLT X  3 15 5 9 5 37 
LHD, LPD-17, LPD(17)  FLT 
X 2 12 4 10 8 36 
LHD, LHD 3 3 15 2 3 26 
LHD, LHA-1 5 1 13 4 4 27 
LHD, LHA(R)  4 6 16 1 1 28 
LHA(R), LHA-1 6 4 14 3 2 29 
LPD-17 x 5 1 2 1 11 14 29 
 
Table 13. Weighted MEU Lift Rank
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Applying the weighting factors to the analysis did not affect the ranked order of the 
alternatives, but did increase the margin by which Options 5 and 6 stood out as shown in 
Table 14: 
Alternative # Rank 
Big Deck 5 27.50 
Small Deck 6 29.00 
LSD (XB) 3 33.00 
LPD-17 1 35.67 
LPD (17) Flt X 4 37.33 
LSD (X) 2 49.00 
Table 14. MEU Lift Weighted Ranks 
Figure 19 gives a visual representation of the change in lift capability compared to the 
standard for each option. Each option can lift more of a MEU than the standard with the 
exception of the LSD(X). 
 





















































B. ATF AND MEB ANALYSIS 
In the same manner as the gap analysis was performed, each of the six options was 
analyzed for overall MEB lift capability. The MEU and MEB lift requirements represent a 
roughly scalable problem, so the methodology of the analysis was conducted in a different 
manner from the MEU analysis. Because the 2.0 MEB lift requirement applies to the entirety 
of the amphibious fleet, not individual ARG architectures, the MEB lift analysis was instead 
illustrated over decades. Each of the six options assumed a procurement schedule detailed in 
the cost portion of the report (Section III). Using this procurement schedule and the defined 
lift footprints, analysis of MEB lift capacity was conducted. 
 
 
Figure 20.   Alternatives Comparison – LCAC 
Figure 20 depicts the difference in LCAC carrying capacity that develops when the 
alternative solutions come on line in the 2020s. All options are equal with the exception of 
Option 5: the all Big Deck alternative, which would drop below the requirement in the late 






































Figure 21.   Alternative Comparison – Cargo 
 
Figure 21 depicts a difference of cargo carrying capacity for each option with a 




Figure 22.   Alternative Comparison – Troop 
Figure 22 depicts a difference of troop carrying capacity for each option with Option 








































































Figure 23.   Alternative Comparison – Aviation 
Figure 23 depicts a difference of aviation carrying capacity for each option with 
Option 5: the Big Deck alternative, significantly outperforming all other options.  
 
 
Figure 24.   Alternative Comparison – Vehicle 
Figure 24 shows that no option analyzed will meet the required 2.0 MEB lift 
requirement for vehicle carrying capacity. The Big Deck alternative (Option 5) performs the 












































































Figure 25.   Alternative Comparison - JP-5 
The graph depicts a difference of JP-5 carrying capacity for each option. All options 
increase the capacity over current levels. 
To combine the comparisons of alternatives across the footprint categories, the MEB 
analysis used the same weighting order as the MEU analysis. The order of footprint 
importance was stated as LCAC capacity, cargo capacity, troop capacity, aviation capacity, 
vehicle capacity and finally JP-5 capacity. The six options were ranked from best to worst in 
each category based on lift capacity in year 2042. The remaining options were then ranked in 
each category and summed as shown in Table 15. The final result was that LPD-17 option 
was deemed best, LPD(17) Flt X second, LSD (XB) third, LSD (X) fourth, and Big deck last. 
  LPD-17 LSD(X) LSD(XB) LPD(17) FLT X Big Deck Small Deck 
LCAC 2 2 2 2 3 1 
Cargo 3 6 1 4 2 5 
Troops 1 5 3 4 3 2 
Aviation 2 4 3 2 1 5 
Vehicle 4 5 3 2 6 1 
JP-5 2 5 4 3 2 1 
SUM 14 27 16 17 17 15 

































C. SIMULATION DESIGN 
1. Purpose 
The goal of simulation was to gain insight regarding the operational effects caused by 
adding or removing lift capability from an ARG and/or a platform within an ARG such as the 
LSD.   This enabled decisions to be made regarding how much lift capacity a prospective 
follow-on ship to the current LSD classes would need in order to maintain or exceed current 
operational capability.  
The simulation was constructed to model the high level aspects of amphibious 
operations only. Namely, throughput was the measure the model was designed to examine. 
As discussed in the MOE Generation Section, throughput was the number of troops and cargo 
an ARG was able to transfer between the ships and beach per unit time. Therefore, the 
Measures of Performance (MOP) extracted from the simulation were the number of troops 
transported per hour (MOPt) and the cargo square footage transported per hour (MOPc).  
These two MOPs were used to evaluate the effectiveness of each configuration under the 
assault and HADR scenarios.   
2. Parameters 
The simulation was built using ExtenSim8 software. Its features were leveraged to 
produce a discrete event queuing model that simulated the interactions between the ships and 
connecters to shore that occur during an amphibious operation. The model was created such 
that the user could manipulate the following variables influencing throughput: 
 Number of LCACs 
 Number of A/C (CH-53 equivalency) 
 Number of A/C spots 
 Transit time (A/C and LCAC) 
 Total Troop Capacity 
 Total Cargo Capacity (sq. ft.)43 
 Total JP-5 Capacity (gallons) 
 Transit time for either platform (triangular distributions) 
                                                 
43
 Information gathered for amphibious ships’ cargo capacity and vehicle capacity were typically given in 
two different units from various sources: cubic ft. and square ft. respectively. Therefore, the decision was made 
to assume that cargo storage spaces were 10 ft. high in order to convert cubic ft. to square ft.   
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The remaining variables were hard-programmed into the simulation. Although the 
following variables were adjustable if necessary, the Design of Experiment (DOE) was not 
constructed in a manner that would investigate a range of values for these factors: 
 LCAC Ao  = .85 
 A/C Ao  = .5 
 LCAC JP-5 consumption rate =  1250 gallons /hr. 
 A/C  JP-5 consumption rate =  441.75 gallons /hr. 
 LCAC load time = triangular distribution 
o Most Frequent  =43 min 
o Min = 33 min 
o Max = 180 min 
 LCAC unload time = triangular distribution 
o Most Frequent  = 19 min 
o Min = 12 min 
o Max = 30 min 
 LCAC refueling time = triangular distribution 
o Most Frequent = 15 min 
o Min = 10 min 
o Max = 30 min 
 A/C load time = triangular distribution 
o Most Frequent  = 5 min 
o Min = 2 min  
o Max = 15 min 
  A/C unload time = triangular distribution 
o Most Frequent  = 3 min 
o Min = 2 min 
o Max = 5 min 
 A/C Refueling time = triangular distribution 
o Most Frequent = 15 min 
o Min = 10 min 
o Max = 30 min 
 Repair times for either platform = 120 min 
All of the values for these parameters were gathered from unclassified sources such as 
UNCLAS DOD publications, NATOPs manuals and Subject Matter Experts’ (SME) 
operational experience. Brief sensitivity analysis was conducted upon the completion of 
model construction to assess the potential bias that inaccurate parameters would inflict on the 
results. The differences found by changing the parameters by 50% in either direction had 
negligible effects. Changing the parameter values altered the magnitude of the results, 
however, the same trends in the data were observed. Since the purpose of this simulation was 
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to examine points of diminishing return by adding or subtracting lift capabilities from an 
ARG, the end time value recorded was not significant in itself. Rather, the point where added 
capability did not yield a higher observed rate of transfer was meaningful. 
3. Process 
For the purposes of the experiment, ExtendSim8 items were used to represent LCACs 
and CH-53s transiting between the ARG ships and shore. The fundamental sequence was 
simple: (1) LCACs and CH-53s, used as connectors, started at the ship and loaded cargo, (2) 
transited to the beach once all of the cargo was loaded, (3) unloaded the cargo, and (4) 
returned to the ship.  While returning to the ship there was a chance the connector would need 
repairs in accordance with the platform’s operational availability (Ao). If it needed repairs, it 
would experience a two-hour delay before rejoining the other connectors transporting goods. 
If the connector needed fuel, it would experience a refueling delay in accordance with the 
platform type before reloading and transiting again. Before each connector loaded, it checked 
the amount of cargo or troops left to carry to the beach. If nothing was left to transport the 
connector was stowed. Figure 26 is a process model that represents the simulation’s 
algorithm. 
 




a. Data Input 
As previously noted, the simulation was constructed in a manner that allowed 
a user to manipulate the parameters as necessary to gain insights on amphibious operations. 
There were two ways in which parameter data could be entered into the simulation. Method 1 
involved manually changing the simulation blocks’ parameters to fit the needs of a user. All 
of the parameters that were deemed dynamic to any degree were gathered into a Notebook. 
The Notebook is a feature in the software that allowed a user quick access to the fields for 
various blocks that manipulate parameters as shown in Figure 27. 
 
Figure 27.   Example of Parameter Entry Point via Notebook Feature 
 
Method 2 differed in the sense that the parameters were assigned values from 
an “input database.”  The advantage of this method will be discussed below.  
b. Data Output 
The results of each simulation run total time to completion were written to an 
output database. If the simulation ran 50 times, then 50 rows of completion times were stored 
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in the output database. These figures were based on the design inputs Method 1 or 2 and 
saved for further analysis in the following section (Chapter V Section D). 
4. Execution 
There were two versions of the model. The only difference between the two versions 
was in the data input. Version 1 supported Method 1 of data input. This result of initial model 
development allowed a user to input any values that represented a given ARG Architecture.  
This version was used to investigate the points of inflection in order to determine design 
parameters for the chosen alternatives. Version 2 used Method 2 of data input. This method 
allowed a user to feed mass quantities of parameters from a database into the simulation. 
Each row of the database shown in Figure 28 represented inputs associated with the given 
architecture that was examined.  
 
Figure 28.   Database of Alternate ARG Architecture Parameters 
This method of input facilitated the use of a Design of Experiments (DOE) that 
allowed for the examination of ranges for each of the variables that are discussed in the 
analysis of Section L. This method also allowed for many specific ARG architectures to be 
examined without having to manually input the data each time the need arose to investigate a 
new ARG.   
Two create blocks worked in parallel and had their own sequence of blocks that 
followed the process flow described above. Each create block injected a predetermined 
number of items that represented either LCACs or CH-53’s based on data input parameters. 
After item initialization, the items loaded cargo or troops by taking resources from resource 
pools that contained the total amount of troops or cargo present in a given ARG architecture.  
This was the first point in which items experience queuing behavior. The maximum number 
of items that could be loaded at a time was constrained by the maximum number of loading 
spots for the platform type in a given ARG architecture. Therefore, if all of the loading spots 
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were full, additional empty connectors waited to load in a queue. The loading process for 
either platform was altogether simulated by attaching a resource queue to an activity block. 
 
Figure 29.   Cargo Load and Delay Method 
This combination simulated what fundamentally happens when LCACs or aircraft 
load. Cargo is being taken, which the resource queue block on the left of Figure 29 
represents, and time transpires while the loading takes place, which is represented by the 
activity block on the right. Each item took the maximum amount of troops or cargo the 
platform it represented could carry until either resource had dropped below the max load. At 
this point the simulation was designed to inform the next item due to load only to carry what 
remained. This was done via an equation block that allowed code to be programmed into the 
simulation. Any item still looking to load cargo would see that resources were depleted and 
would exit the simulation.   
The round trip of the connectors between ships and shore was represented by activity 
blocks that delayed the item from moving for a set period of time. Transit times were an input 
variable. The user could manipulate the transit times according to a desired distance from 
land, either directly at the activity blocks or through database input for Version 2. Platforms 
would pass through the repair loop in accordance with the set Ao of each platform. The Ao 
values were set in decision blocks directly following the off-load activity block. The Ao was 
used to represent the probability that a connector would be able to transport cargo to and from 
the ship. A random number generator embedded in the software directed the item to either 
proceed on the normal path or to proceed to a repair path as shown in Figure 30. 
 
Figure 30.   Failure Decision 
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There was no maximum number of platforms that could be repaired simultaneously. 
Each time a craft passed through this loop, the refuel time was reset as the team assumed a 
craft would take advantage of this staging time to refuel as well as repair as shown in Figure 
31.  
 
Figure 31.   Repair Loop 
Platforms’ fuel levels were tracked by tracking the time that had elapsed since a 
particular platform had refueled. All items were initialized at the beginning of the simulation 
as having zero minutes since last refueling. The time for each item was tracked in an attribute 
set to each item. Once the time reached a platform’s max time to refuel, the platform went 
through the refueling loop of the simulation, shown in Figure 32, before rejoining the off-load 
effort.   
  
Figure 32.    Refueling Loop 
The method that accounted for crafts’ refueling and the time delay associated with 
refueling was constructed in the same manner as the load delay. Each platform that refueled 
received fuel from a JP-5 resource pool. The amount of JP-5 in the pool was consistent with 
the amount carried by the ARG architecture being analyzed. The maximum amount of 
connectors that could refuel simultaneously was equal to the amount of launch spots there 
were in the simulation. However, a connector did not use a launch spot in this simulation 
when refueling. In essence, this implied that one connector could refuel while another loaded 
and launched simultaneously for every launch spot in the ARG.     
Items that returned to the blocks representing the ship passed through a “stuff left” 
check to ensure there were items remaining to transport. If there were not, the item exited the 
simulation. When the last item exited the simulation the final stowage time was recorded.  
This represented the total time the simulation took to empty all of the contents of the vessel 
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ashore and transit back to the ship. The completion time was written to a database. Each row 
in the database represented a time associated with a given simulation run number. 
5. Assumptions 
There were many assumptions that must be noted in order to provide the strengths and 
limitations of this model. The assumptions may have led to shorter overall completion times, 
but this should not have significantly influenced the relationships between the sets of factors 
examined.   
Operational Availability: System failures were not taken into account until the 
connector was returning to its ship. The simulation assumed that any malfunction en route to 
or from the shore would be tolerable until the ship is reached.  
Maintenance: The model assumed that each time a vessel needed repair it would be 
refueled in the process. Therefore, each time an item broke down and went through the repair 
loop it also received JP-5 from the resource pool and had its refueling clock reset.   
Aircraft: All aircraft contributing to lift were converted to CH-53 equivalent aircraft. 
This conversion served two purposes. In most cases, the publications used to determine the 
lift capacities of the ship provided aircraft capacities in a specific platform equivalency.  
Therefore, the CH-53 equivalencies provided by the 2010 Amphibious Ship Recapitalization 
CBA conducted by OPNAV N8F in conjunction from information acquired from Jane’s 
Fighting Ships and the Federation of American Scientists were used in the simulation and 
other facets of the project where aircraft lift capability was examined. The aircraft 
equivalencies provided by the sources indicated how many spots one aircraft may use when 
compared to a base aircraft. With that, the assumption was made that the lift capacity 
equivalencies were equal to the spot equivalencies.   
D. SIMULATION ANALYSIS 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of the Performance and Effectiveness Analysis was to examine the data 
provided by the simulation in order to answer the following major questions: 
1. Which of the seventeen derived ARG Architecture performed the best in a 
given scenario? 
2. Which design trade-space factors influenced the results the most?  
3. Which lift capability combination was associated with the most robust, 
theoretical ARG Architecture the Navy could achieve? 
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An initial set of data was extracted using Version 1 of the simulation discussed above. 
This first data set was used to examine the effects of adding lift capability to an ARG. Points 
of diminishing returns point to an optimum number that maximizes capability. Subsequently, 
lift capability design considerations were scoped for both the potential new construction 
designs (Options 2, 3, and 4) and proposed ARG configurations using these results. 
Simulation results were used to aid in the design of the new construction alternatives as well 
as aid in comparing all the alternatives in common scenarios. To aid in alternative design, the 
point examined was the point of diminishing returns in the mean total completion time, in 
hours, which referred to the mean time elapsed for a number of simulation runs with specific 
input settings. The quantity for design factors were adjusted one at a time while holding other 
design factors constant in order to extrapolate the effects caused by changing a given factor. 
Table 16 shows the effects of adding LCACs to an ARG: 
 
Figure 33.   Mean Completion Times for LCACs 
Figure 33 shows a clear point of diminishing capability returns at around six LCACs 
in a three ship ARG carrying the requisite amount of Marines and their equipment making a 

































Figure 34.   Mean Completion Time for Aircraft 
Figure 34 shows a clear point of diminishing returns as aircraft are added to an ARG 
at around 27 CH-53 equivalent aircraft. It is important to note that these results represent 
aircraft directly contributing to offloading troops and cargo. Harriers, Cobras and Join Strike 
Fighters were disregarded.   
As a result, there is little to no utility in adding 7 or more LCACs or 28 or more CH-
53 equivalent aircrafts to improve an ARG’s lift capability. This effort assisted the team in 
constructing 17 different ARG architectures bounded by these constraints that were analyzed 
as potential solutions to the problem statement. When the four current ARG architectures are 
included, 21 architectures are compared. 
For each design point, a total of three hundred simulation runs were made for two 
different simulated ARG distances from shore: near and far.  An ARG’s distance was 
simulated by adjusting the transit times associated with both LCACs and Aircraft.  The transit 
times chosen reflect reasonable minimum and maximum distances, 3 and 10 miles, between 
an operating ARG and the shore.  This step was implemented in order to account for possible 
performance effects caused by changing transit time.   
The key data collected from each run was the time it took to unload all troops and 
cargo associated with an ARG configuration. With three hundred observations collected for 
each ARG configuration, the mean time to unload all troops and cargo was a reasonably 
accurate, unbiased estimator of the true mean. Table 16 summarizes the design points for the 
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7 2925 84054 46.52 947180 13 
14. 
LHA-1, LPD-17, 
LPD(17) FLT X 
5 2993 87597 41.37 1044586 13 
15. 
LHA(R), LPD-17, 
LPD(17) FLT X 
6 2560 82780 55.12 1221616 13 
16. 
LHD, LPD-17, 
LPD(17) FLT X 
7 2795 83954 47.48 1115488 13 
17. LHD, LHD 6 3394 60348 77.86 957744 18 
18. LHD, LHA-1 4 3592 63991 71.75 886842 18 
19. LHD, LHA(R)  5 3159 59174 85.51 1063872 18 
20. LHA(R), LHA-1 3 3357 62817 79.39 992970 18 
21. LPD-17 x 5 10 3490 121400 21.37 1591540 10 





As discussed in the scoping portion of the introduction and described in the CONOPs 
section of the report, the project team focused on two distinct scenarios and MOPs for 
alternative evaluation and comparison. 
a. Assault Scenario 
In an assault scenario, the measure of effectiveness was assumed to be the 
time it took to unload all troops on the shore. Therefore, a troop-unloading rate was 
calculated utilizing the following formula: 
 
 
A higher troop rate was preferred to a lower troop rate. 
b. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Scenario 
In a HA/DR scenario, the key performance indicator was assumed to be the 
time it took to unload all cargo on shore. Therefore, a cargo-unloading rate was calculated via 
the following formula: 
 
 
A higher cargo rate was preferred to a lower cargo rate. 
3. Methodology 
To ascertain the performance for each ARG configuration under the different 
scenarios, a ranking and selection procedure outlined by Rinott was performed.
44
 A 
confidence level of 0.95 was used to rank the ARG combinations under the various scenarios.  
This procedure fell under the category of indifference-zone (IZ) ranking and selection 
procedures as it utilized an indifference zone δ to define the smallest absolute difference in 
the expected performance that was considered important to detect. The experimenter 
determined this parameter δ. The procedure also guaranteed, with a confidence level at least 
1−α, that the configuration selected as the best had the largest true mean when the true mean 
is at least δ greater than the second best. To determine the top three configurations for each 
scenario, the best performer for each execution of the procedure was omitted for the 
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 (Rinott, 1978) p.799-811 
Troops Carried
Troop Rate = 
Mean Time in hours
Cargo Carried
Cargo Rate = 
Mean Time in hours
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subsequent iteration. The ranking and selection procedure were then performed again, this 
time using a smaller subset of ARG configurations. 
The aim was to determine which of the six input variables were important in 
predicting the performance of an ARG. To do this, a two-pronged approach was taken. 
a. Principal Component Analysis 
Principal Component Analysis was used to identify linear dependence among 
the variables, if any.  This provided a deeper understanding of how the variables correlated. 
b. Partition Trees 
Recursive partitioning is a statistical method for multivariable analysis. 
Recursive partitioning creates a decision tree that strives to correctly classify members of the 
population based on several dichotomous dependent variables. The partition tree recursively 
partitions data according to optimal splitting relationships created between dependent and 
predictor variables. It creates simple tree-based rules for predicting the dependent variable. 
Partition trees were performed fitting six of the seven input variables against 
the mean MOEs. This was done a total of seven times, with one variable being left out during 
the creation of each tree. The results of each tree were compared against the tree built with all 
variables included. If a tree with a variable omitted changed the Root Mean Square Error 
(RMSE), the omitted variable was considered important in the presence of the rest.  
Similarly, if a tree with a variable omitted did not change the RMSE, the omitted variable 
could be considered of lesser importance in the presence of the rest. 
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4. Performance Comparison 
a. HA/DR Scenario 
Near Distance: The results for the near HA/DR scenario for the various ARG 









1. LHD, LPD-17, LSD-49 12977 1664 96 
2. LHD, LPD-17, LSD-41 12332 1637 94 
3. LHA, LPD-17, LSD-49 13498 1521 87 
4. LHA, LPD-17, LSD-41 12432 1620 93 
Option 1 
5. LHD, LPD-17, LPD-17 13894 1494 86 
6. LHA(R), LPD-17, LPD-17 13881 1601 92 
7. LHA-1, LPD-17, LPD-17 13674 1466 84 
Option 2 
8. LHA-1, LPD-17, LSD(X) 13666 1570 90 
9. LHA(R), LPD-17, LSD(X) 13830 2173 125 
10. LHD, LPD-17, LSD(X) 12850 1567 90 
Option 3 
11. LHA-1, LPD-17, LSD(XB) 13932 1731 99 
12. LHA(R), LPD-17,LSD(XB) 14798 2085 120 
13. LHD, LPD-17, LSD(XB) 14028 1664 96 
Option 4 
14. LHA-1, LPD-17, LPD(17) FLT X 14210 1708 98 
15. LHA(R), LPD-17, LPD(17) FLT X 11114 1317 76 
16. LHD, LPD-17, LPD(17) FLT X 14208 1708 98 
Option 5 
17. LHD, LHD 12869 2259 130 
18. LHD, LHA-1 11743 1721 99 
19. LHD, LHA(R) 12195 2230 128 
20. LHA(R), LHA-1 12777 2075 119 
Option 6 21. LPD-17 x 5 18328 1869 107 
























Far Distance: The results for the far HA/DR scenario for the various ARG 









1. LHD, LPD-17, LSD-49 11223 1144 66 
2. LHD, LPD-17, LSD-41 10107 1366 78 
3. LHA, LPD-17, LSD-49 10643 1297 74 
4. LHA, LPD-17, LSD-41 10891 1107 63 
Option 1 
5. LHD, LPD-17, LPD-17 11847 1062 61 
6. LHA(R), LPD-17, LPD-17 11795 1423 82 
7. LHA-1, LPD-17, LPD-17 10849 1239 71 
Option 2 
8. LHA-1, LPD-17, LSD(X) 10625 1153 66 
9. LHA(R), LPD-17, LSD(X) 11501 1327 76 
10. LHD, LPD-17, LSD(X) 11227 1503 86 
Option 3 
11. LHA-1, LPD-17, LSD(XB) 11139 1242 71 
12. LHA(R), LPD-17,LSD(XB) 12023 1211 69 
13. LHD, LPD-17, LSD(XB) 11766 1339 77 
Option 4 
14. LHA-1, LPD-17, LPD(17) FLT X 11246 1265 73 
15. LHA(R), LPD-17, LPD(17) FLT 
X 
9106 1078 62 
16. LHD, LPD-17, LPD(17) FLT X 11738 1281 73 
Option 5 
17. LHD, LHD 10647 1563 90 
18. LHD, LHA-1 9594 1151 66 
19. LHD, LHA(R) 9711 1260 72 
20. LHA(R), LHA-1 9591 1078 62 
Option 6 21. LPD-17 x 5 16125 1477 85 






Figure 36.   HA/DR Far Graph 
Analysis: When the mean Cargo Rates were plotted for each ARG 
configuration, it became obvious that the ARG configuration corresponding to 5 x LPD-17s 
dominated the other configurations in both the near and far scenarios. 
This result was echoed in the Rinott’s ranking and selection procedure 
mentioned above under “Methodology.” The results, obtained via sequential deletion of the 
best performer using a large δ as the indifference zone, are detailed in the Table 19. 
 
Ranking Near Scenario Far Scenario 
1. LPD-17 x 5  (Combo 21) LPD-17 x 5 (Combo 21) 
2. LHA(R), LPD-17, LSD(X)  
(Combo 12) 
LHA(R), LPD-17, LSD(X) 
(Combo 12) 
3. LHA-1, LPD-17, LPD(17) Flt X 
(Combo 14) 
LHA(R), LPD-17, LPD-17 
(Combo 6) 




















a. Assault SCENARIO 
Near Distance: The results for the near Assault scenario for the various ARG 









LHD, LPD-17, LSD-49  471 60 3.4 
LHD, LPD-17, LSD-41  477 63 3.6 
LHA, LPD-17, LSD-49 501 56 3.2 
LHA, LPD-17, LSD-41 490 63 3.6 
Option 1 
LHD, LPD-17, LPD-17 545 58 3.3 
LHA(R), LPD-17, LPD-17 511 59 3.4 
LHA-1, LPD-17, LPD-17 546 58 3.3 
Option 2 
LHA-1, LPD-17, LSD(X) 485 55 3.2 
LHA(R), LPD-17, LSD(X) 442 69 4 
LHD, LPD-17, LSD(X) 444 54 3.1 
Option 3 
LHA-1, LPD-17, LSD(XB) 496 61 3.5 
LHA(R), LPD-17,LSD(XB) 480 67 3.9 
LHD, LPD-17, LSD(XB) 488 57 3.3 
Option 4 
LHA-1, LPD-17, LPD(17) FLT X 485 58 3.3 
LHA(R), LPD-17, LPD(17) FLT X 343 40 2.3 
LHD, LPD-17, LPD(17) FLT X 473 56 3.2 
Option 5 
LHD, LHD 723 127 7.3 
LHD, LHA-1 659 96 5.5 
LHD, LHA(R)  651 119 6.8 
LHA(R), LHA-1 682 110 6.4 
Option 6 LPD-17 x 5 526 53 3.1 


































Far Distance: The results for the far Assault scenario for the various ARG 









LHD, LPD-17, LSD-49  407 41 2.3 
LHD, LPD-17, LSD-41  391 52 3 
LHA, LPD-17, LSD-49 395 48 2.7 
LHA, LPD-17, LSD-41 430 43 2.5 
Option 1 
LHD, LPD-17, LPD-17 465 41 2.4 
LHA(R), LPD-17, LPD-17 434 52 3 
LHA-1, LPD-17, LPD-17 433 49 2.8 
Option 2 
LHA-1, LPD-17, LSD(X) 377 40 2.3 
LHA(R), LPD-17, LSD(X) 367 42 2.4 
LHD, LPD-17, LSD(X) 388 52 3 
Option 3 
LHA-1, LPD-17, LSD(XB) 396 44 2.5 
LHA(R), LPD-17,LSD(XB) 390 39 2.2 
LHD, LPD-17, LSD(XB) 409 46 2.6 
Option 4 
LHA-1, LPD-17, LPD(17) FLT X 384 43 2.4 
LHA(R), LPD-17, LPD(17) FLT X 281 33 1.9 
LHD, LPD-17, LPD(17) FLT X 390 42 2.4 
Option 5 
LHD, LHD 598 87 5 
LHD, LHA-1 538 64 3.7 
LHD, LHA(R)  518 67 3.8 
LHA(R), LHA-1 512 57 3.3 
Option 6 LPD-17 x 5 463 42 2.4 





Figure 38.   Assault Far Graph 
Analysis: When the Troop Rates were plotted for the various ARG 
configurations, it is clear that in both near and far scenarios, the 2 x LHD ARG configuration 
outperformed all other configurations. 
Again, this result is echoed in the Rinott ranking and selection procedure. The 
results are detailed in Table 22: 
Ranking Near Scenario Far Scenario 
1. LHD, LHD  (Combo 17) LHD, LHD  (Combo 17) 
2. LHA(R), LHA-1  (Combo 20) LHD, LHA-1 (Combo 18) 
3. LHD, LHA-1  (Combo 18) LHD, LHA(R) (Combo 19) 
Table 22. Assault Combined Results 
5. Performance Comparison 
Principal component analysis found m orthogonal linear combinations of original k 
regressors, where m ≤ k.  In essence, this transformation was used to remove any multi-
colinearity detected in the original input variables. Using a Variance Inflation Factor,
45
 it was 
revealed that multi-colinearity existed for Cargo, Aviation and Aviation Spots.   
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VIF 2.05524 7.63143 15.485 58.8382 9.79275 70.6859 5.59702 
Table 23. Test of Multi-Colinearity 
A basic understanding of the process of moving troops and cargo to shore is proof 
enough that multiple colinearities exist. An LCAC would only load with troops or cargo 
when it was occupying an LCAC spot in the well deck in the simulation. The same held true 
for the aircraft in the simulation. LCACs or aircraft that arrived back to their respective ships 
that did not have a free spot for loading had to wait until a spot became free. Therefore, the 
amount of LCACs or aircraft that can load at a time is directly related to the total number of 
each and how many spots are available for each to load.   
Instead of performing an orthogonal transformation on just these three variables, the 
transformation was conducted on all variables to determine the dimensionality in which the 
MOEs actually exist. Table 24 details the loadings for each Principal Component (PC), where 
each loading states the coefficient of the variable in the Principal Component. 
 PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 
LCAC 
-0.36311 -0.00869 0.316885 -0.8625 0.114236 -0.10297 0.009789 
Troops 
0.115714 0.706915 -0.56884 -0.27414 0.088183 0.195327 0.20547 
Cargo 
-0.44762 0.214529 -0.13947 0.265042 0.293134 -0.75656 0.074899 
Aviation 
0.430399 0.208081 0.43542 -0.01251 -0.25943 -0.31713 0.6433 
JP.5 
-0.23835 0.584546 0.592829 0.2875 0.12459 0.325226 -0.2147 
Spots 
0.457382 0.23971 0.043019 -0.16411 -0.20052 -0.41519 -0.7014 
LCAC 
Spots 
-0.45072 0.10826 -0.11688 0.030723 -0.87762 -0.01169 -0.01345 
Table 24. Principal Component Loading Coefficients 
 
For example:  
1 0.36311 0.115714 0.44762
0.430399 0.23835 .5 0.457382
0.45072  
PC LCAC Troops Cargo
Aviation JP Spots
LCAC Spots
      





The importance of each Principal Component is listed in Table 25. 
 PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 
Standard 
Deviation 
2.065 1.1598 0.8449 0.69941 0.37449 0.2032 0.08629 
Proportion 
of Variance 
0.609 0.1922 0.102 0.06988 0.02003 0.0059 0.00106 
Cumulative 
Variance 
0.609 0.8012 0.9031 0.973 0.99304 0.9989 1 
Table 25. Principal Component Importance 
As a rule of thumb, each linear combination is kept in the model if its proportion of 
variance exceeds 0.1. Therefore, PC1, PC2 and PC3 were kept in the model. 
Principal Component 1: The larger loadings in Principal Component 1 involved 
LCACs, Cargo, Aviation and Spots. This seemed intuitive given the simulation approach and 
parameters.   
Principal Component 2: The heavier loadings in Principal Component 2 involved 
Troops and JP-5. At first glance this was an interesting finding, as Troops do not seem related 
to JP-5 consumption. However, aircraft and LCACs both carried troops in this simulation; 
both platforms also use JP-5. Therefore, this was a valid connection between JP-5 and 
Troops.   
Principal Component 3: The heavier loadings in Principal Component 3 involved 
Troops, Aviation and JP-5. To expand on the ideas supporting PC2, aircraft carried more 
troops than LCACs did in the simulation. Therefore, it was logical that PC3 mathematically 
identified these variables as significant in this model.   
Analysis: Going by the manner in which all variables were spread across the three 
most important Principal Components, and also that there was no Principal Component that 
was heavily loaded with only one variable, it appeared that there was no one variable that was 
significant by itself. Each variable was significant only in the presence of other variables. 
6. Partition Trees 
This procedure was conducted in JMP, a statistical analysis software package, and the 





































































































Table 26. Partition Tree Results 
Within the HA/DR mission set for both Near and Far scenarios, it was observed that 
omitting Cargo as an input parameter had the most effect on RMSE and R-square.  This was 
intuitive given the MOE used for the HA/DR missions was Cargo Rate. It was also observed 
that within the HA/DR Near scenario, RMSE decreased when Aviation was left out of the 
model. Aviation was the last variable to be branched upon in the tree. While it appeared, from 
the decrease in RMSE, that leaving out Aviation actually improved the model, this decrease 
was due wholly to the “Minimum Size Split” setting.46  Given Aviation was the second 
variable to be split; aviation can be considered an important variable in the HA/DR model. 
The partition tree for the HA/DR Near scenario with all seven variables included is displayed 
in Figure 39. 
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Figure 39.   HA/DR Near Scenario With All Seven Variables 
 




Under the Assault mission set for both Near and Far scenarios, it was observed that 
omitting Troops had the most effect on RMSE and R-square. Again this was intuitive given 
the MOE for the assault mission was the Troop Rate. As with the HA/DR Near scenario, the 
Assault Far scenario had RMSE decrease when LCACs were omitted. The reasoning for this 
was similar to that presented for Aviation under the HA/DR Near scenario. The partition tree 
for the Assault Far Scenario with all seven variables included is shown in Figure 41.  
 
 
Figure 41.   Assault Far Scenario With All Seven Variables 
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The partition tree for the Assault Far scenario with LCACs omitted is shown in the Figure 
42. 
 
Figure 42.   Assault Far Scenario With LCACs Omitted 
7. Summary of PC Analysis 
A classical IZ ranking and selection procedure allowed for the identification of which 
ARG configuration performed best under the different mission sets. Ideally, there would be one 
ARG configuration that performs best in each scenario, but the results showed otherwise, with 
LPD-17 x 5 (Architecture 21) performing best in the HA/DR mission set, and LHD x 2 
(Architecture 17) performing best in the Assault mission set.  
The Principal Component Analysis and partition tree approaches allowed for a deeper 
understanding of how the input variables correlated with each other, and which ones were more 
significant in the two mission sets. A possible improvement would be to extract from the 
simulation the time taken to unload only troops, and the time taken to unload only cargo.
47
 This 
would perhaps be a more accurate representation of the MOEs.   
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8. Design of Experiments Analysis 
The design of experiment (DOE) analysis aimed to identify the most robust architecture 
with respect to the most significant factors influencing the output. Based on the simulation output 
for each of the derived architectures, the data was analyzed to determine which architecture 
performed the best in terms of completion time, and which of the factors (Number of LCAC 
spots, Aircraft spots, LCACs, Aircrafts, JP-5, Troops and Cargo unloading) influenced the 
completion time the most.  
The experiment was designed using Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercubes.
48
 This method 
was designed to examine multivariate multilevel space where a simple multifactor two level 
design is not sufficient. This method allowed an analyst to be confident that the distribution of 
values represented in the experimental design has sufficiently covered factor space such that a 
highly robust combination of levels could be identified. In this case, three hundred configurations 
were generated and input into version 2 of the simulation. Each configuration was run thirty 
times. Based on the means of the outputs, the significant factors were determined through 
partition tree analysis. The generated design has varied the factors between their high and low 














JP-5 Troops Cargo 
A/C 
Transit 
Type Disc. Disc. Disc Disc. Cont. Cont. Cont. Cont. Cont. 
Number 
Levels 
4 7 8 26 300 300 300 300 300 
Model 
Form 
MQI MQI MQI MQI MQI MQI MQI MQI MQI 
Low 
Level 
2 12 3 25 10 778438 2360 48174 5 
High 
Level 
5 18 10 50 30 1591540 3592 129900 15 
Round     6 6 6 6  
Table 27. DOE Factor Table 
The partition tree analysis was performed on the 9 factors against the mean outputs of the 
simulation data to determine the significant factors. The results of each tree were compared 
against the tree built containing all variables. As previously noted, if a tree with a variable 
omitted changed the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) the omitted variable was considered 
significant. Similarly, if a tree with a variable omitted did not change the RMSE, the omitted 
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 (MacCalman, 2012) 
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variable was considered insignificant with respect to influencing the results. Figure 43 and 44 





Figure 43.   Partition Tree Analysis for Troop Unloading Rate 
   
 
 
Figure 44.   Partition Tree Analysis for Cargo Unloading Rate 
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By splitting the partition tree down to the fourth level, the team was able to identify 
the branches that had the highest means (unloading rates), and then traced the tree upwards to 
identify the significant factors that contributed to that particular mean unloading rate value. 
For the HADR scenario, it seemed that the significant factors were LCAC Spots, Total 
Number of LCACs and Aircrafts, Transit Time and Cargo Space. For the Assault scenario, 
the significant factors were LCAC Spots, Total Number of LCACs and Aircrafts, Transit 
Time, Cargo Space and Troop Space. It seemed that the other factors such as Aircraft Spots, 
Aircraft Transit Time and JP-5 were not significant factors that contributed to the unloading 
rates. 
Based on the results of the partition tree analysis, Table 28 lists the various design 
possibilities based on the desired cargo-unloading rate for the HADR scenario. For each of 
the designs, the limits for the significant factors are shown. For example, for Design 1 with 
the highest cargo-unloading rate, one can have more than 6 LCACs with more than 4 LCAC 













1 293.89 >=4 >=6     >=85737.89 
2 258.27 >=4 >=6     85737.89< x <112816.81 
3 230.4 3<= x <4 >=6     >=85737.89 
4 214.12   4<= x <6 >=33   >=85737.89 
5 209.87 >=4 >=4     60883.90 <= x <85737.89 
6 198.2   <4   <18.10 >=85737.89 
7 191.36 3<= x <4       72697.27<= x <85737.89 
8 187.32   4<= x <6 >=33   >=85737.89 
Table 28. Design Parameters for HA/DR Scenario 
Similarly, Table 29 lists the various design possibilities based on the desired troop-
unloading rate for the Assault scenario. For Design 1 with the highest troop-unloading rate, 













1 10.07 <5   >= 40   <74252.52 >=3303.86 
2 9.19 >= 3     <19.186 <74252.52 <3303.86 
3 8.81 <5   <40   <74252.52 >=3303.86 
4 8.46       >=19.186 53796.42 < x <74252.52 <3303.86 
5 7.91 <3     <19.186 <74252.52 <3303.86 
6 7.79 >=3 >=5     >=74252.52 >=2901.79 
7 7.35       >=19.186 53796.42 < x <74252.52 <3303.86 
8 7.32 >=4        74252.52 < x <90414.59 <2901.79 
Table 29. Design Parameters for Assault Scenario 
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Comparing both tables for the HA/DR and Assault scenarios, Design 5 would have 
the highest troop and cargo unloading rates with non-conflicting design parameters. Design 5 
allows for more than 4 LCACs, but there must be less than 3 LCAC spots, with a transit time 
of less than 19.18 minutes, and must carry between 60883 and 85737 square feet of cargo and 

















1 10.07 293.89 4<= x <5 >=6 >= 40   Conflict >=3303.86 
2 9.19 258.27 >= 3 >=6   <19.186 Conflict <3303.86 
3 8.81 230.4 3<= x <4 >=6 <40   Conflict >=3303.86 
4 8.46 214.12   4<= x <6 >=33 >=19.186 Conflict <3303.86 
5 7.91 209.87 <3 >=4   <19.186 60883.90 <= x <85737.89 <3303.86 
6 7.79 198.2 >=3 Conflict   <18.10 >=74252.52 >=2901.79 
7 7.35 191.36 3<= x <4     >=19.186 72697.27< x <74252.52 <3303.86 
8 7.32 187.32 >=4 4<= x <6 >=33     85737.89< x <90414.59 <2901.79 
Table 30. Design Parameters for HA/DR and Assault Scenarios 
The results showed the most robust derived ARG architecture consisted of 6 or more 
LCACs with 4 LCAC spots and 40 or more CH-53 equivalent aircraft. Partition tree analysis 
showed that this combination provided a relatively high rate for both MOPs analyzed and 
made transit time an insignificant factor. The Cargo amount calculated conflicted with an 
amount actually analyzed. However, an amphibious operation planner would aspire to load as 
much cargo and as many troops as necessary to successfully conduct a given amphibious 
operation. Furthermore, any proposed ARG architecture or new ship design presented in this 
report allows the set Cargo, Vehicle and Troop requirements to influence design.  Since these 
requirements are seen as set values, these factors are not seen as values that can be 
manipulated to influence performance. Their inclusion in the simulation was necessary since 
the main trade space factors (LCACs, LCAC spots, aircraft, aircraft spots and transit time) 
were contributing to moving these quantities to shore at certain rates. Therefore, as long as 
there were not conflicts with these main trade space factors within the results, that 
combination was deemed valid (i.e. design 6 listed on Table 30 was invalid).   
This robust solution provided implications as to where a decision maker should 
expend resources in order to maximize ARG performance. For instance, identification of 
transit time as an insignificant factor might imply that there is no need to fund improving an 
LCAC’s or connecting aircraft’s speed. Conversely, the results showed that improving LCAC 
and aircraft totals improve performance. Combining this information with the sensitivity 
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analysis previously shown can further refine this observation. This partition tree analysis 
places no upper bound on LCAC and air craft totals but does provide minimums. Sensitivity 
analysis showed points of diminishing return for adding capability in both areas. Since it has 
already been shown that more is not necessarily better one can assume these minimums are 
associated with points in which no further performance increase will be achieved when 
exceeding these quantities. In summary, four ships (LCAC spots), six LCACs and 40 aircraft 
is the most robust solution the team was able to derive.  
E. OTHER DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
Self-Defense – A significant probability of survivability (PS) analysis was completed 
to determine what capability a new design ship should incorporate. This analysis is contained 
in Appendix B and concluded that the presence of an escort group made a significant 
difference in the survivability of lesser-equipped ships. Two courses of action were 
developed to address the appropriate balance between weapon systems cost and PS. (1) Have 
Escort Groups with the platforms whenever the expected threat level is high.  (2) Have a new 
construction ship design that is modular in nature (similar to LCS concept), allowing the 
addition of added NSSM modules whenever the threat level is high but otherwise operating 
with just the RAM as a basic defense (similar to LPD-17) when low threats are expected.  
Hangar – The current LSD does not have an aircraft hangar on board.  Therefore, its 
air operations are restricted to non-organic operations. This hinders the current LSD from 
embarking on independent operations as it is missing a key element of the nation’s current 
method of conducting maritime operations. A follow-on ship developed to replace the current 
LSD should be designed with an aircraft hangar capable of embarking modern and 
anticipated aircraft, such as the MV-22 or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), to adequately 
support independent operations.   
C2 Suite – The current LSD is limited in its capability to share C2 intelligence with 
platforms in a group due it a relatively weak C2 suite. The LSD does not have many of the 
links and frequencies necessary to effectively contribute to the Common Operational Picture 
(COP). It specifically lacks the modern Tactical Data Information Link (TADIL) capability, 
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), modern Self-Defense Integration capability and 
many other communication frequencies shared by platforms with more modern C2 
capabilities. A follow-on ship should be designed with a C2 suite that facilitates 
communication with modern systems. It should also be designed such that it is adaptable to 
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technological advances. This modular or “plug-and-play” idea mitigates the threat of the LSD 
returning to a state in which it is not capable of contributing to the COP. 
Unmanned Vehicles (UV) – With the push toward unmanned systems rapidly 
increasing in the Navy, a follow-on platform should not be designed in a manner that would 
hinder UV operations. Additionally, the size and type of UVs deployable to a follow-on ship 
must be determined. This will influence any additional design considerations pertinent to UV 
implementation. The main design factors include launching, recovery, and storage space. 
These factors will also influence other design considerations such as C2 needs and potential 
stability issues. 
Propulsion Plant – Any new ship design should implement a hybrid or even all 
electrical plant or other alternative to diesel, if possible, propulsion system.  This effort would 
serve two main purposes. The first would be to decrease the Navy’s dependency on foreign 
oil. It is well known the US aspires to reduce dependency on foreign oil. With that, the Navy 
can assist the government in achieving this goal by taking steps to reduce dependency within 
the organization. The more dependent our platforms are on foreign resources, the more our 
platforms operate at the mercy of those providing the resources.  Furthermore, the more 
foreign entities realize the gravity of the US’s dependency on their material, the more likely 
they are to inflate the price.  This leads to an increased risk of high costs and lower 
availability for desired resources. The second purpose is alternative fuel sources contribute to 







VI. COST DECISION ANALYSIS  
A. INTRODUCTION  
The objective of this cost estimating process was to provide a realistic life cycle cost 
estimate (LCCE) for the different design alternatives and fleet architectures. These estimates 
were anchored in historical data from analogous systems, and created using quantitative 
models to predict the costs of each alternative. LCCEs were the tool used to evaluate and 
rank the six alternatives with respect to cost, and combined with the performance and 
evaluation results, form the foundation for the comparison of alternatives.  The cost 
estimating results were used to make recommendations on which alternative is most cost 
effective. 
LCCEs cover all the time phases of each alternative’s life cycle, namely Research and 
Development (R&D), Production, and Operation and Support (O&S) Costs. This section 
outlines the research, analysis, and modeling techniques that underlie the cost estimates that 
were developed for the proposed alternatives.  
1. Assumptions 
The following assumptions were utilized to allow for the most similar cost 
comparisons between the alternatives. All cost calculation predictions are in Fiscal Year 2012 
(FY12) dollars. 
 Adjustments for costs were made for both quantity and quality of the systems being 
compared using Base Year 2012 dollars. 
 A 30-year life cycle was used for all ships for the total life cycle cost estimate. 
 Recommended new ship constructions were assumed to be relative in size to current 
ships to allow for the parametric cost model approximation. 
 The new construction cost model will be a single variable regression, either linear, 
logarithmic, power or exponential, of the historical data broken down to the 1-digit 
Ship Work Breakdown Structure (SWBS) level (100, 200, …900). 
 All ships built will be accepted. There are no spares or test equipment. 
 Historical ship construction data is complete, accurate and sufficient for cost 
estimation analysis. 




 Learning curves for current production ships, LPD-17 and LHA-8, are assumed to be 
99% for material and labor. 
 A point estimate was developed for lead ship costs. Monte Carlo simulation was used 
to develop an estimate of the 80th percentile of the LCCE cumulative distribution 
function. 
2. Terms and Definitions49  
Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE):  The LCCE is the sum of the acquisition and ownership 
costs of a ship class over its expected life cycle. This cost includes the cost of R&D, 
Production and Manufacturing (P&M), and O&S for each of the ships throughout their 
operational years. The cost of disposal was not utilized for this calculation.  LCCE is given 
by Equation 1. 
# . . ( )30
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Research & Development Costs (R&D): Estimated cost of all program specific research and 
development.  
Production & Manufacturing Costs (P&M):  Estimated cost of the investment phase, 
including total cost of procuring the prime equipment, related support equipment, training, 
initial and war reserve spares, preplanned product improvements and military construction. 
Operations & Support Costs (O&S): Estimated cost of operating and supporting the fielded 
system, including all direct and indirect costs incurred in using the system, e.g., personnel, 
maintenance (unit and depot), and sustaining investment (replenishment spares). The bulk of 
lifecycle costs occur in this category. 
Ship Work Breakdown Structure (SWBS):  This is the work break down structure (WBS) of 
ship construction. MIL-STD-881C (3 OCT 2011) defines the WBS as a product-oriented 
family tree composed of hardware, software, services, data, and facilities. The family tree 
results from systems engineering efforts during the acquisition of a defense materiel item. A 
WBS displays and defines the product, or products, to be developed and/or produced. It 
relates the elements of work to be accomplished to each other and to the end product. In other 
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words, the WBS is an organized method to breakdown a product into sub-products at lower 
levels of detail. For the cost analysis the 1-digit SWBS was utilized, as displayed and defined 
in Table 31. 
 
SWBS 100 Level Breakdown Chart 
Level Title Components 
100 Hull Structure 
Shell plating, decks, bulkheads, framing, 
superstructure, pressure hulls & 
foundations. 
200 Propulsion Plant 
Boilers, reactors, turbines, gears, 
shafting, propellers, steam piping & lube 
oil piping. 
300 Electric Plant 
Ship service power generation 
equipment, power cable, lighting 





Navigation systems, interior 
communication systems, fire control 
systems, radars, sonars, radios, 
telephones & command and control 
systems. 
500 Auxiliary Systems 
Air conditioning, ventilation, 
refrigeration, replenishment at sea 
systems, anchor handling, elevators, fire 
extinguishing systems, distilling plants, 
steering systems & aircraft launch and 
recovery systems. 
600 Outfit and Furnishing 
Hull fittings, painting, insulation, 
berthing, sanitary spaces, offices, 
medical spaces, ladders, storerooms, 
laundry & workshops. 
700 Armament 
Guns, missile launchers, ammunition 
handling and stowage, torpedo tubes, 
depth charges, mine handling and 






Ship Assembly & 
Support Services 
Staging, scaffolding, launching, trials, 
temporary utilities and services, material 
handling and removal services & 
cleaning services. 
Table 31. 1-digit SWBS Titles and Definitions (From 51) 
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Analogy Estimation:  A cost estimation technique that is based on analogous relations found 
within a similar type of system. These relationships are based on actual, subject matter expert 
or estimated relations between two or more components of a WBS as a ratio to a base 
quantity. This technique is utilized when limited historical information is available for 
comparison. 
Parametric Estimation: A cost estimation technique that is based on functional relationships. 
These relationships are generally based on similar systems that were of similar technical, 
performance and schedule standards. This technique is utilized when enough historical cost 
data is available for comparison. 
 
Equation 2: Cost Equation
 
3. Cost Estimating Process Methodology 
Each of the alternatives that were examined may have elements that are either 
currently in existence, so-called legacy components, or need to be developed, new 
construction. The cost of these alternatives can then be estimated using different design 
parameters that were developed by the systems engineering team.   
Life Cycle Cost Estimates were completed for the following six options:   
 New construction of the LSD(X) 
 New construction of the LSD(XB) 
 Additional procurement of 11 LPD-17s 
 Additional Procurement of 19 LPD-17s 
 Follow-on to the LPD-17 designated as LPD(17) Flt X 
 Additional procurement of LHA-8s. 
A LCCE was developed for each of these options.  These LCCEs were used in the 
project decision process to compare the alternatives.  The detailed description of these 
options is contained in the previous section of the report subtitled Alternative Generation.  
B. NEW CONSTRUCTION COST MODEL DEFINITIONS AND 
DOCUMENTATION 
1. Objective and Summary 
The objective of this cost estimating model was to develop the LCCE for producing a 
new class of LSDs designated the LSD(X). The procurement cost of the lead ship was 
modeled using regression analysis, with the independent variables being the LSD(X)’s 
desired attributes and capabilities.  The regression model was derived from data of five lead 
ships of existing similar classes (LSD-41, LSD-49, LPD-17, LHA-6, LHD-1).  Follow-on 
 Cost technical,  performance,  schedulef
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ship construction costs were estimated using the estimated cost of the lead ship and learning 
curve theory. Operation and Support (O&S) costs are estimated by analogy to the O&S costs 
of existing ships and then applied over the life-cycle. The sum of all these costs was the 
LCCE. 
2. Overview 
An overview of the cost estimating model is shown in Figure 45, and the paragraphs 
below describe the blocks of the model. 
 
 
Figure 45.   Overview of Cost Estimating Model 
 
“Material & Labor Costs Database for Lead Ships” refers to historical industry data 
from previous amphibious ship classes. 
“Regression Cost Estimate Models” refers to the models compiled and analyzed by 
LT Allison Hills, USN as part of her thesis Life Cycle Cost of LSD(X).
52
 Her models 
estimated total costs of the lead ship at the 1-digit SWBS level.  These models formed the 
foundation from which the new ship construction model was built.  In her thesis LT Hills 
used single and multivariate regression to examine the relationships in the cost of historic 
ships construction as a function of the 1-digit SWBS level.  Results from her analysis 
concluded that no multivariate regression fit was an acceptable estimation to the costs of 
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construction of the amphibious ship class. She concluded that some single variable 
regressions modeled the construction with fair estimation to a ships construction cost on most 
SWBS levels through several different regression techniques. These specific techniques were 
integrated and validated in this project's new construction model. 
“Alternatives” refers to the scenarios and developments by the systems engineering 
team that resulted in the six options for analysis. These alternatives are described by size and 
mission and by five input parameters: cargo capacity in cubic feet, troop size in bunks, 
number of LCACs, crew size, and beam of the ship in feet. These parameters are the 
independent variables that drove the lead ship cost estimates.     
“Lead Ship” includes the design cost, material, labor, and non-recurring costs for the 
Lead ship.   
“Follow-on Ship” accounts for the use of lead ship estimates and learning curve 
theory to estimate the cost of procurement for additional ships. 
“O&S Cost” encompasses all the Operating and Support data and O&S cost estimates. 
The total personnel and material O&S costs of the five current amphibious ship classes was 
extracted from Navy’s Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs 
(VAMOSC) management information system and categorized. Operational and Support cost 
data, which includes personnel cost data, was obtained through the Ships Data Universe of 
VAMOSC.  As described in the VAMOSC website at https://www.vamosc.navy.mil, the 
VAMOSC system is used by the Navy to estimate future life cycle costs (LCC) of legacy and 
future programs as well as determine opportunity areas to reduce LCC.
53
 The VAMOSC 
system processes historical data taken from over 160 data sources. The detailed cost element 
format provides a system level that can be broken down further to subsystem and component 
levels.   
VAMOSC presents data in the O&S categories required by the Cost Analysis 
Improvement Group (CAIG) Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).  This allowed the 
team to estimate annual costs specifically for operations, support, and personnel of specific 
ship classes that best related to each of the six alternatives.  
For each CAIG O&S cost element, the team used VAMOSC class average data from 
the following similar classes of ships:  LSD-41, LSD-49, LPD-4, and LPD-17.  In reporting 
the CAIG structure, VAMOSC reported average cost values from ships that were in 
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commissioned service of the active fleet during the entire fiscal year.
54
 The average cost 
values were reported in FY2012 dollars.  In order to forecast future O&S costs for a new 
ship, seven-year averages in manpower O&S costs were taken from the LSD-41, LSD-49 and 
LPD-4 class of ships.  A five-year average in the same categories was determined for the 
LPD-17 class of ships due to the limited period of service for that class.  These values were 
then averaged to estimate annual operations, maintenance, and personnel costs for the base 
year 2012, and this average was used to estimate future year (O&S) costs, as part of the 
LCCE for the different alternatives.  Each O&S cost estimate was adjusted to be an estimate 
based on the alternative ship’s input parameters.   
Other factors within the model included inflation and labor rate. As ship construction 
is sequential over many years and the O&S stretches decades before decommission, inflation 
can be an important factor to consider within the model. This cost model has the functionality 
to utilize the inflation factors generated using the Joint Inflation Calculator, FY2012 version 
1c, available at www.ncca.navy.mil. The inflation figures were generated based on the 
selections listed in Appendix C, and the inflation rates for FY 2013-2042 are shown in 
Appendix D.  All cost estimates in this model are in FY12$ for consistency. The labor rate 
used in the model is $67.02/hr. (FY12$).  This rate was determined using a mean base rate for 
Ship and Boat Building labor of $22.34 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
55
  From 
discussions with subject matter experts in the shipbuilding field, it was determined based on 
historical experience that a 200% load was appropriate, yielding a fully loaded or wrapped 
rate of $67.02/hr.  
“Life Cycle Cost Estimate” is the final product of the modeling effort.  It is a 
summation of all costs associated with each new construction alternative. 
3. Methodology 
a. Regression Cost Estimate Model 
Regression analysis was performed on each of the nine levels of the Ship 
Work Breakdown Structures (SWBS) for the currently existing five classes of ships: LSD-41, 
LSD-49, LPD-17, LHA-6, LHD-1. This analysis was completed and compiled by LT Allison 
Hills, USN, as part of her NPS thesis.  The capability figures defined within the model’s 
input parameters, number of LCACs, number of troops, crew size, cargo size and ship beam, 
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were input into the alternatives costing model to create a material and labor cost estimate 
model for the construction of a ship in accordance with required capabilities. Different 
regression models, linear, exponential, etc., were developed to determine the best-fit 
regressors. The regression models that yielded the top three best fits were then considered for 
adoption into the new construction model for each SWBS. Of the top three best fits, the cost 
estimation team chose the regressors that would be most responsive to the five input 
parameters of the model.  For SWBS 200, 400, 500, and 700 where historical data on the 
labor cost does not exhibit any strong relationship for the creation of the model, defined as a 
low R-squared value, less than .65, within the regression, the mean cost value of the five 
ships was used instead. 
The selected input parameters for material and labor of each SWBS are shown 
in Table 32.  Table 32 also shows which model was chosen to estimate the cost of each 
SWBS.  “In regression, a transformation to achieve linearity is a unique kind of nonlinear 
transformation that portrays the non-linear relationship between two variables.  
Transformations are often applied when the data ranges over several orders of magnitude.”56  
For the purpose of this project, the Exponential, Logarithmic and Power models were used in 
addition to the simple linear regression model.   
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100 Beam Linear Troops Power 
200 Cargo Linear Mean - 
300 Crew Power Beam Logarithmic 
400 Troops Exponential Mean - 
500 Crew Logarithmic Mean - 
600 Cargo Linear Troops Power 
700 LCAC Linear Mean - 
800 Beam Linear Crew Logarithmic 
900 Beam Linear Troops Logarithmic 
Table 32. Input Parameters for Estimating Material and Labor 




Method Transformation(s) Regression Equation Predicted Value (ŷ) 
Linear Model None y = b0 + b1x ŷ = b0 + b1x 






Logarithmic model Independent variable = log(x) y= b0 + b1log(x) ŷ = b0 + b1log(x) 
Power model 
Dependent variable = log(y)  
Independent variable = log(x) 






Table 33. Transformations to Achieve Linearity 
b. Model Verification  
In order to ensure that the model was credibly estimating the cost of new ship 
construction, the cost estimation team ran the Navy’s five current amphibious ships through  
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the model to validate results. Table 34 shows the Input Parameters that were used and the 
resulting estimated costs. The model costs were then compared to the historical costs to 
determine if the model was producing credible estimates of the known ships.   







Input Parameters LSD-41 LSD-49 LPD-17 LHA-6 LHD-1 
Number of 
LCACs 
4 2 2 0 3 
Cargo (cubic ft.) 5000 50700 34000 160000 125000 
Crew 434 434 388 1124 1188 
Troops 402 402 720 1687 1687 




1.0025 1.1149 0.6834 0.9839 1.1850 
Total Cost 
Historical 




0.26% 11.49% -31.66% -1.61% 18.50% 
Table 34. Model Comparisons with Historical Data 
The final line in Table 34 “Total Cost Difference” shows the percent 
difference between the model cost estimate and the historical cost. A positive number 
indicates the model is overestimating by that percentage and a negative number indicates the 
model is underestimating by that percentage. Note that the costs are normalized, with 
historical costs set to 1.0. The model is close (less than 2%) on the LSD-41 and LHA-6 and 
not unreasonable (less than 20%) on all of the other ships except the LPD-17 (-32%).  This 
shows that the model would expect the LPD-17 to cost 32% less than it actually did.  
Historically, the LPD-17 was over budget and behind schedule from its very beginning: 
The LPD-17 program has experienced considerable cost growth, schedule 
delays, and construction problems, particularly on the earlier ships in the 
program. The first ship in the program experienced cost growth of about 70%, 
and later ships in the program were substantially more expensive to build than 
originally estimated.58  
The model was validated by estimating the costs of amphibious ships within 
an acceptable margin, with the one outlier as explained. This gave the cost estimation team  
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the confidence to use the model to estimate the cost of new ship construction and acquisition. 
The team then used this model to estimate the cost of the lead ship for the two new 
construction options LSD(X) and LSD(XB).   
c. Calculating Lead Ship Cost 
Material and labor costs were modeled for each SWBS according to the 
regressor selection and the transformation equations, these estimates were summed to 
develop the point estimate for the lead ship. This lead ship cost includes capital costs, which 
are acquisition and construction costs, including acquisition of materials and systems to build 
a ship, labor costs during construction, and services rendered.   
For the LSD(X) and LSD(XB) alternatives, the input parameters are 
summarized in Table 35. These are the design parameters developed by the systems 
engineering team. Using these parameters the cost estimation team estimated the cost of the 
lead ship of both variants. 
 
 LSD(X) LSD(XB) 
Beam 90 94 
LCACs 2 2 
Troops 400 530 
Cargo 20000 66000 
Crew 350 380 
Table 35. New Construction Parameter Inputs 
This lead ship cost point estimate was then additionally modeled using a 
Monte Carlo simulation to account for variations in costs and to adjust the estimates to use 
the 80
th
 percentile of the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF), which is in compliance 
with the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, requiring a 80% confidence 
level when calculating a cost estimate for a major defense acquisition program.59 For more 
information concerning the Monte Carlo Simulations used, see Appendix F. 
Methodology:  A Monte Carlo simulation was run for each cost component, 
i.e. material costs and labor costs. The steps are detailed below. 
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a. Identifying Probability Distribution: The first step involves identifying 
the parameters of a suitable probability distribution. Given the limited data points in creating 




b. Deriving Parameters: As mentioned previously, each SWBS level had 
a regression model built, to estimate either material costs or labor hours, as a function of only 
one regressor; let this model be termed f(x). The range of this regressor was obtained from the 
data set and three values in this range were passed through the regression model to obtain the 
parameters for the triangular distribution, namely, the lowest value over the range a to obtain 
parameter f(a), the highest value over the range c to obtain parameter f(c) and the most likely 
value b to obtain parameter f(b).  Figure 46 illustrates this process. 
 
 
Figure 46.   Procedure for Derivation of Parameters 
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C. LSD(X) AND LSD(XB) ALTERNATIVES 
1. LSD(X) Lead Ship Model 
The following methodology applied to estimates for alternatives that involve utilizing 
a newly designed ship hull form for the project. These alternatives are the LSD(X) and 
LSD(XB). The ranges of the regressors used as input parameters to estimate the cost of the 
LSD(X) are shown in Table 36. 
 
Regressor Lowest Value Most Likely Value Highest Value 
Beam (Ft) 81 90 99 
LCACs (Spots) 1 2 3 
Troops (Bunks) 340 400 460 
Cargo (Cu Ft) 17000 20000 23000 
Crew (Number) 298 350 403 
Table 36. Range of Values for Regressors – LSD(X) 
The final probability distributions for material costs and labor hours are shown in 




Regressor f(a) f(b) f(c) 
100 Beam 5763380 11332421 16901463 
200 Cargo 25585255 27484003 29382750 
300 Crew 7295348 9869447 12863317 
400 Troops 14359267 15702126 17170568 
500 Crew 1976422 22281333 40082053 
600 Cargo 17396813 18436561 19476310 
700 LCAC 3374304 2367834 1361364 
800 Beam 25347691 30090861 34834031 
900 Beam 538299 5698065 10857831 






Regressor f(a) f(b) f(c) 
100 Troops 1217227 1355175 1486245 
200 Mean 307295 307295 307295 
300 Beam 322356 525375 709028 
400 Mean 453541 453541 453541 
500 Mean 2243576 2243576 2243576 
600 Troops 482747 579471 678013 
700 Mean 50235 50235 50235 
800 Crew -236374 446661 1045457 
900 Troops 1063360 1407275 1703032 
Table 38. Probability Distributions for Labor Hours – LSD(X) 
 
Simulation Results: 100,000 simulations were run for each cost component with the 
following results: 
a. Material Costs: The simulations resulted in a mean of $142.6M with a 
standard deviation of $8.7M. This resulted in a range from $133.8M to $151.3M based on 
one standard deviation. The results of the Monte Carlo simulation are shown in Figure 47. 





Figure 47.   Results of Monte Carlo Simulation for Material Costs – LSD(X) 
 
b. Labor Hours: The simulations resulted in a mean 7.3M hours, with a standard 
deviation of 310,118 hours. After factoring in the recommended labor rate of $67.02 per 
hour, the range for the total cost of labor was from $469.6M to $511.1M based on one 
standard deviation. The results of the Monte Carlo simulation are shown in Figure 48. The 






Figure 48.   Results of Monte Carlo Simulation for Labor Hours – LSD(X) 
Monte Carlo simulation yielded a total cost range was from $603.4M to $662.5M 
based on one standard deviation for the LSD(X). The 80% CDF level is $660M. 
2. LSD(XB) Lead Ship Model 
The ranges of the regressors used as input parameters to estimate the cost of the 
LSD(XB) alternative are shown in Table 39. 
 
Regressor Lowest Value Most Likely Value Highest Value 
Beam (Ft) 84.6 94 103.4 
LCACs (Spots) 1 2 3 
Troops (Bunks) 451 530 610 
Cargo (Cu Ft) 56100 66000 75900 
Crew (Number) 323 380 437 




The final probability distributions for material costs and labor hours are shown in 




Regressor f(a) f(b) f(c) 
100 Beam 7990996 13807551 19624106 
200 Cargo 50332263 56598130 62863996 
300 Crew 8487560 11518606 14977766 
400 Troops 16941846 19058201 21470896 
500 Crew 12146426 32663333 50307325 
600 Cargo 30948204 34379375 37810545 
700 LCAC 3374304 2367834 1361364 
800 Beam 27244959 32198937 37152915 
900 Beam 2602205 7991294 13380383 




Regressor f(a) f(b) f(c) 
100 Troops 1466972 1632027 1790843 
200 Mean 307295 307295 307295 
300 Beam 406148 609166 792819 
400 Mean 453541 453541 453541 
500 Mean 2243576 2243576 2243576 
600 Troops 663124 794998 931048 
700 Mean 50235 50235 50235 
800 Crew 105733 795900 1389424 
900 Troops 1661219 2002786 2300279 
Table 41. Probability Distributions for Labor Hours – LSD(XB) 
 
Simulation Results: 100,000 simulations were run for each cost component with the 
following results: 
a. Material Costs: The simulations resulted in a mean of $209.8M with a 
standard deviation of $9.3M.  This resulted in a range from $200.5M to $219.1M based on 
one standard deviation. The results of the Monte Carlo simulation are shown in Figure 49. 





Figure 49.   Results of Monte Carlo Simulation for Material Costs – LSD(XB) 
 
b. Labor Hours: The simulations resulted in a mean 8.8M hours, with a standard 
deviation of 315,740 hours. After factoring in the recommended labor rate of $67.02 per 
hour, the range for the total cost of labor was from $571.1M to $613.4M based on one 
standard deviation. The results of the Monte Carlo simulation are shown in Figure 50. The 






Figure 50.   Results of Monte Carlo Simulation for Labor Hours  – LSD(XB) 
Monte Carlo simulation yielded a total cost range from $771.6M to $832.5M based on 
one standard deviation for the LSD(XB) variant. The 80% CDF level is $827.9M. 
3. Follow Ship Costs and Other Costs 
The output cost ranges based on one standard deviation for the two simulated 
alternatives, and their respective 80% CDF levels are summarized in Table 42. All estimates 
are in FY12$M.   
 
Alternatives Lower Limit Upper Limit 80% CDF 
LSD(X) $603.4M $662.5M $660.0M 
LSD(XB) $771.6M $832.5M $827.9M 
Table 42. Summary of Monte Carlo Results 
From a purely lead ship procurement perspective, the LSD(X) alternative appeared to 
be the cheaper alternative, assuming both alternatives are equally able to meet the desired 




and O&S, still need to be considered, and they represent a larger portion of the LCCE than 
does the lead ship. The results from this section help form the basis from which a substantial 
portion of the remaining Life Cycle Costs portions were estimated. 
Design Costs: With each of the new ship construction designs there is an associated 
design cost which is attached to the lead ship cost. This cost accounts for the preliminary 
design as well as any design changes and modifications that need to be made during 
construction of the first ship. Discussion with industry experts led to an estimated design cost 
for an amphibious ship of this size to be $350M (FY12$). This cost was be added to each of 
the lead ship for all new construction alternatives. 
Follow Ship Costs: (2nd – nth ships) Utilizes learning curve theory to model 
efficiency gains made for material and labor aspects as the construction proceeds. The model 
also made provisions for customizations of the learning curve within the class as the hull 
number progresses. This customization of ship components for ‘n’ ships is also built into the 
model to allow flexibility in cost estimation. 
Base case learning curve parameters for the labor learning curve was set at 95% while 
the material learning curve was set at 99%, based on discussions with subject matter experts.  





          
      
  
x = hull number 
y = unit cost for hull number x 
T = Lead ship cost 
 
Life Cycle Operational and Support (O&S) Costs: Annual O&S costs are required 
to maintain and sustain the operation of the ship. This includes the material and personnel 
costs. As additional ships are procured there is an annual O&S cost for each new ship.  
Table 43 shows the averages of the current annual O&S costs of amphibious ships in the US 
Navy. This data was obtained from the VAMOSC database. These are the base line values 
that were used for computation in the models. These numbers represent the average cost to 
operate one ship for one year in FY12$. 
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 Historical O&S Data Averages (FY12$M) 
 Total O&S Manpower Operations Support 
LHA-1 $157.8M $89.4M $30.8M $37.6M 
LHD-1 $157.8M $86.8M $28.6M $42.3M 
LSD-41 $65.1M $23.5M $8.0M $33.6M 
LSD-49 $56.9M $23.7M $9.6M $23.6M 
LPD-4 $64.3M $29.3M $14.9M $20.1M 
LPD-17 $49.6M $28.2M $6.5M $14.9M 
Table 43. VAMOSC Historical O&S data (Follows 62) 
Table 43 shows the actual, historical, and O&S values derived from the VAMOSC 
historical database, and used to estimate O&S costs for LSD(X). LSD(X) O&S was estimated 
as the average of the two current LSD variants, where the LSD(XB) value is the LSD(X) 
value increased by 10% to account for the larger ship size and increase in crew size. The 






LPD(17) Flt X 49.6 
LHA-8 157.8 
Table 44. Alternatives O&S 
Additional O&S considerations: There was some consideration for adding helicopter 
and LCAC O&S.  The LSD(X) and LSD(XB) new construction designs are based on CH-53 
equivalent aircraft at an annual O&S cost of $6.3M, based on the VAMOSC historical data 
from the past five years. Both of these options include two helicopter assets associated with 
their ship design. They also both include two LCACs with an annual O&S cost of $1.8M, 
based on the average O&S of the 81 LCACs in the fleet over the past three years. Since both 
designs include the same number of aircraft and LCACs and the O&S costs are relatively 
small in comparison to the ships’ O&S, the decision was made to exclude the external assets’ 
O&S from the calculations. This would also allow the cost team to compare and contrast, 
more fairly, the LCCE alternatives of different ship classes.  
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4. New Construction LSD(X) and LSD(XB) Results 
The results from the modeling, lead ship procurement and follow on ship 
procurement, described above produced the final procurement cost estimates shown in Table 
45. These results are estimates for the procurement of the eleven new construction ships for 
both designs provided by the systems engineering team. The lead ship of both classes also 
accounts for the design cost of a new construction ship.   
 
New Construction (FY12$M) 
Hull # LSD(X) LSD(XB) 
1 1010.0 1177.9 
2 633.0 795.2 
3 617.8 776.8 
4 607.3 764.1 
5 599.3 754.4 
6 592.8 746.6 
7 587.4 740.0 
8 582.8 734.4 
9 578.8 729.5 
10 575.2M 725.2M 
11 572.0M 721.3M 
Table 45. New Construction Procurement Cost 
The LCCEs are based on the model results for Procurement Cost as well as the 
Operating and Support Cost and cover a 30-year period which begins with the procurement of 
the first ship and ends with the completion of the 30 year life of the lead ship, therefore, 
operational life will be left on the remaining 10 ships. These options include buying 11 new 
construction LSD(X)s or LSD(XB)s at an interval of one ship every other year during a 22 
year period. The O&S costs are incurred annually for each.  An example of how the LCCE is 
calculated can be seen in Table 46. The table shows that each time a new procurement occurs 
there is an O&S cost associated with it, which is then continued for each year of the LCCE. 
The LCCE covers years 1-30, so there is some usable life left in hulls 2-11. The LCCE for the 




Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
LSD(X) 1   2   3   4 
Procurement 
Cost 1010.00   633.00   617.80   607.30 
  61.00 61.00 61.00 61.00 61.00 61.00 61.00 
    61.00 61.00 61.00 61.00 61.00 
      61.00 61.00 61.00 
        61.00 
Cost per Year 1071.00 61.00 755.00 122.00 800.80 183.00 851.30 
Cumulative LCCE 1071.00 1132.00 1887.00 2009.00 2809.80 2992.80 3844.10 
Table 46. Example of LCCE Calculation 
D. LPD-17 ALTERNATIVES 
There were three options for LPD-17 procurement that were examined by the cost 
estimation team. The first two options continue procuring LPD-17s at the completion of the 
current order. This would allow for the use of already established best building practices and 
avoid the cost of new design and plans. The third alternative would be to use a portion of the 
current LPD-17 and redesign and reapportion the interior of the ship to better fill the 
requirement capability gaps. This option was considered an LPD(17) Flt X. The following 
analysis examines these options. 
1. Continuation of the Current LPD-17 
To estimate the cost of continuing the current LPD-17 line the team examined the data 
for ships currently being procured.  Procurement data, taken from the Selected Acquisition 
Report LPD-17 dated December 31, 2011, for the first 11 LPD-17s allowed for an estimate of 
the current learning curve. Figure 51 shows the cost of the first 11 LPD-17s (T1-T11).  Using 




Equation 3: Learning Curve Calculation 
 
The learning curve value is 2
-0.011






Figure 51.   Estimated LPD-17 Learning Curve (Follows 63) 
 
A major assumption for this alternative was that the continued construction of LPD-
17s would take advantage of the current learning curve.  In accordance with the FY 2011 
shipbuilding plan this would lead to a construction gap of three years between construction of 
ship 11 and 12. This assumption stipulates that no learning would be lost and this alternative 
would recommend that current ship construction be slowed to maintain the industrial base 
until additional funding would be available to continue construction. 
The equation of y = 1756.6e
-0.011x
 where y is the cost in FY12$ and x is the 
consecutive number of LPD-17, allowed for a model that can predict the next 10 follow-on 
ships. For example, hull 12 is estimated to cost $1539M. This can be seen in Figure 52. 
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# of LPD-17s 




Figure 52.   Prediction of constructing additional LPD-17s (Follows 64) 
 
The historical LPD-17 cost as well as the predicted procurement of the next 11 LPD-
17s can be seen in Table 47. These estimates are shown in FY12$ Millions and represent 
buying one ship every other year for 22 years. 
 










1 2353 12 1539 23 1364 
2 1509 13 1523 24 1349 
3 1524 14 1506 25 1334 
4 1524 15 1489 26 1320 
5 1714 16 1473 27 1305 
6 1613 17 1457 28 1291 
7 1471 18 1441 29 1277 
8 1579 19 1425 30 1263 
9 1685 20 1410     
10 1611 21 1394     
11 1691 22 1379     
Table 47. Historical and Predicted Procurement Costs of LPD-17s 
The additional LPD-17s LCCEs were based on the model prediction of Procurement 
Cost and the Operating and Support Cost for a 30-year period beginning with the 
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Predicted Cost of LPD-17 T12-T22 
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procurement of the first ship. The first alternative included buying 11 additional LPD-17s at 
an interval of one ship every other year during a 22-year period. The O&S costs are 
cumulative for each additional ship resulting in 11 ships’ O&S for the final 8 years in the life 
cycle cost of the first ship before they begin decommissioning. The second alternative 
included buying 19 additional LPD-17s at an interval of one ship every year over a 19-year 
period. The O&S costs are cumulative for each additional ship resulting in 19 ships’ O&S for 
the final 11 years of the life cycle. There was no design costs associated with these 
alternatives because the construction line for the current LPD-17 would be continued. The 
LCCE is $26.94 Billion (FY12$) for 11 LPD-17s and $46.32 Billion (FY12$) for 19 LPD-
17s. The price of the 19 LPD-17s is much higher than any other options in this analysis, but 
this alternative would not require the procurement of the LHA-8 class ship, which would 
decrease the total ship procurement budget of the Navy. The entire analysis can be seen in 
Appendix J. 
2. LPD(17) Flt X 
The cost estimate for the LPD(17) Flt X was also based on the current 11 LPD-17s 
and used learning curve theory to predict the cost of the next 11 ships. To estimate the cost 
for the LPD(17) Flt X, an estimate was needed concerning how much of the ship would 
remain the same as the previous ships and how much the systems engineering team expected 
it to change compared to previous ships. 
 In order to estimate the cost of LPD(17) Flt X, the cost and system engineering teams 
analyzed the ship at the 1-digit SWBS level to determine which levels would be changed in 
order to accommodate the new design. It was determined that the ship would be 70% legacy 
and 30% new design and construction. The team used the original LPD-17 learning curve 
equation to estimate the cost of T12-T22. Knowing that the ship would be 70% legacy allowed 
the team to multiply these values by 0.7 and sum them with the values of T1-T11 multiplied by 
0.3 to get a price for each LPD(17) Flt X ship. The new construction portion began with T1 
for LPD-17. The equation below demonstrates how the cost of T12 was calculated. 
LPD(17) Flt X     T12=(T12*.70)+(T1*.30) 
 







    Ship # FY12$M   
30% 
New   
   1 2353   706   
   2 1509   453   
   3 1524   457   
Historical Data 
4 1524   457   
5 1714   514   
   6 1613   484   
   7 1471   441   
   8 1579   474   
   9 1685   505   
   10 1611   483 
LPD(17)  
Flt X 
    11 1691 
70% 
Legacy 507 FY12$M 
   12 1539 1078  1783 
   13 1523 1066  1518 
   14 1506 1054  1511 
Predicted 
15 1489 1043  1500 
16 1473 1031  1545 
 Procurement Cost 17 1457 1020  1504 
18 1441 1009  1450 
   19 1425 998  1471 
   20 1410 987  1492 
   21 1394 976  1459 
    22 1379 965   1472 
Table 48. LPD-17 procurement Cost Estimates 
 
This LCCE for the LPD(17) Flt X is based on the model prediction of Procurement 
Cost and the Operating and Support Cost for a 30-year period beginning with the 
procurement of the first ship. This alternative includes buying 11 additional LPD(17) Flt Xs 
at an interval of one ship every other year during a 22-year period.  The O&S costs are 
cumulative for each additional ship resulting in 11 ships O&S for the final 8 years in the life 
cycle cost of the first ship before they begin decommissioning. The cost of this option was 
slightly higher because of the design costs and the inability to use the lessons learned for the 
30% of the ship that is new. The LCCE for the LPD(17) Flt X is $27.86 Billion (FY12$).  
The entire analysis can be seen in Appendix I. 
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E. LHA-8 ALTERNATIVE 
The final alternative would procure four LHA-8s in addition to the six that are already 
being designed and procured, for a total of 10 new LHA-8s in the fleet. With six LHA-8s as 
part of the current Navy shipbuilding plan, the challenge was determining how to compare 
procuring an additional four and determining the LCCE of just these four, so it could be 
compared to the LCCE of the other alternatives. 
A major assumption was the LHA-8 will be analogous to LHA-6 and that T1 for 
LHA-6 could be used as the T1 for the learning curve associated with the LHA-8 class.  The 
team also assumed that the Navy was going to procure and operate the LHA-8 class as 
described in the current Navy Ship Building plan dated February of 2010.
65
   
Development of the LCCE for the LHA-8 alternative was done in a similar manner as 
the LPD-17 options. LHA-6 was used for analogy to estimate the T1 for the new class of 
ships. Costs to follow-on ships were modeled using a 99% learning curve for material and 
labor. This allowed the team to estimate the entire cost of procuring and operating the six 
LHA-8s that are scheduled to be built as part of the current ship building plan, and to model 
the procurement of 10 LHA-8s, buying one every other year, over the course of 20 years. 
Using these two procurement plans and adding the O&S costs of the ships as they were 
completed allowed the team to build two LCCEs. 
The Navy shipbuilding plan calls for the procurement of LHAs in 2020, 2025, 2028, 
2032, 2036, and 2040.  The team planned for procuring 10 ships over the course of 20 years. 
The two plans did not line up neatly to allow for some of the 10 ships (and their associated 
O&S) to be called additional costs over the original planned procurement. To account for the 
variance in the two plans the cost team estimated the cost of the original plan and the cost of 
the team’s alternative. With this information the difference was taken between the 10 LHA-8s 
plan and the original six LHA-8s plan to determine the LCCE of just the additional four 
LHA-8s for comparison to the other alternatives LCCEs.   
The procurement costs of the LHA-8s can be seen in Table 49. These procurement 
costs and their associated O&S costs were used to develop LCCEs for both the six and ten 
LHA plans which led to the final LCCE for this alternative of $23.045B in FY12$.  The 
entire analysis including O&S and the difference between the two LHA-8 plans that make up 
this LCCE can be found in Appendix J. 
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Table 49. Procurement cost of LHA-8s 
F. SUMMARY OF COST ESTIMATES AND CONCLUSIONS 




Figure 53.   LCCE Summary 
 
Additionally, Figure 54 shows Cumulative LCCE on a yearly basis over the 30-year 
life cycle for the six alternatives.  It shows that all six options retain their relative position to 
each other throughout the life cycle.  The only exception is the LSD(XB) which overtakes the 
LHA-8s around year 26 of the life cycle.  This is because it is more costly to operate 11 
































Figure 54.   Cumulative LCCE (Yearly Basis)66 
 
Looking at the results there are effectively four different cost points. The LSD(X) 
option is the least expensive option, the LSD(XB) and 4 additional LHAs are the second  
least expensive, the 11 LPD-17s and LPD(17) Flt X are the third least expensive, and the 19 
LPD-17s is the most expensive option.   
The LSD(X) is the smallest ship and therefore would be expected to cost the least. 
This is a new construction alternative but has relatively small size requirements, which helps 
keep the costs down. 
The LSD(XB) is a larger ship, but still smaller than an LPD-17 and starts the second 
cost tier.  This ship has an added capability, but this comes with the higher price.  The reason 
the LHA option is so cost competitive is because it requires the procurement and O&S of 
only four new ships, as opposed to the other options, which all require 11 ships. Additionally, 
the team made the assumption that with six LHA-8s already in the procurement process there 
would be no additional design or startup costs for this option.   
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 The negative slope of the LHA-8 alternative at year five can be explained by the fact that the 
team subtracted the LCCE of 6 ships from the LCCE of 10 ships. At year four the team plan calls for a 
procurement which causes the large positive slope but then in year 5 the original plan calls for a procurement 


































The third price tier of LPD-17 and LPD(17) Flt X is expected.  The LPD-17 has been a 
historically expensive ship class and has shown very little decrease in cost over the first ten 
built. This analysis showed that continued procurement of the LPD-17 would continue to be a 
very expensive alternative. 
The final, and highest, price tier is the 19 LPD-17 alternative. This is a very expensive 
option due to the expense of the ships and also that it requires 19 instead of the 11 required 
by most of the other options. If this option is chosen there are several other cost 
considerations that should be measured. This option would not require the LHA-8 class to be 
built with some mitigating considerations. The current LHA-8 class of six ships was 
estimated to cost approximately $31.9 Billion over the 30-year life cycle. If it is decided that 
this money can be reappropriated to the 19 LPD-17 alternative, it would then be an additional 
$14.4 Billion and make this option the least expensive option over the course of its 30 year 
life cycle. However, as it currently stands it is the most expensive option at double the cost of 
the bottom two tiers. 
The LCCEs of all six alternatives were used as part of the cost-versus-risk-versus-
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VII. RISK DECISION ANALYSIS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The following risk analysis aimed to identify the areas throughout the lifecycle of the 
ship that should be considered prior to selecting an alternative. The goal was to give decision 
makers a rudimentary understanding of areas that, if left unaddressed, could lead to serious 
issues during the acquisition or operations of an LSD replacement ship. The assessment that 
follows was founded in the principles of the DOD’s Risk Management Guide for Acquisition 
6
th
 Edition, and the majority of risk for the project focused on the areas of performance, 
schedule and cost.
67
 The analysis defined risk as it relates to the proposed alternatives, 
evaluates risk within the three basic areas, and attempted to give operationally based 
consideration to guide alternative comparison. The risk of each option was subjectively 
quantified according to techniques described by Mierzwick & Brown solely for the sake of 
comparing the six options.
68
 The emphasis of this section was the identification of risk factors 
and correlating mitigating strategies as they relate to the alternatives.  At the conclusion of 
this chapter a list of mitigation techniques is provided. 
1. Terms and Definitions69 
Risk:  A measure of future uncertainties in achieving program performance goals 
within defined cost and schedule constraints. It has three components: a future root cause, a 
likelihood assessed at the present time of that future root cause occurring, and the 
consequence of that future occurrence. 
Consequence: The outcome of a future occurrence expressed qualitatively or 
quantitatively, being a loss, injury, disadvantage or gain. 
Future Root Cause: The reason, which, if eliminated or corrected, would prevent a 
potential consequence from occurring. It is the most basic reason for the presence of a risk. 
2. Risk Management Process 
Risk Management is an overarching process that encompasses identification, analysis, 
mitigation planning, mitigation implementation, and tracking of future causes and their 
                                                 
67
 (Department of Defense, 2006) 
68
 (Mierzwick & Brown, 2004) 
69
 (Department of Defense, 2006) p.33 
124 
 
consequences. The risk management process model included the following key activities, 
performed on a continuous basis as shown in the Figure 55.
70
 
 Risk Identification 
 Risk Analysis 
 Risk Mitigation Planning 
 Risk Mitigation Plan Implementation 
 Risk Tracking 
 
Figure 55.   DoD Risk Management Process (From71) 
 
Risk Identification: The activity that examines each element of the program to 
identify associated future root causes, begin their documentation, and set the stage for their 
successful management. Risk identification begins as early as possible in successful programs 
and continues throughout the life of the program. 
Risk Analysis: The activity of examining each identified risk to refine the description 
of the risk, isolate the cause, determine the effects, and aid in setting risk mitigation priorities. 
It refines each risk in terms of its likelihood, its consequence, and its relationship to other risk 
areas or processes.  
Risk Mitigation Plan Implementation: The activity of executing the risk mitigation 
plan to ensure successful risk mitigation occurs. It determines what planning, budget, and 
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requirements and contractual changes are needed, provides a coordination vehicle with 
management and other stakeholders, directs the teams to execute the defined and approved 
risk mitigation plans, outlines the risk reporting requirements for on-going monitoring, and 
documents the change history.  
Risk Mitigation Planning: The activity that identifies, evaluates, and selects options to 
set risk at acceptable levels given program constraints and objectives. It includes the specifics 
of what should be done, when it should be accomplished, who is responsible, and the funding 
required to implement the risk mitigation plan. 
Risk Tracking: The activity of systematically tracking and evaluating the performance 
of risk mitigation actions against established metrics throughout the acquisition process and 
develops further risk mitigation options or executes risk mitigation plans, as appropriate. It 
feeds information back into the other risk management activities of identification, analysis, 
mitigation planning, and mitigation plan implementation. 
This analysis focused on the first three steps; Risk Mitigation Plan Implementation 
and Risk Tracking would be performed during the conduct of the acquisition process. 
3. Risk Identification 
The first objective in the risk management process was risk identification. Risk 
identification includes the screening of all requirements and the identification of those likely 
not to be met. The intent of risk identification was to answer the question, “What can go 
wrong?” by: 
 Looking at current and proposed staffing, process, design, supplier, 
operational employment, resources, dependencies, etc. 
 Reviewing potential shortfalls against expectations. 
Risk identification begins as early as possible and continues throughout the program 




4. Types of Risk 
a. Performance (P) Considerations  
Performance considerations focused on the effective impact that technical 
performance could have on the scope of the project. These impacts are associated with how 
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well a solution does what it was designed to do in the environment for which it was designed. 
These considerations are generally defined within the analysis of stakeholder requirements 
and during the initial design. They should be traced through the functional and physical 
decompositions and the scenarios in which the designs will be utilized. The overall question 
examined in this section was, “What can go wrong from an operational perspective and what 
are the consequences of it happening?” 
b. Performance Risk Factors 
(P1) Risk of Not Meeting Lift Requirements – This factor included the risks 
associated with the probability of the given architecture not being able to meet the mission 
requirements due to inadequate lift capability. The lift capability was inclusive of the the 
analysis performed in Section V of this report for both the MEU and MEB lift requirements. 
(P2) Number of Ships (Failure, Maintenance) – This factor focused on the 
risks associated with the impact of ship failures, due to maintenance or equipment failure, in 
certain sized amphibious fleets as well as the implications of a design flaw impacting  
multiple ships.   
(P3) Risk of Failing to Conduct a Diverse Mission Set – This factor focused 
on the ability of the various alternatives to conduct the range of military operations.  
(P4) Mission Accomplishment (Split-Ops Impacts) – This factor focused on 
the impact the number of ships might have on the Combatant Commander’s ability to conduct 
multiple, simultaneous operations effectively. 
(P5) Risk of Mission / Force Projection Delays Due to Enemy Actions – This 
factor addressed the risk of mission accomplishment and force projection delays due to 
enemy actions.   
(P6) Risk Associated with Logistical Support – This factor considered the size 
of the ship and the requisite replenishment needs as well as the impact of ship size with 
respect to ports and shipyards.  
c. Schedule (S) Considerations  
Schedule considerations focused on the impact the building schedule could 
have on the ability to meet requirements. The primary measure for dealing with schedule 
impacts is effect on the critical path construction process. Certain impacts may be positive in 
isolation but can have a negative effect to the overall schedule. The overall question to be 
examined in this section was, “What can go wrong from the perspective of the building 
schedule that can impact the fielding of the solution?” 
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d. Schedule Risk Factors 
(S1) Number of Ships Being Built or Timeline Required – This factor 
primarily examined the ship construction schedule. It examined those areas in the schedule 
most likely to slip the potential effects if they did. 
(S2) Risk of Delay – This factor examined the components of the architecture 
as they apply to the risk associated with the construction schedule. It examined those 
components with sufficient complexity to threaten the schedule.  
(S3) Risk of Insufficient Testing of Systems – This factor addressed the threat 
of flawed or inadequate testing on requirement achievement. 
(S4) Ship Design / Building Issues – This factor examined issues related to the 
maturity of design, technology needed for the architecture, and adequacy of the facilities and 
workers available to meet the building requirements. 
(S5) Construction Availability – This factor examined the impact of the 
architecture in relation to the current FY 2011 shipbuilding plan with respect to budget, 
shipbuilding plan, and annual construction limits. 
(S6) Risk of Exceeding Approved Annual Ship Construction Budget – This 
factor examined budgetary constraints of the US Navy’s annual construction plan. 
e.  Cost (C) Considerations  
Cost considerations focused on the likelihood for cost changes and the impact 
those changes could have on the procurement of a replacement ship. The overall question 
examined in this section was: “What issues during the construction and operation of a 
replacement ship could most impact cost.” 
f. Cost Risk Factors 
(C1) Cost Overrun – This factor examined the probability that is associated 
with the risk of the project going over budget. Are there any historical trends that need to be 
mitigated from any similar projects?  
(C2) Production Process Not Proven – This section examined the probability 
that production processes could impact the cost of the ships. Are there any production 
processes that are being recommended in the alternatives that are not proven?  
(C3) Sufficient Facilities are Not Available for Construction – This section 
examined the likelihood of current construction not being able to handle the required size, 
amount or complexity of the recommended alternatives. 
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(C4) Sensitivity to Fuel, Maintenance, Personnel Cost Flux – This section 
addressed the overall confidence level of the cost estimate by examining the underlying 
assumptions.  
(C5) Infrastructure Changes Required for Port Facilities – This section 
examined the possibility that current Navy facilities would require modification to handle the 
size or number of ships being serviced or stationed in the fleet. 
B. RISK MITIGATION STRATEGY 
According to the DOD’s Risk Management Guide for DOD Acquisition, the intent of 
risk mitigation planning is to answer the question “What is the program approach for 
addressing this potential unfavorable consequence?” There are four general means by which 
to mitigate risk. One of more may be applied for each identified risk. They are:
73
  
1. Avoid the risk by eliminating the root cause and/or the consequence,  
2. Control the cause or consequence,  
3. Transfer the risk 
4. Assume the level of risk and continuing on the current program plan.  
The risk mitigation strategy for this project was to provide several overall mitigations 
that should be considered during the design phase. Those identified issues associated with 
each of the alternatives will lend insight during the decision-making phase. 
C. RISK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
For each of the developed alternatives several factors were identified as key to the risk 
comparison. These key factors were: (1) Lift Capability (MEU and MEB Level); (2) Modeled 
Unload Times; and (3) Cost. 
The greater part of the analysis of these three key factors was considered to be 
associated with performance and cost risks. The following analysis sought to identify and 
quantify possible risks areas, as well as provide an initial framework for the areas that should 
be examined for risk mitigation throughout the life cycle. This analysis began with an 
examination of each of the alternatives from the perspective of these key factors. 
The analysis of lift capability was conducted in Section V of this report. It focused on 
the comparable metrics of the six footprints at both the MEU and MEB level. The alternative 
ARG configurations were then modeled through simulation to see the estimated expected 
unload times of the ship’s cargo by both LCACs and aircraft. Within the cost chapter of this 
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report, Section VI, each of the alternatives was examined to determine the estimated expected 
cost of each configuration over the 30-year life cycle of the alternative. These analyses 
ranked each of the developed alternatives, lowest numerical rank being best, to determine 
which alternative most met the desired requirements. A summary of the findings is shown in 
Table 50. 
 
Summary of Rankings 
  
Lift Performance Cost Overall Rank 
MEU  MEB  HA/DR Assault LCCE Sum Place 
Option 1 LPD-17 1 1 3 2 4 11 1 
Option 2 LSD (X) 2 6 4 5 1 18 3 




4 4 5 6 5 24 4 




6 2 1 3 6 18 3 
Table 50. Ranking Summary 
After conducting the alternative analysis utilizing the three key factors of Lift 
Capability (MEU and MEB Level), Modeled Unload Times, and Cost, the team determined 
that alternatives 5 and 6 would require additional and more thorough analysis beyond just 




D. RISK ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
The following analysis of the alternatives was conducted in the three areas of risk: 
performance, schedule and cost. The basic premise of this analysis was to quantify risk using 
a systematic examination of probabilities and consequences that are inherent to each of the 
identified risk factors. The analysis follows the procedures described by Mierzwick, et al, to 
define the values associated with the probabilities and consequences within the analysis and 
then calculate an overall risk value.
74
 Table 51 shows the probability likelihoods that were 
assigned for each risk factor. 
 
Probability / Likelihood Level Criteria, PLi 




0.7 Highly Likely 
0.9 Near Certain 
Table 51. Probability/Likelihood of Risk Factor (From 75) 
The team formed working groups to discuss each of the key areas of analysis. The 
groups discussed the likelihood of each of the risk factors and assigned them a likelihood of 
occurrence (probability) level. The groups then discussed the consequences that might be 
associated with each risk factor and determined a consequence level. The definition for these 
consequence levels is shown in Table 52 for each of the three areas of analysis.
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Consequence Level Criteria 
Level Performance, CFi Schedule, CFk Cost, CFj 
0.1 Minimal or no impact 
Minimal or no impact on total 
ship design or production 
schedule 
Minimal or no 
impact on total 
objective cost 
0.3 
Acceptable with some 
reduction in margin 
Additional resources required; 
able to meet need dates 
< 5% increase 
0.5 
Acceptable with significant 
reduction in margin 
Minor slip in key milestones; 
not able to meet need date 
5 - 7% increase 
0.7 
Acceptable; no remaining 
margin 
Major slip in key milestone or 
critical path impacted 
7-10% increase 
0.9 Unacceptable 
Can't achieve key team or 
major program milestone  
>10% increase 
Table 52. Consequence Level Criteria (Follows 76) 
The value of risk to each of the alternatives was given by the following equations: 
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Term / Symbol Definition 
Rp,c,s Risk Level 
PLi,j,k Probability Level 
CFi,j,k Consequence Factor 
wp Weight Factor (Performance) 
Rp Risk Level (Performance) 
ws Weight Factor (Schedule) 
Rs Risk Level (Schedule) 
wc Weight Factor (Cost) 
Rc Risk Level (Cost) 
Table 53. Risk Equations Term and Definitions 
There were six, seven, and five risk factors identified for performance, schedule and 
cost, respectively. Within performance, each of these six risk factors was determined to 
present an equal threat, and thus, each    equaled 1/6. Similarly for schedule and cost, each  
   was set to 1/7, and each    to 1/5. This normalized the risk value for performance, 
schedule, and cost according to the number of risk factors identified.  
Overall risk was calculated using Equation 6 and assigned weighting factors in line 
with overall stakeholder requirements for performance, schedule, and cost risk. It was 
determined that several risk factors for each of the alternatives needed to be examined in 
order to derive an explanation as to the root cause for the overall risk score given to each 
alternative. These key risk factors were determined by examining those individual risk factors 
that had high consequence scores, all those greater than 0.25, and led to the selection of three 
to five factors per alternative that required further explanation. The intent was to identify any 
underlying root causes for risks that were common throughout all proposed alternatives.  
These root causes were then examined in the determination of mitigation strategies. A 
complete risk card for the analysis is shown in Appendix K.  
E. HIGH RISK FACTORS LEADING TO ROOT CAUSE 
1. Alternatives That Add LPD-17s  
The alternatives replacing the Whidbey Island and Harpers Ferry classes with the San 
Antonio Class, option 1 with 11 LPDs and the Small Deck option 6 with 19 LPDs, would be 
suitable on the basis of continuation of a current hull design; but historically there have 
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always been changes to the design based on a desire to upgrade the existing system. The 
LPD-17 hull design has had significant challenges due to budget overruns of around 30%. 
This inherent risk to the cost of the project may be unacceptable to decision makers without 
significant mitigation measures in place.  
2. Alternatives That Utilize A New Hull Design 
The alternatives based on replacing the Whidbey Island and Harpers Ferry classes 
with a newly designed hull form, the LSD(X), LSD(XB) and LPD(17) Flt X, offer the most 
flexibility to address new or different requirements. One risk identified was the development 
of new ship designs has historically been problematic. Cost overruns and delays associated 
with the acquisition of recent systems such as the LPD-17 and LCS have been significant.  
3. Alternatives That Reduce Or Increase The Number Of Ships 
Alternatives that increase or decrease the number of ships within the amphibious fleet, 
the Big Deck option 5 and Small Deck option 6, also have associated risks. With the 
implementation of option 5, the projected fleet size would decrease in the number of ships 
and would eventually rely solely on the capabilities of the larger LHA and LHD classes. The 
risk associated with the loss of one of these ships due to construction, enemy action or 
maintenance delays pose a significant threat to the amphibious fleet’s ability to meet mission 
requirements. Likewise, the ability of the amphibious fleet to meet the COCOM’s desire to 
conduct multiple missions would likely be constrained due to the risk of losing such a 
valuable asset. This is despite the greatly increased lift capacity associated with alternative 5.  
The analysis of alternative 6, the Small Deck option, identified significant risks in the 
limited ability to support fixed wing aircraft operations. This capability loss will have to be 
analyzed to determine if the projected cost savings in the operations and support of the fleet is 
enough to justify the loss of this capability.  
4. Overall Weighted Risk Card 
Table 54 shows the results of the weighted risk analysis of each of the proposed 
alternatives. A weighting was assigned to the factors of performance, cost and schedule risk 
at 0.9, 0.5, and 0.3 respectively. These weighting factors were based on stakeholder analysis 
to place emphasis on threats to ship and fleet performance over threats to cost, and both over 
threats to procurement schedule. The result is a unit-less risk measure that allowed for a 
general comparison of the six options. According to this analysis, Option 6, the Small Deck 
Option, presents the least risk while Option 2, the LSD(X), presents the most risk. The risk 
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cards shown in Appendix K display the probability likelihoods and consequence factors 
assigned to each risk factor as well as the overall risk value for performance, schedule, and 
cost for each alternative. The results are displayed in Table 54. 
 
Overall Risk Assessment for Alternative Architecture 
Alternative Overall Weighted Risk 
Option 1: LPD-17 0.30 
Option 2: LSD(X) 0.45 
Option 3: LSD(XB)  0.38 
Option 4: LPD(17) FLT X 0.34 
Option 5: Big Deck Option 0.41 
Option 6: Small Deck Option 0.25 
Table 54. Overall Risk Assessment 
The results of the analysis show options that focused on the production of the LPD-17 
to replace the LSD demonstrate the lowest risk in achieving a satisfactory impact to the cost, 
performance and schedule of the amphibious fleet. This is intuitive, as a known design should 
present less risk than any new and untested design. 
F. RISK MITIGATION PLANNING 
 Risk mitigation planning is the activity that identifies, evaluates, and selects 
options to set risk at acceptable levels given program constraints and objectives.
79
 Below are 
the recommended mitigating strategies in the three major risk consideration areas of 
performance, schedule and cost. The strategy will first deal with considerations that need to 
be addressed within each of the alternatives of this analysis and then any that were found to 
be specific to a particular alternative. 
1. Mitigation to Risks to Mission Performance (P): 
 Adding an Additional Ship to the Traditional ARG Configuration: Adding an 
additional ship to the ARG would eliminate the risk of not having the required lift 
capabilities to meet mission objectives. 
 Improving Maintenance Scheduling to Reduce Time in Maintenance: The risk 
of losing one ship to maintenance would present significant problems to meeting 
mission objectives. Improving the maintenance schedule would reduce the loss of a 
ship due to unscheduled maintenance.  
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 (Department of Defense, 2006) p.18 
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 Preposition Equipment: Prepositioning equipment would mitigate the risk of 
not being able to conduct multiple or diverse missions. Prepositioned equipment 
would enable a ship to leave more quickly, with less equipment and give it a wider 
range of capabilities by effectively expanding its cargo capacity. 
 Change Doctrine to Allow for More Follow-on Shipping: Follow-on shipping 
would enable a ship or ARG to mitigate the risk of not meeting lift requirements. This 
would enable the ship to carry only what is needed in the short term of an amphibious 
mission. Follow-on shipping would augment supplies to meet longer-term 
requirements.  
 Change Doctrine to Change Fixed Wing Operation (CVN Only): Using an all 
small deck ARG composition eliminates a fixed wing aviation capability. Fixed wing 
aircraft will most likely be needed only during an assault operation. In the case of an 
assault, the amphibious force will be accompanied by a CSG where the CVN could 
fulfill the fixed wing aircraft requirements.  
The potential risk reduction for the successful implementation of each of these was 
calculated and is displayed in Table 55. 
 








Add Additional Ship .1 .9 2-5% 
Optimize Maintenance 
Schedule 
.8 .8 5-7% 
Preposition Equipment .3 .6 3-5% 
Follow-on Shipping .5 .8 2-4% 
Fixed Wing CVN Only .7 .8 4-6% 
Table 55. Performance Risk Mitigations 
2. Mitigation to Risks to Project Schedule (S): 
Using Earned Value Management Procedures: Earned Value Management (EVM) is 
a method for integrating scope, schedule, and resources for measuring project time. It 
compares the amount of work or effort that was planned with what was actually earned and 
spent to determine if cost and schedule are tracking as planned. By comparing planned value 
(the ideal progress of the project) to the earned value (the value of the project to date based 
on work or effort expended), a project manager can detect early if the project is going awry. 
This will help to mitigate schedule delays early in the SEP. 
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Using Mature Technology: Technology Readiness Level (TRL) is a measure used by 
the DoD and many of the world's major companies to assess the maturity of evolving 
technologies (materials, components, devices, etc.) prior to incorporating that technology into 
a system or subsystem. When a new technology is first invented or conceptualized, it is not 
suitable for immediate application. Instead, new technologies are usually subjected to 
experimentation, refinement, and increasingly realistic testing. Once the technology is 
sufficiently proven, it can be incorporated into a system/subsystem. Current policy requires 
technology to have met TRL6 before it is used in a new or existing system. Technology 
Readiness Level 6 demonstrates technology maturity at the subcomponent level, not the 
integrated system.
80
 If the technology used meets the minimum requirement of TRL 6 then it 
is clear that schedule risk will be reduced due to time not being wasted in experimentation 
and testing. 
Using Well Known Facilities: Working closely with known industry leadership in 
shipbuilding helps to mitigate schedule risk since factors impacting its shipbuilding plans are 
known and seen before. This closer working relationship may require the DoD to supply 
industry with more information regarding long-range plans, future budgets, and procurement 
options. However, it should also reduce risk in shipbuilding programs by providing the 
government with greater understanding and certainty regarding industrial capacity as well as 
better progress indicators. This mitigation factor also will allow for the use of complementary 
skills, skill synergies (such as design resources), and give DoD procurement options, which 
result in greater industrial efficiencies. 
The potential risk reduction for the successful implementation of each of these 
strategies was calculated and is displayed in Table 56. 
 








Using EVM .9 .9 2-5% 
Mature Technology .9 .8 5-8% 
Using Known Facilities .7 .6 3-5% 
Table 56. Schedule Risk Mitigations 
                                                 
80
 (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (ASD(R&E)), 2011) 
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3. Mitigation to Risks to Project Cost (C) 
Open Ship to Foreign Military Sales: By opening the ship to foreign military sales, it 
is possible for the US to conduct joint collaboration with purchasing nations. The increase in 
production of ships would reduce the overall individual ship cost associated with each ship.  
Incentivize Lower Cost: Contracts could be written in order to incentivize lower cost 
of the ship construction. This option would focus on the desires of the company to reduce 
costs in order to achieve a company level bonus.  
Increase Automation: Automation (robotics, streamlined supply chain) can be 
implemented on the shipbuilding process to improve productivity, thus reducing the 
manpower requirements and costs accordingly.  
Optimize Internal Sensors: More internal sensors can be installed within the ships to 
perform damage detection and limited damage control functions, thus reducing the manpower 
requirements and costs on board each ship. 
Increased Specialized Training: A core group of selected personnel can be groomed 
to develop deep expertise in their specialized fields (engine specialist, radar specialist) and 
serve as permanent party to the ship for longer periods of time, providing two key benefits. 
The first is the deeper knowledge base made available onboard, and the second is the possible 
faster training of newer personnel to manage the systems, as this core of experts can provide 
more in-depth and effective training to the inexperienced crews.  
Expand Life-Cycle: In-service upgrading or life extension programs should be 
scheduled within the life cycle of the ship, reducing the probability of more severe 
malfunctions or damages within the ships that may result in more costly repairs. 
Improve Maintenance Programs: Frequent Preventive Maintenance (PM) should be 
scheduled throughout the life cycle of the ships to rectify minor problems before they can 
develop into more severe malfunctions and cause higher maintenance costs. Increased 
scheduling efficiency can be developed in order to provide for expected high cost repairs to 
be done at locations that have reduced labor rates.  
Reduce Building Standards: The introduction of civilian ship building standards at 
certain points in the ship construction could reduce the overall cost of the construction of the 
ship.  
Minimize Class Upgrades (Use Standard Technology): The ship should integrate 
largely established and stable systems that have proven performance records with other 
countries or platforms. This can reduce the probability of integration issues, and hence the 
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development and construction costs. This option would also look to push for standard 
modularization of higher cost systems. 
Pre-Warehouse Spares: Further studies should be conducted in order to predict the 
spares requirements throughout the life cycle of the ships, which can then allow for advanced 
planning and budgeting for parts and components. This reduces the probability of 
overstocking spares, and the subsequent warehousing costs. Alternatively, accurate prediction 
can allow for the just-in-time order and delivery of spares to minimize any equipment 
downtime, or minimize the increased cost of ad-hoc orders.  
Continue Research for New Fuel Technology: Research into new and alternative fuels 
can result in the development of cheaper and more efficient fuels. These new alternatives 
fuels can reduce the per-knot / per-hour cost of operation of the ships.  
Out-Source Labor: Outsourcing labor to countries with lower labor costs can reduce 
the overall construction costs of the ships. This can also be accomplished by working with 
companies to expand foreign worker visas to supplement current labor. This strategy may 
reduce the estimated 70% ship construction cost that is due to labor costs.  
The potential risk reduction for the successful implementation of each of these 












Open Ship to Foreign 
Military Sales .9 .7 
5-9% 
Incentivize Lower Cost .8 .7 3-5% 
Increase Automation .8 .8 2-4% 
Optimize Internal 
Sensors .8 .8 
1-3% 
Increased Specialized 
Training .8 .9 
2-5% 
Expand Life-cycle .9 .9 4-6% 
Optimize Maintenance 
Programs .9 .9 
5-7% 
Reduce Building 




Standard Technology) .7 .7 
3-5% 
Pre-Warehouse Spares .9 .9 3-5% 
Continue Research for 
New Fuel Technology .7 .7 
1-2% 
Out-Source Labor .5 .9 5-7% 
Table 57. Cost Risk Mitigations 
G. MITIGATION STRATEGY ANALYSIS 
The risk mitigation strategy analysis was based on the analysis of factors that would 
most likely impact decisions being made for the adoption of an overall strategy. The primary 
factors that were chosen represent a combination of the probability that decision makers 
would adopt the strategy, the probability that the strategy would be successful and the 
anticipated range of cost savings that could be expected for that strategy on the overall cost of 
the program. The product values for each of these three factors (including the average 
expected savings) were calculated to determine the overall value of the strategy. The top five 


















Performance 0.8 0.8 5-7% 
Using Mature Technology Schedule 0.9 0.8 5-8% 
Open Ship to Foreign 
Military Sales 
Cost 0.9 0.5 5-9% 
Expand Life Cycle Cost 0.9 0.9 4-6% 
Pre-Warehouse Spares Cost 0.9 0.9 3-5% 
Table 58. Risk Mitigation Strategy 
The use of these individual strategies in a combined overall cost savings strategy was 
determined to be the most cost effective methodology that should be incorporated in the 
decision of the next ship class. 
H. CONCLUSIONS 
This assessment proposed a two-tiered approach to objective risk management of the 
problem. First, by utilizing a simplified risk event approach for concept exploration and 
requirement definitions; and second, by identifying the proposed mitigation strategies 
described above. Utilizing concept exploration, risk was evaluated using subjectively 
determined occurrence probabilities and scaled consequence values; an overall risk 
assessment score was assigned that identified the high-risk events associated with each 
alternative. Through the use of these scores the analysis identified the most and least risky 
alternatives. Analyzing risk through this process was simple, direct, and consistent with the 
DoD 5000 risk management approach.  
Our analysis identified alternative 6, the Small Deck Options, as the least risky option 
and alternative 2, the LSD(X) Option,   as the most risky option for the LSD replacement. 
Furthermore, our analysis demonstrated that through the utilization of the two-tiered 
approach mentioned above that the overall risk level for each alternative could be reduced, 




VIII. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Whidbey Island and Harpers Ferry classes of LSD ships begin decommissioning 
in 2022 with the last ship leaving active service in 2039. A replacement ship class must be 
procured if the Navy wishes to maintain a 33 ship amphibious fleet in order to meet the 2.0 
MEB lift capability as well as operational tasking from various COCOMs. However, neither 
of these two requirements is threatened in the near term. With the arrivals of the last San 
Antonio class ship and the planned procurement of new LHA class ships, the amphibious 
fleet maintains a level of at least 33 ships until that first Whidbey Island decommissioning a 
decade from now. And the 2.0 MEB lift capability maintains or exceeds current levels in all 
footprint categories except Vehicle capacity into the 2030s. The Navy’s current plan has the 
first LSD replacement ship reach the fleet in 2022 but could push this date back. Given the 
changing fiscal environment and strategic environment, both internal to US force structure 
and external with respect to current threats and areas of emphasis, time should be taken to 
make an informed decision regarding this national security issue. 
This project analyzed four options which provide a one-to-one replacement for the 
LSD class ships. It also chose to analyze the possibility of an amphibious fleet composed of 
all Big Decks or all Small Decks, Options 5 and 6, simply for the sake of comparison and to 
validate the need for a robust and diverse set of capabilities. But when analyzed for MEU and 
MEB lift capability, modeled for throughput performance in the given scenarios, and 
estimated for cost given an assumed procurement schedule, these two options appear to be 
reasonable considerations. While the project has four viable alternatives to recommend as 
replacement ships for the LSD-41 and 49 class ships, it is the opinion of the project team that 
the best course of action would be to further study the degree of viability for Options 5 and 6.  
Both these options offer significant advantages and disadvantages to the amphibious 
fleet. A fleet comprised of all big decks provides a tremendous lift capability but at the cost 
of assets available for tasking by the Combatant Commanders. An all small deck fleet would 
maximize the COCOM’s available assets but would require a significant shift in Marine 
Corps fixed-wing operations. The high cost of the small deck option would be significantly 
decreased by the procurement of an LSD(X) or LSD(XB) instead of the LPD-17 analyzed 
for. Both of these options represent extremes, but this analysis shows that an ARG composed 
one big deck, one LPD, and one LSD is not the ideal configuration for all scenarios. The ideal 
amphibious fleet structure may not be 11 big decks, 11 LPDs, and 11 LSDs. This simplified 
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answer to the 2.0 MEB lift requirement, comes at the cost of many other considerations 
regarding day-to-day amphibious operations. All the analysis conducted in the previous 
chapters supports an amphibious fleet restructuring and further study to investigate the most 
appropriate balance. 
As to a simple ship-for-ship replacement, three of the four options have merit. A 
replacement class ship called LPD(17) Flt X modeled on the hull of the San Antonio class 
designated Option 4, was determined to achieve few performance gains and few cost savings 
and is not recommended for selection. The LSD(X), Option 2, was the cheapest option with 
measurable gains over the current standard. If cost were the most significant factor, the 
LSD(X) would be the clear winner. 
 
Figure 56.   Performance vs. Cost (Assault) 
The LPD-17 and the LSD(XB) stand out when cost and performance are considered 
together as shown in Figure 56. Each of these options offers bang for the buck by improving 
capability at a lower cost. The LPD-17 program has been plagued by cost overruns, but it is 
an extremely capable ship and with eleven ships already procured the savings in R&D cannot 
be ignored. Similarly, the LSD(XB) represents a significant improvement in capability for the 
fleet at a moderate cost. These two options are the best alternatives for selection.  
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Having considered lift capacity, throughput performance, cost and risk, the best 
solution to the defined problem most likely lies outside the bounds of current accepted fleet 
architectures. With the time available, further study should determine the appropriate fleet 








A. LSD FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION 
 
 




Figure 58.    LSD Functional Decomposition (a) 
1. Lift: This function refers to the capability to hold and transport personnel and equipment 
over the sea.  This shall include the ability to perform the following functions:  
1.1. Embark: This function describes the loading of the personnel and equipment 
onboard. 
1.2. Debark: This function describes the unloading or launching of embarked personnel 
and equipment. 
1.3. Store: This function describes the securing and containment of embarked equipment.  
1.4. Berth: This function describes the housing of embarked personnel. 
1.5. Maneuver: This function describes the movement over the sea. 
2. Command: This function describes the ability to control the functions, operations, and 
assets with respect to the amphibious vessel’s mission.  
2.1. Communicate: This function describes the ability to convey and receive information 
internally and externally both organically and non-organically.  
2.2. Direct: This function describes the ability to manage, exert control, or dictate actions 
internally and externally both organically and non-organically. 
2.3. Observe: This function describes the ability to receive information with sensors or 
personnel. 


























Figure 59.   LSD Functional Decomposition (b) 
3. Conduct Operations: Amphibious Operations functionally requires the utilization of those 
forces and equipment deployed on or assigned to the amphibious vessel. This includes but 
is not limited to USMC and naval personnel, SOF forces, and the crews who operate the 
LCACs, small boats, and rotary aircraft utilized in the accomplishment of the amphibious 
mission set. 
3.1. Air Operations include all aircraft operations on the flight deck and in the hangar of 
the amphibious vessel.  
3.1.1.  Launch – Ability to have aircraft take-off from the ship. 
3.1.2.  Recover – Ability to have aircraft land on the ship. 
3.1.3.  Refuel – Ability to provide additional fuel to aircraft. 
3.1.4.  Load – Ability to transfer personnel and equipment onto and off of aircraft.   
3.1.5.  Transfer – Ability to move aircraft as necessary to include between the flight 
































































3.2. Surface Operations refers to all amphibious vessel actions necessary for the 
completion of amphibious missions. This includes the maneuvers of amphibious 
vessel as well as the small boats and LCACs launched from that vessel. 
3.2.1.  Launch – Ability to have surface craft debark from the ship. 
3.2.2.  Recover – Ability to have surface craft embark on the ship. 
3.2.3.  Refuel – Ability to transfer fuel. 
3.2.4.  Load – Ability to transfer personnel and equipment onto and off of the vessel 
and surface craft.   
3.3. Medical Operations include all efforts to aid, treat, and attend to the medical and 
dental needs of embarked personnel or personnel of interest in a given area of 
operation. 
3.4. Maintenance Operations refer those efforts to repair or prevent damage to the 
equipment embarked on the vessel necessary for the employment of forces. This 
includes maintenance of LCACs, aircraft, and embarked vehicles and equipment but 
does not refer to the maintenance of the amphibious vessel itself. 
3.5. Defensive Operations refers to amphibious force protection and surface craft 
deployed in operations.  
3.5.1.  Detect: To discover or determine the existence or presence of a potential 
threat in the operating area. 
3.5.2.  Track: To receive updates of the threats position 
3.5.3.  Identify: To discern whether the potential threat is friend, foe, or neutral. 
3.5.4.  Engage: To employ weapons against the potential threat. 
3.6. Conduct Medical Ops: This function describes the ability to provide for the 
coordination of medical care to troops onboard the ship. It includes the provision of 
equipment necessary for performing emergency medical functions like life support 
units 
3.6.1. Humanitarian Assistance (HA): This function describes the ability to provide 
for emergency on-site care for people affected in the disaster region. It includes 
provision of operating rooms, hospital facilities, and auxiliary supporting 
features like backup power supply and oxygen-supporting plants.  
3.6.2. Triage/Emergency: This function describes the ability to provide operating 
rooms, hospital facilities and auxiliary supporting features for the emergency on-
site care of US combatant forces deployed in war or other operations. This 
149 
 
includes equipment for the treatment and containment of chemical and biological 
threats. 
3.6.3. Crew/Troop Support: This function describes the ability to provide for basic 
health care services for crew and troops onboard the ship. Preventive measures 




Figure 60.   LSD Functional Decomposition (c) 
4. Conduct Damage Control: This function describes any tasks or actions that are 
undertaken to control any situation that may result in the sinking of the ship.  It consists 
of the following actions: 
4.1. Identification: This function describes any action that detects the presence, extent 























































4.2. Damage Suppression: This function describes any action that reduces vulnerability to 
the ship either by containing or minimizing the damage or reducing the effects of 
damage to the critical components. 
4.2.1. Passive Damage Suppression: This function refers to damage suppression 
measures that do not have any damage-sensing capabilities. 
4.2.2. Active Damage Suppression: This function refers to damage suppression 
measures that utilize a sensor or other device that senses when a hit or damage 
process occurs and activates a function that either contains the subsequent 
damage or reduces the effects of the damage. 
4.3. Damage Repair: This function refers to any action performed on a damaged 
component, in order to restore it to a serviceable condition. 
4.4. Maintenance of Breathable Air: This function describes the provision, filtering and/or 
re-circulation of air that can be inhaled by the crew without detrimental effects to 
their health. 
5. Sustain: This function describes the combination of providing for the needs of both the 
crew and vessel so that operations will be conducted efficiently.  
5.1. Sustain Ship: This function describes the abilities necessary for the ship to maintain 
an operational tempo required by the directed tasking. 
5.1.1. Conduct Resupply: The act of obtaining needed sustenance for both crew and 
embarked personnel or materials required onboard the vessel that were not 
already located there. 
5.1.2. Conduct Refueling: The process of obtaining required fuel either underway or 
while in port. 
5.1.3. Conduct Maintenance:  The practice of vessel wide care for all facets aboard 
through corrective or preventative upkeep conducted while in port or underway. 
5.2. Sustain Crew: This function describes the abilities necessary for the crew to maintain 
an operational tempo required by the directed tasking. 
5.2.1. Sustain Habitability: The vessel will provide shelter from the weather, provide 
running water, access to a toilets and bathing facilities, heating, electricity, 
freedom from noxious smells, noise and garbage. 
5.2.2. Berth Crew: Provision of a sleeping space for crewmembers. 
6. Maneuver 
6.1. Propel – The ability to generate thrust to move the ship across water 
6.2. Steer – The ability to direct the course of the ship.  
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6.3. Float – The ability to displace water, be buoyant or suspended in water.  To remain 
suspended on the surface of the sea without sinking 
6.4. Ballast – The act of adding any weight in solid or liquid form to increase draft, to 
change trim, or to improve the stability. 
6.5. De-ballast – The act of returning the ship to its operational draft following ballasting. 
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B. PROBABILITY OF SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS 
Abstract: A deterministic model was implemented using MATLAB to compute the 
probability of survival (Ps) of various amphibious platforms against Anti-Ship Missile 
threats. The models implemented a layered defense approach based on equipping of each ship 
and allowed the possibility to add an outer defensive escort layer (e.g. SAG / CSG). Based on 
the results, the impact of equipping on Ps strongly depends on the expected threat. For cases 
of a single threat (subsonic or supersonic), all equipping combinations less the LSD-4 
perform well even without the presence of an escort ship. However, as the number of threats 
increased, the presence of additional layers of defensive started to make a difference in the 
survivability of individual platforms. The presence of an Escort Group made a significant 
difference to the survivability of lesser-equipped ships. 
In view of the results, two possible courses of actions to balance between Ps and cost 
of equipping is: 
(1) Have Escort Groups with the platforms whenever the expected level of 
threat is high.   
(2) Have a LSD(X) design that is modular in nature (similar to LCS concept), 
allowing the plug-on of added NSSM modules whenever threat level is high 
but operating with just the RAM as a basic defense (similar to LPD-17) when 
low threats are expected.   
Objective:  The Ps values obtained from this model are intended to be:  
(1) Used in a higher-level simulation that studies the amphibious group operations 
performance in terms of Probability of Survival when faced with a possibly hostile 
landing zone with anti-ship missile threats. 
(2) A Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) relating to the survivability of amphibious group 
operations during amphibious landing operations in “hot” landing zone against anti-




1. Description & Assumptions: 
 The schematic diagram below illustrates the geometrical layout (not to scale) assumed 
in the computations. The implemented concept is one of layered defense, where each layer 
would attrite the numbers of threats as far as possible before handing-over the “leakers” to 


















Figure 61.   Engagement Geometry and Layered Defense Concept* 
*(Actual layering may differ from platform to platform depending on equipping) 
 
The baseline defensive layers assumed for the study are summarized in Table 59. It 
should be noted that the actual layering would vary from platform to platform depending on 
their equipping. When present, the Escort Group, comprising either a Surface Action Group 
(SAG) or Carrier Strike Group (CSG), would supplement the layers. These escort layers can 
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 Amphib. Platform 
Self Defense Systems 
Escort Group  
Outer Layer 
defense  
Assumed Layer Ranges 
(WRT Amphib. Platform) 
Layer 1  SM-2 15nm to 40nm 
Layer 2 SLQ32 (Jammer) ESSM 10nm to 15nm 
Layer 3 NSSM (if avail) and 
SLQ32 
Escort No Fire 
Zone 
(*) 
3.5nm to 10nm 
Layer 4 RAM 1.1nm to 3.5nm 
Layer 5 CIWS 0.3nm to 1.5nm 
Table 59. Summary of Defense Layering 
 (* SAG assumed to leave the leakers in this zone for the self-defense systems of the amphibious platforms) 
 
Computation Methodology 
(1) Threat scenario definitions: 
In the computations performed, it was assumed that all threats were simultaneously 
incoming and identical. In order to compute the results where there were different kinds of 
threats (e.g. 2 subsonic and 1 supersonic), it was necessary to obtain independent results for 
these two kinds of threats and combine the probabilities obtained (i.e. Ps = Ps2 subsonic * Ps1 
supersonic). An additional step prior to performing the independent runs was to manually adjust 
the resource allocation, to ensure that the launchers at each layer had sufficient rounds to 
engage both sets of targets. It should be noted that this way of combination represents a very 
coarse computation and would only be accurate if there was ample time within each layer to 
engage the different kinds of targets independently. This condition could be practically 
achieved if it is assumed that the different threat kinds have sufficient time offsets between 
their arrivals. 
(2) Interaction between different defensive layers: 
The concept of a layered defense was implemented using Bayesian analysis on a 
layer-by-layer basis. The computed probabilities for each previous layer acted as the 
conditional probability for the subsequent layer (Note: This required the layers to be 
independent). The final probability of survival was computed by summing the probabilities 
for all the cumulative outcomes with no “leakers” at the end of the last layer. This concept is 




Figure 62.   Bayesian Analysis for Layered Defense 
 
(3) Computation of probabilities within each layer: 
The computation of probabilities within each layer took into account each weapon’s 
capabilities as follows: 
 The “firing window” (i.e. the amount of time during which the weapon can be fired) 
was computed using weapons’ maximum and minimum ranges, which are defined in 
conjunction with the start and stop ranges of each layer (i.e. these may not be the 
weapon’s actual max and min ranges, but rather these are limited by the layer’s 
limits). The flight time of the missile and the threat were used to determine the time 
window within which the weapon can be fired to intercept the threat for the layer. 
 Within the firing window, the number of shots that can be fired was computed based 
on: 
o Firing rate (or time between launches) for the weapon 
o Time needed to slew weapon between targets (if applicable) 
o Quantity of rounds per launcher (assuming no reload during engagement) 
o Max number of rounds that could be allocated per threat. This was manually 
set to “simulate” a simple resource allocation function across different threats 
in case of multiple threats; otherwise it was assumed that all available 
resources for the weapon would be devoted to defeating the threat. 
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For missile systems, it was assumed that all the shots would be “ripple-launched,” that 
is launched consecutively as soon as possible to ensure maximum intercept range and 
hence the supporting systems, fire-directors, were assumed to be able to support this 
mode of operation. 
 To determine the kill probability for each incoming threat: 
o The round allocation for each threat was first determined. The number of 
rounds that could be fired in the window was divided across the number of 
threats, but only an integer number of rounds could be assigned to each threat.  
Hence, if 7 shots could be fired within the firing window and there were 4 
threats, the first 3 threats were targeted with 2 rounds each and the last threat 
was targeted with 1 round.   
o The kill probability for each target was computed based on the number of 
rounds allocated as:  
PkNrounds = 1 – (1 – Pk1round)
Nrounds
 
Equation 6: Probability of Kill 
 
o The conditional probability for the number of leakers (i.e. not killed) was 
computed by considering the probabilities of all the different permutations of 
killed/not killed for all the threats, e.g. if there were 3 threats, then there would 
be 1 case when all 3 were killed, 3 cases of single kill, 3 cases of 2 kills and 1 
case of all 3 not killed. This is similar to the computation of binomial 
distribution probabilities, except that in this case the probabilities were not 
uniform across each threat, as different number of rounds had been allocated 
for the different threats. 
(4) Computation of survival probabilities for each individual amphibious platform: 
As described previously, the conditional probabilities for cases with no leakers were 
summed at the end of the last defensive to compute the Ps for entire layered defense. For 
individual amphibious platforms, the team introduced the concept of “defensive sectors” to 
account for the fact that the turreted weapons currently equipped on the amphibious platforms 
(i.e. NSSM on rail launchers, RAM & Phalanx CIWS) cannot provide all-round coverage and 
typically pairs or multiple of pairs would be needed to provide omni-directional coverage (e.g. 
fore & aft or port & starboard configurations).
81
 This was implemented in the simulations by 
                                                 
81
 Based on IPR1, there was a comment that there is no intention to consider Vertical Launch System (VLS) 
type systems, which can provide omni-directional coverage with a single launcher, for a LSD(X) in this study. 
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dividing the number of systems for each type by two when considering the number of 
available rounds which was equivalent to the constraint that systems on the “other sector” of 
a ship cannot help to engage a threat inbound in one sector. For threats approaching within a 
single sector, the Ps was derived directly from the layered defense calculations. For threats 
approaching from two sectors, the result was obtained by combining the results from the 2 
sectors independently (i.e. Ps2sectors = Pssector1 * Pssectors2) since the overall survivability was 
based on survival within both sectors. 
(5) Computation of survival probabilities for an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG): 
In the computation of the Ps for an ARG, the team would need to consider the relative 
geometry of the different amphibious ships as part of fleet formations in order to complete 
the analysis. The analysis would vary from case-to-case and would require some judgment 
from the analyst on how best to combine the results for the different ships for an overall 
result.  This was not performed in this simulation but is as part of the ExtendSim simulations 
at the higher level using the Ps derived from this set of simulations. 
 
Model Assumptions: 
The assumptions used in the model are summarized as follows: 
1. It was assumed that the overarching firing policy would designate “kill zones” for 
each platform such that the defenses could be considered to comprise mutually 
exclusive layers (with the exception of parallel engagements with SLQ32 from the 
amphibious platforms and SM-2/ESSMs from the SAG). SM-2 and ESSMs from the 
SAG were assumed to be unaffected by SLQ32 operations such that concurrent usage 
within a single layer was possible.  
2. Only a one-dimensional model was used in the modeling, i.e. the effects of cross-
range between the threat and own weapon were neglected. This approximation was 
considered reasonable since: 
a. The threat was assumed to always emanate from the shoreward direction 
within the confines of the beach frontal area and headed in a straight line 
towards the LCAC. 
b. Assumed, for such frontal landing operations, the escort ship(s) could be well 




3. A constant PK was assumed for all considered weapons up to a maximum range, then 
a PK of zero thereafter. This simplistic model may not be fully accurate, but was 
expected to be conservative in terms of results. More information about a PK versus 
range would be required to implement a more accurate model.    
4. For missile systems, it was assumed that all the shots would be “ripple-launched,” 
launched consecutively as soon as possible to ensure maximum intercept range and 
hence the supporting systems (e.g. fire-directors) were assumed to be able to support 
this mode of operation. 
5. Each amphibious platform was protected by a maximum of 3 SM-2 and 3 ESSM shots 
from the escort(s). This assumption sought to place a reasonable balance between 
resource (i.e. ESSM) availability versus PS without having to model the actual number 
of ESSMs available across all the escorts. Implicitly built into this assumption was the 
underlying assumption that escorts had enough ESSMs to protect as many LCACs as 
could be launched, the amphibious platforms and themselves for all threats missiles 
that could be launched. 
6. The amphibious platform and escort were assumed to be stationary in their relative 
locations, with only the threat and defensive weapons moving with their respective 
speeds (in the down range direction). 
7. As explained in the model description, it was assumed that all threats were 
simultaneous and identical for each computation. For cases where there were different 
threat kinds, launcher resources were manually allocated to ensure sufficient rounds 
for all threats without reloading. It is also assumed that the different threat kinds 
arrived with sufficient time offset in order for them to be engaged independently. 
8. As explained in the model description, the team simplified the model by considering 
only a one-dimensional model for the separation in range between the different 
amphibious ships relative to the threat direction taken into account. It was also 
assumed that the escort ships were well positioned to provide protective coverage to 
all the amphibious ships. 
2. Results and Analysis: 
Parameters for Study 
The key parameters used for the study are listed below. 
Threats: 2 basic threat types, namely, subsonic and supersonic anti-ship missiles 
were considered with the following characteristics: 
159 
 
Threat Type Subsonic Supersonic 
Threat Speed 320 m/s 1200 m/s 
Threat Detected (w.r.t amphib) 12 Nm from Amphib 20 Nm from Amphib 
Threat PK per round 100% 100% 
Table 60. Threat Parameters 
 
The following threat quantities (against single platform) were considered: 
o 1, 2, 3 or 4 subsonic missiles inbound within 1 sector 
o 2, 4, 6 or 8 subsonic missiles inbound spread equally across 2 sectors 
o 1 or 2 supersonic missiles inbound within 1 sector 
o 2 or 4 supersonic missiles inbound spread equally across 2 sectors 
o 2 subsonic plus 1 supersonic missile inbound within 1 sector 
o 4 subsonic plus 2 supersonic missile inbound spread equally across 2 sectors 
Rationales for threat selection: 
(1) They were more stringent than the most capable current threats for both types (i.e. 
has built in margin for future threats circa 2025). The current threats surveyed in 
making this assessment included the DongFeng-21 and SS-N-22 “Sunburn”.  (See 
Appendix B2). 
(2) A PK of 1 for the threat was conservative, but noting the comment about using 
non-MIL SPEC and also the trend taken with LCS (i.e. survivability level 1), this was 
be a good assumption to make since survivability/threat PK is highly dependent on 
ship construction. 
(3) None of the current threats seemed to be stealthy, so the detection ranges assumed 
were conservative (i.e. may represent future stealth advancements or littoral 
blockages). 
Amphibious Platform Equipping:  As a baseline, the existing classes of ships 
(LHD-1, LHA-1, LSD-41/49, LPD-4, LPD-17) with their existing equipping were used as a 
starting point. Additional hypothetical LSD(X) equipping which differed from existing 
platforms, shown in Table 61, was also studied. It was assumed for the hypothetical designs 
that the self-defense suite may only consist of combinations of existing self-defense systems 






Platform Designation LSD-X1 LSD-X2 LSD-X3 
Assumed no. of 
sectors 
2 2 2 
NSSM launchers/ 
sector 
1 1 1 
RAM turrets / sector 0 1 0 
CIWS turrets / 
sector 
0 0 1 
SLQ32 Jammer 1 1 1 
Table 61. LSD(X) Self-Defense Options 
(B1) Results for Single Amphibious Platform Survivability 
Detailed Ps results for the following cases are presented in Appendix B3: 
Case Case Description Reference 
1 Against non-RF anti-ship missile(s) without Escort 
Group 
Table A2-1 
2 Against RF anti-ship missile(s) without Escort Group Table A2-2 
3 Against non-RF anti-ship missile(s) with Escort 
Group 
Table A2-3 
4 Against RF anti-ship missile(s) with Escort Group Table A2-4 
Table 62. Survivability Results 
(B2) Analysis for Single Amphibious Platform Survivability  
 Based on the results, the impact of equipping on Ps strongly depends on the expected 
threat. For cases of a single threat (subsonic or supersonic), all equipping 
combinations less the LSD-4 perform well even without the presence of an escort 
ship. However, as the number of threats increases, the presence of additional layers of 
defense starts to make a difference in the survivability of individual platforms. The 
presence of an Escort Group makes a significant difference to the survivability of 
lesser-equipped ships. 
 In view of the results, two possible courses of actions to balance between Ps and cost 
of equipping is: 
o (1) To have Escort Groups with the platforms whenever the expected level of 
threat is high. With this arrangement, the LPD-17 (minimum equipping 
recommendation) is expected to have a Ps of at least 75% and typically closer 
to 85% against up to 3 inbound non-RF and RF anti-ship missile threats, 
respectively, within a single defensive sector. 
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o (2) Have a LSD(X) design that is modular in nature (similar to LCS concept), 
allowing the plug-on of added NSSM modules whenever the threat level is 
high but operating with just the RAM as a basic defense (similar to LPD-17) 
when low threats are expected. With this arrangement, the NSSM equipped 
platform (equivalent to LSD-X2) is expected to have a Ps of at least 92.1% 
and 98.4% against up to 3 inbound non-RF and RF anti-ship missile threats, 
respectively, within a single defensive sector. This drops to 42.3% and 84.6% 
without NSSM equipped. However, in this unaugmented configuration (i.e. 
LPD-17 baseline), the PS against a single non-RF and RF threat are 99.6% and 
99.8%, respectively. 
 
 While the CIWS by itself is not sufficient to bring the Ps to a high level, it should be 
considered from the viewpoint that current CIWS versions have been upgraded to be 
also effective against swarming boat attacks and thus it would still be a useful dual 




Appendix B1: Fixed Data Parameters assumed  
1. Threat Parameters 
These values were assumed for a typical subsonic and supersonic anti-ship missile.  
They can be adjusted in the model if required. 
Threat Type Subsonic Supersonic 
Threat Speed 320 m/s 1200 m/s 
Threat Detected (w.r.t amphib) 12 Nm from Amphib 20 Nm from Amphib 
Threat Pk per round 100% 100% 
Table 63. Threat Parameters 
2. Escort Group Weapons Parameters 
These parameters are assumed as “possible values” and can be adjusted in the model 
if required. 
Escort Range from Amphib 4 Nm (ahead) 
 
Actual Escort Group (SAG or CSG) Weapons parameters are classified.  These 
parameters were assumed.  
Weapon Types SM-2 ESSM 
Weapon Speed 1000 m/s 1000 m/s 
Weapon min range  15 Nm from SAG 
(*) 
10 Nm from Amphib 
(**) 
Weapon max range  40 Nm from SAG 15 Nm from SAG 
Weapon Time Betw. 
Launches 
2 sec 2 sec 
Weapon Slew Interval 0 sec (VLS) 0 sec (VLS) 
Weapon Pk per round 90% 90% 
Weapon Max Round per 
Threat 
3 rounds 3 rounds 
Weapon Max Qty Available Unlimited Unlimited 
Table 64. Weapons Parameters 
 (* to deconflict with ESSM coverage, this is set to be the same as max ESSM range) 
(** This is set  as the limit of the SAG No-Fire zone since it is the max range of the NSSM) 
 
3. Amphibious Platform Self-Defense Weapons Equipping 
The amphibious platform types modeled are summarized below, with their assumed 
equipping.  These platforms are considered to be representative of the weapon mix expected 








































1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
SLQ32 
Jammer 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Table 65. Weapons Mix 
The defense layering assumed varies from platform to platform due to differences in 
weapons mix.  In general, the selected layering seeks to maximize usage of all weapons while 
minimizing gaps.  Regions beyond 15nm (NSSM max range) from the platform left to the 
Escort Group and regions within 15nm are considered as “No-Fire-Zone” for the Escort 
Group in order to deconflict with potential NSSM firing since currently it is assumed that an 
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Layer 0A (If 
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Table 66. Assumed Defense Layering 
4. Amphibious Platform Self-Defense Weapons Parameters 
Actual Weapons parameters are classified.  These parameters are assumed as possible 
values and could be adjusted in the model if required.  Gun systems such as 25mm & 
30mm cannons are not expected to be effective against incoming missiles. 
Weapon Types NSSM RAM Phalanx 
CIWS 
SLQ32 Jammer 
Weapon Speed 385 m/s 600 m/s 1100 m/s 3x10
8
 m/s 
Weapon min range 3.5 Nm  1.1 Nm 0.3 Nm 3.5 Nm (*) 
Weapon max range 10 Nm 3.5 Nm 1.1 Nm 15 Nm (*) 
Weapon Time 
Betw. Launches 
2 sec 5 sec 0.02 sec 10 sec (*) 
Weapon Slew 
Interval 
3 sec 3 sec 3 sec 0 sec 
Weapon Pk per 
round 
70% 60% 0.2% 50% 
Weapon Max 

















Table 67.  Weapon Parameters 
(* This is expected to be the range where an RF anti-ship missile can be effectively jammed and it is expected to take a finite 
amount of time for this jamming)
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Appendix B2: Survey of Current Anti-Ship Missile systems 
As missile parameters are typically highly classified, these are based on survey of 
open literature and may not be fully accurate.  However these represented a useful guide for 
consideration of threat scenario in this work. 
 
Missile Name Speed (kts) Range (Nm) Pk 
DongFeng-21 500 (to 800)  1100-1600 Unknown 
C-802 500  65-270 0.98 
Silkworm 400-500 45-81 0.7 
FL-7 926 17 Unknown 
Exocet 612 38-97 Unknown 
Table 68. Subsonic Missile Parameters 
 
Missile Name Speed (kts) Range (Nm) Pk 
SS-N-21 Sampson 1400 5-81 Unknown 
SS-N-22 Sunburn 1985 135 Unknown 
C101 1323 24 Unknown 
Brahmos 1985 17 Unknown 




Table of Results for Single Amphibious Ship 
Case 1 - Against a non-RF anti-ship missile without Escort Group 
The SLQ-32 Jammer will not be effective against such threats.  The results for various threat quantities are summarized in Table A2-1 (in order 
of most equipped ships to least): 
Threats Scenario 
Scenario 
Weightage  LHD-1 LSD_X1 LSD_X2 LSD_X3 LHA-1 or LSD41/49 LPD17 LPD4 
1 - subsonic in 1 sector 1 0.999999630765869 0.999999731261440 0.999964014095427 0.999934390000000 0.994372288811262 0.995904000000000 0.450418829224756 
2 - subsonic across 2 sectors 1 0.999999261531874 0.999999462522952 0.999928029485839 0.999868784304672 0.988776248755747 0.991824777216000 0.202877121720200 
2 - subsonic across 1 sector 1 0.999898229780079 0.999920157483520 0.991122228619173 0.983865610000000 0.827164046253234 0.786240000000000 0.019197849907017 
4 - subsonic across 2 sectors 1 0.999796469917336 0.999840321341868 0.982323272063037 0.967991538540672 0.684200359414022 0.618173337600000 0.000368557441052 
3 - subsonic across 1 sector 1 0.998287561634863 0.998264691262720 0.921688599562913 0.861523390000000 0.514007582407129 0.423360000000000 0.000000000000000 
6 - subsonic across 2 sectors 1 0.996578055714881 0.996532393821854 0.849509874564245 0.742222551517092 0.264203794772022 0.179233689600000 0.000000000000000 
4 - subsonic across 1 sector 1 0.990169093510939 0.988698646282240 0.809022228275815 0.685749610000000 0.105583938272378 0.129600000000000 0.000000000000000 
8 - subsonic across 2 sectors 1 0.980434833744275 0.977525013160334 0.654516965844366 0.470252527615152 0.011147968021105 0.016796160000000 0.000000000000000 
1 - supersonic 1 0.999880117272570 0.999844480000000 0.999949424474365 0.999934390000000 0.950665544267475 0.936000000000000 0.229149129179291 
2 - supersonic across 2 sectors 1 0.999760248917008 0.999688984186470 0.999898851506615 0.999868784304672 0.903764977057374 0.876096000000000 0.052509323403627 
2 - supersonic across 1 sector 1 0.969113395588035 0.965104000000000 0.987547756943974 0.983865610000000 0.469991582006060 0.504000000000000 0.000000000000000 
4 - supersonic across 2 sectors 1 0.939180773508171 0.931425730816000 0.975250572245074 0.967991538540672 0.220892087156559 0.254016000000000 0.000000000000000 
2 sub + 1 sup in 1 sector 1 0.984206258742494 0.977102809661440 0.903139160821592 0.861523390000000 0.725144826194692 0.592704000000000 0.004399170588308 
4 sub + 2 sup across 2 sectors 1 0.968661959747898 0.954729900648280 0.815660343809530 0.742222551517092 0.525835018956931 0.351298031616000 0.000019352701865 
         
 Weighted Ps 0.987568992169735 0.984905451603509 0.920680094450854 0.876201047595716 0.584696447310428 0.546803285430857 0.068495666726151 
  






Case 2 - Against RF anti-ship missile without Escort Group 
It is assumed that the SLQ32 Jammer will be effective against such threats and that only the Amphibious platforms provide the jammer (i.e. not 
the Escort Group).  The results for various threat quantities are summarized in Table A2-2 (in order of most equipped ships to least): 
Threats Scenario 
Scenario 
Weightage  LHD-1 LSD_X1 LSD_X2 LSD_X3 LHA-1 or LSD41/49 LPD17 LPD4 
1 - subsonic in 1 sector 1 0.999999815382934 0.999999865630720 0.999982007047713 0.999967195000000 0.997186144405631 0.997952000000000 0.725209414612378 
2 - subsonic across 2 sectors 1 0.999999630765903 0.999999731261458 0.999964014419173 0.999934391076168 0.994380206594567 0.995908194304000 0.525928695042428 
2 - subsonic across 1 sector 1 0.999974372827954 0.999979905001600 0.997762564202507 0.995933597500000 0.953977155968939 0.944512000000000 0.480008877089132 
4 - subsonic across 2 sectors 1 0.999948746312660 0.999959810407009 0.995530134523961 0.991883730629292 0.910072414110586 0.892102918144000 0.230408522084369 
3 - subsonic across 1 sector 1 0.999747642909089 0.999753044687200 0.986868415963339 0.976615423750000 0.872327073450077 0.846224000000000 0.301106254674415 
6 - subsonic across 2 sectors 1 0.999495349502278 0.999506150361326 0.973909270425990 0.953777685906392 0.760954523073976 0.716095058176000 0.090664976604053 
4 - subsonic across 1 sector 1 0.998365538159572 0.998234008968160 0.946298101112281 0.906970211875000 0.665960366891513 0.612648000000000 0.063501547368226 
8 - subsonic across 2 sectors 1 0.996733747784651 0.996471136660644 0.895480096168708 0.822594965228582 0.443503210270279 0.375337571904000 0.004032446518159 
1 - supersonic 1 0.999940058636285 0.999922240000000 0.999974712237183 0.999967195000000 0.975332772133737 0.968000000000000 0.614574564589645 
2 - supersonic across 2 sectors 1 0.999880120865537 0.999844486046618 0.999949425113836 0.999934391076168 0.951274016398081 0.937024000000000 0.377701895440552 
2 - supersonic across 1 sector 1 0.992218407533294 0.991198240000000 0.996861651473176 0.995933597500000 0.842830667635252 0.844000000000000 0.364574564589645 
4 - supersonic across 2 sectors 1 0.984497368247906 0.982473950979098 0.993733152177828 0.991883730629292 0.710363534306485 0.712336000000000 0.132914613145730 
2 sub + 1 sup in 1 sector 1 0.992089409286692 0.988515736007680 0.951036874386602 0.929389048750000 0.856532391938833 0.778688000000000 0.295001246636218 
4 sub + 2 sup across 2 sectors 1 0.984241396018818 0.977163360334805 0.904471136443038 0.863764003936430 0.733647738440458 0.606355001344000 0.087025735516923 
         
 Weighted Ps 0.996223686016684 0.995215833310451 0.974415825406810 0.959182083418380 0.833453015401315 0.801941624562286 0.306618096707991 








Case 3 - Against a non-RF anti-ship missile with Escort Group 
The SLQ32 Jammer will not be effective against such threats.  The results for various threat quantities are summarized in Table A2-3 (in order 
of most equipped ships to least): 
Threats Scenario 
Scenario 
Weightage  LHD-1 LSD_X1 LSD_X2 LSD_X3 LHA-1 or LSD41/49 LPD17 LPD4 
1 - subsonic in 1 sector 1 0.999999963076587 0.999999973126144 0.999996401409543 0.999993439000000 0.999437228881126 0.999590400000000 0.945041882922476 
2 - subsonic across 2 sectors 1 0.999999926153175 0.999999946252289 0.999992802832035 0.999986878043047 0.998874774473584 0.999180967772160 0.893104160477658 
2 - subsonic across 1 sector 1 0.999989490667290 0.999991773883648 0.999079835547801 0.998327512000000 0.977651464555459 0.974937600000000 0.407296731292982 
4 - subsonic across 2 sectors 1 0.999978981445026 0.999983547834965 0.998160517798222 0.996657821216110 0.955802386147433 0.950503323893760 0.165890627321947 
3 - subsonic across 1 sector 1 0.999737162965558 0.999754610861440 0.984178865713547 0.971631388000000 0.795848399868623 0.749952000000000 0.017278064916315 
6 - subsonic across 2 sectors  1 0.999474395014422 0.999509281938710 0.968608039717205 0.944067554146807 0.633374675573448 0.562428002304000 0.000298531527252 
4 - subsonic across 1 sector 1 0.997475714822471 0.997308086764672 0.910421962434204 0.843946012000000 0.473165217993654 0.393984000000000 0.000000000000000 
8 - subsonic across 2 sectors 1 0.994957801660599 0.994623419926211 0.828868149682547 0.712244871170704 0.223885323518982 0.155223392256000 0.000000000000000 
1 – supersonic 1 0.999999880117273 0.999999844480000 0.999999949424474 0.999999934390000 0.999950665544267 0.999936000000000 0.999229149129179 
2 - supersonic across 2 sectors 1 0.999999760234560 0.999999688960024 0.999999898848951 0.999999868780004 0.999901333522424 0.999872004096000 0.998458892469424 
2 - supersonic across 1 sector 1 0.999956166061026 0.999948307840000 0.999982085600175 0.999976779730000 0.994141870362893 0.992592000000000 0.915748105951363 
4 - supersonic across 2 sectors 1 0.999912334043466 0.999896618352080 0.999964171521277 0.999953559999181 0.988318058408632 0.985238878464000 0.838594593553510 
2 sub + 1 sup in 1 sector 1 0.997377539899535 0.995235534641926 0.983650323049710 0.970285566439000 0.903465272369943 0.826427750400000 0.406982766252982 
4 sub + 2 sup across 2 sectors 1 0.994761957096050 0.990493769414001 0.967567958035799 0.941454080439851 0.816249498378495 0.682982826631205 0.165634972026930 
         
 Weighted Ps 0.998830076661217 0.998338886019722 0.974319354401107 0.955608947525336 0.840004726399926 0.805203510415509 0.482397034131573 








Case 4 - Against RF anti-ship missile with Escort Group 
It is assumed that the SLQ32 Jammer will be effective against such threats and that only the Amphibious platforms provide the jammer (i.e. not 
the Escort Group).  The results for various threat quantities are summarized in Table A2-4 (in order of most equipped ships to least): 
Threats Scenario 
Scenario 
Weightage  LHD-1 LSD_X1 LSD_X2 LSD_X3 LHA-1 or LSD41/49 LPD17 LPD4 
1 - subsonic in 1 sector 1 0.999999982120289 0.999999986563072 0.999998253934435 0.999996719500000 0.999727484965849 0.999795200000000 0.973387203696198 
2 - subsonic across 2 sectors 1 0.999999964240578 0.999999973126144 0.999996507871918 0.999993439010762 0.999455044196142 0.999590441943040 0.947482648319505 
2 - subsonic across 1 sector 1 0.999997356022467 0.999997869567808 0.999767119527743 0.999563835250000 0.993072923824909 0.992608000000000 0.709451489682673 
4 - subsonic across 2 sectors 1 0.999994712051924 0.999995739140154 0.999534293288800 0.999127860739689 0.986193832034154 0.985270641664000 0.503321416212963 
3 - subsonic across 1 sector 1 0.999953158783809 0.999957218970160 0.996769407034171 0.994001780125000 0.947258153553714 0.934683200000000 0.471609501956051 
6 - subsonic across 2 sectors 1 0.999906319761717 0.999914439770536 0.993549250799253 0.988039538891669 0.897298009473992 0.873632684362240 0.222415522335235 
4 - subsonic across 1 sector 1 0.999422595182324 0.999396966832336 0.973757641945489 0.952264546187500 0.782973059374835 0.734407200000000 0.122388811154625 
8 - subsonic across 2 sectors 1 0.998845523760971 0.998794297313673 0.948203945247239 0.906807765925685 0.613046811706789 0.539353935411840 0.014979021095843 
1 - supersonic 1 0.999999994733336 0.999999993001600 0.999999975312512 0.999999967195000 0.999975918316674 0.999968000000000 0.999623723698031 
2 - supersonic across 2 sectors 1 0.999999989466672 0.999999986003200 0.999999950625024 0.999999934390001 0.999951837213275 0.999936001024000 0.999247588979917 
2 - supersonic across 1 sector 1 0.999999822429063 0.999999767625040 0.999999204763680 0.999998943820750 0.999507743870565 0.999350800000000 0.992487101590807 
4 - supersonic across 2 sectors 1 0.999999644858158 0.999999535250134 0.999998409527992 0.999997887642616 0.999015730057226 0.998702021460640 0.985030646824120 
2 sub + 1 sup in 1 sector 1 0.998688707481174 0.997617283663841 0.991822757778803 0.985123892429875 0.951653917214930 0.912566988800000 0.700419297358056 
4 sub + 2 sup across 2 sectors 1 0.997379134450419 0.995240244664820 0.983712382847949 0.970469083436188 0.905645178150521 0.832778509047500 0.490587192111553 
         
 Weighted Ps 0.999584778953064 0.999350950106608 0.991936364321786 0.985384656753195 0.933912545996684 0.914474544550947 0.652316511786827 





C. INFLATION QUERY TABLE 
 
Categories Inputs Remarks 






Civ pay = Civilian Payroll for 








Military Personnel, Navy 
(1453) 
O&S 
Base/Input Year 2012   
Inflation Type 
Budget/Then-Year $ to 
Budget/Then-Year $ 
Budget Dollar - Funds 
inflated for budgeting 
purposes that include 
inflation for the years of 
expenditure, calculated 
using the outlay profile. 
Also called "then-year 
dollar" for a particular 
budget year. 




D. INFLATION RATES FROM YEAR 2013 TO 2042 
 Capital O&S 







Civ pay = Civilian Payroll 









2012 1 1 1 1 
2013 1.0168 1.0173 1.0168 1.021 
2014 1.0341 1.0406 1.0341 1.0479 
2015 1.0517 1.0646 1.0517 1.0766 
2016 1.0696 1.0891 1.0696 1.106 
2017 1.0878 1.1141 1.0878 1.1362 
2018 1.1063 1.1397 1.1063 1.1672 
2019 1.1251 1.166 1.1251 1.199 
2020 1.1442 1.1928 1.1442 1.2317 
2021 1.1636 1.2202 1.1636 1.2654 
2022 1.1834 1.2483 1.1834 1.2999 
2023 1.2035 1.277 1.2035 1.3354 
2024 1.224 1.3064 1.224 1.3718 
2025 1.2448 1.3364 1.2448 1.4092 
2026 1.266 1.3671 1.266 1.4477 
2027 1.2876 1.3986 1.2875 1.4871 
2028 1.3094 1.4307 1.3094 1.5278 
2029 1.3316 1.4637 1.3316 1.5695 
2030 1.3543 1.4973 1.3543 1.6123 
2031 1.3773 1.5318 1.3773 1.6563 
2032 1.4007 1.567 1.4007 1.7015 
2033 1.4245 1.603 1.4245 1.7479 
2034 1.4488 1.6399 1.4488 1.7956 
2035 1.4734 1.6776 1.4734 1.8446 
2036 1.4984 1.7162 1.4984 1.895 
2037 1.5239 1.7557 1.5239 1.9467 
2038 1.5498 1.7961 1.5498 1.9998 
2039 1.5762 1.8374 1.5762 2.0544 
2040 1.603 1.8796 1.603 2.1104 
2041 1.6302 1.9229 1.6302 2.168 
2042 1.6579 1.9671 1.6579 2.2272 
Table 75. Inflation Rates From 2013 to 2032
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E. O&S HISTORICAL DATA 
 
Table 76. Big Deck Historical O&S Data 
LHA-1 LHD-1
Total O&S Manpower Operations Support Total O&S Manpower Operations Support
1984 95,672,398$              39,341,453$        29,795,243$    26,535,702$         
1985 104,344,180$            38,747,304$        25,693,351$    39,903,525$         
1986 136,504,713$            39,125,768$        18,026,616$    79,352,329$         
1987 107,589,349$            40,237,331$        24,024,002$    43,328,016$         
1988 105,675,068$            39,901,511$        16,662,200$    49,111,357$         
1989 83,052,480$              41,231,146$        26,250,083$    15,571,251$         
1990 82,204,119$              41,967,053$        26,186,032$    14,051,034$         65,422,007$        44,093,462$       10,628,759$       10,699,786$       
1991 120,418,830$            44,034,347$        23,399,740$    52,984,743$         101,662,719$      48,659,434$       25,111,436$       27,891,849$       
1992 130,818,937$            44,544,902$        23,457,430$    62,816,605$         124,169,968$      51,583,385$       30,038,630$       42,547,953$       
1993 137,074,993$            41,831,685$        21,659,229$    73,584,079$         85,704,005$        47,169,091$       18,245,265$       20,289,649$       
1994 133,897,439$            45,210,360$        19,770,576$    68,916,503$         114,924,305$      48,973,381$       19,105,434$       46,845,490$       
1995 133,263,936$            48,715,456$        25,526,114$    59,022,366$         107,419,218$      53,753,054$       29,595,975$       24,070,189$       
1996 107,944,487$            50,174,710$        27,923,651$    29,846,126$         130,207,729$      51,480,130$       20,218,500$       58,509,099$       
1997 139,354,773$            58,942,893$        22,505,815$    57,906,065$         131,725,630$      65,414,463$       29,078,907$       37,232,260$       
1998 130,446,360$            56,863,450$        27,883,193$    45,699,717$         110,583,263$      60,475,783$       20,649,916$       29,457,564$       
1999 156,392,842$            55,542,972$        26,151,974$    74,697,896$         106,149,905$      57,324,312$       23,317,659$       25,507,934$       
2000 169,260,429$            61,851,973$        20,912,245$    86,496,211$         119,026,970$      64,468,854$       22,562,188$       31,995,928$       
2001 160,878,329$            63,642,544$        18,425,713$    78,810,072$         125,864,324$      68,521,510$       25,381,760$       31,961,054$       
2002 152,067,271$            74,216,715$        24,293,857$    53,556,699$         144,098,953$      78,005,064$       24,380,274$       41,713,615$       
2003 163,646,528$            81,824,356$        30,591,570$    51,230,602$         166,345,317$      85,241,774$       32,404,789$       48,698,754$       
2004 169,296,041$            87,525,877$        22,869,623$    58,900,541$         151,782,977$      88,934,491$       26,920,432$       35,928,054$       
2005 134,167,019$            88,819,838$        26,740,127$    18,607,054$         154,938,629$      89,822,114$       32,782,719$       32,333,796$       
2006 156,861,794$            90,549,971$        33,570,682$    32,741,141$         139,631,205$      88,926,457$       26,755,647$       23,949,101$       
2007 154,236,510$            92,100,650$        27,441,903$    34,693,957$         165,042,045$      87,792,667$       32,717,439$       44,531,939$       
2008 165,766,638$            89,468,356$        44,376,738$    31,921,544$         171,355,585$      87,422,983$       27,757,621$       56,174,981$       
2009 177,195,556$            87,075,995$        15,421,350$    74,698,211$         166,958,747$      86,119,080$       31,094,804$       49,744,863$       
2010 155,706,820$            85,714,413$        43,817,731$    26,174,676$         171,790,534$      84,042,263$       31,594,539$       56,153,732$       
2011 160,470,488$            91,710,054$        24,447,912$    44,312,522$         134,332,394$      83,693,521$       17,484,217$       33,154,656$       
LHA-1 LHD-1
Total O&S Manpower Operations Support Total O&S Manpower Operations Support




Table 77. LSD Historical O&S Data 
LSD-41 LSD-49
Total O&S Manpower Operations Support Total O&S Manpower Operations Support
1984
1985
1986 24,184,418$       14,452,183$       7,743,400$                      1,988,835$         
1987 26,030,975$       15,424,647$       7,818,496$                      2,787,832$         
1988 25,220,104$       15,007,414$       5,927,086$                      4,285,604$         
1989 26,916,541$       16,159,735$       7,768,452$                      2,988,354$         
1990 31,390,603$       15,040,372$       6,152,251$                      10,197,980$       
1991 33,971,543$       16,197,884$       8,303,841$                      9,469,818$         
1992 37,243,556$       15,307,257$       10,097,666$                    11,838,633$       
1993 30,501,137$       14,213,936$       6,835,524$                      9,451,677$         
1994 32,802,352$       14,708,267$       7,662,705$                      10,431,380$       
1995 36,349,220$       15,821,830$       6,378,042$                      14,149,348$       
1996 33,877,424$       15,785,146$       7,461,671$                      10,630,607$       33,455,496$       15,007,590$       5,629,872$        12,818,034$      
1997 36,533,471$       17,754,508$       5,341,267$                      13,437,696$       39,530,707$       19,479,754$       5,887,716$        14,163,237$      
1998 38,501,242$       16,946,482$       6,876,947$                      14,677,813$       35,665,296$       18,333,678$       6,412,912$        10,918,706$      
1999 38,979,109$       16,478,326$       7,140,493$                      15,360,290$       31,841,319$       17,288,550$       7,626,010$        6,926,759$        
2000 43,491,835$       18,766,959$       5,919,902$                      18,804,974$       37,775,704$       19,123,026$       6,471,744$        12,180,934$      
2001 38,956,862$       19,413,417$       5,909,181$                      13,634,264$       37,588,755$       19,985,860$       8,209,401$        9,393,494$        
2002 51,006,995$       21,002,209$       6,961,716$                      23,043,070$       44,410,332$       20,736,263$       8,250,882$        15,423,187$      
2003 53,655,588$       22,546,674$       9,803,886$                      21,305,028$       50,226,243$       22,299,754$       9,152,934$        18,773,555$      
2004 48,819,644$       23,205,434$       6,776,256$                      18,837,954$       42,649,239$       23,770,800$       5,835,642$        13,042,797$      
2005 56,121,694$       24,379,012$       9,322,262$                      22,420,420$       48,461,427$       24,639,115$       9,318,134$        14,504,178$      
2006 51,454,544$       24,138,091$       7,839,189$                      19,477,264$       53,667,182$       24,310,450$       11,961,559$      17,395,173$      
2007 51,507,028$       24,708,889$       8,880,975$                      17,917,164$       53,040,288$       24,290,300$       10,723,223$      18,026,765$      
2008 56,337,337$       24,562,372$       8,913,438$                      22,861,527$       53,171,351$       24,237,631$       11,642,127$      17,291,593$      
2009 76,650,456$       22,492,785$       7,172,157$                      46,985,514$       49,157,801$       22,734,047$       8,833,379$        17,590,375$      
2010 87,627,136$       22,201,713$       7,835,643$                      57,589,780$       61,034,182$       22,434,497$       9,908,524$        28,691,161$      
2011 75,954,852$       22,281,270$       6,019,018$                      47,654,564$       79,338,996$       22,964,710$       4,591,057$        51,783,229$      
LSD-41 LSD-49
Total O&S Manpower Operations Support Total O&S Manpower Operations Support




Table 78. LPD Historical O&S Data
LPD-4 LPD-17
Total O&S Manpower Operations Support Total O&S Manpower Operations Support
1984 48,787,805$       18,118,593$       11,124,431$      19,544,781$      
1985 47,540,272$       17,715,763$       11,003,299$      18,821,210$      
1986 43,049,308$       17,153,050$       9,249,604$        16,646,654$      
1987 41,150,111$       17,916,929$       10,617,748$      12,615,434$      
1988 37,946,973$       18,118,367$       11,164,566$      8,664,040$        
1989 39,636,595$       17,902,475$       10,327,105$      11,407,015$      
1990 39,396,331$       17,663,908$       10,561,609$      11,170,814$      
1991 46,233,460$       18,823,067$       12,936,682$      14,473,711$      
1992 48,847,185$       18,356,600$       10,598,725$      19,891,860$      
1993 41,690,400$       16,853,338$       11,783,535$      13,053,527$      
1994 42,155,736$       17,485,793$       11,578,676$      13,091,267$      
1995 43,179,532$       18,784,397$       11,358,705$      13,036,430$      
1996 40,347,962$       18,855,086$       11,517,312$      9,975,564$        
1997 46,323,592$       21,986,358$       10,019,186$      14,318,048$      
1998 57,250,487$       20,764,648$       12,311,628$      24,174,211$      
1999 49,225,856$       19,663,769$       11,848,722$      17,713,365$      
2000 47,783,918$       21,810,447$       9,603,445$        16,370,026$      
2001 43,810,033$       22,824,281$       10,560,654$      10,425,098$      
2002 52,853,038$       23,998,734$       12,176,051$      16,678,253$      
2003 59,167,499$       26,440,567$       13,657,680$      19,069,252$      
2004 66,174,458$       28,566,484$       9,471,144$        28,136,830$      
2005 63,523,658$       29,917,409$       12,149,050$      21,457,199$      
2006 73,485,045$       29,451,711$       12,736,677$      31,296,657$      
2007 63,408,811$       29,941,443$       15,804,726$      17,662,642$      42,461,145$       27,991,200$       4,012,976$      10,456,969$       
2008 67,291,000$       30,215,119$       15,728,354$      21,347,527$      48,461,393$       29,219,832$       8,160,799$      11,080,762$       
2009 64,112,260$       29,679,847$       15,108,717$      19,323,696$      47,098,863$       27,635,614$       9,977,245$      9,486,004$         
2010 65,341,486$       28,721,256$       19,044,605$      17,575,625$      55,224,517$       28,047,942$       7,120,832$      20,055,743$       
2011 53,097,038$       27,323,948$       14,001,250$      11,771,840$      54,652,935$       28,098,422$       3,042,693$      23,511,820$       
LPD-4 LPD-17
Total O&S Manpower Operations Support Total O&S Manpower Operations Support




F. MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS 
Monte Carlo Simulations:  Monte Carlo simulation techniques were used for 
estimating uncertainty for the lead ship.  Monte Carlo simulations are computational 
algorithms that rely on repeated random sampling to compute their results.  These simulations 
were used to account for variations in the design, construction, and cost estimating processes. 
Background: The American Association of Cost Engineers (AACE) defines cost 
engineering as “…that area of engineering practice where engineering judgment and 
experience are utilized in the application of scientific principles and techniques to the 
problems of cost estimation, cost control, and profitability.”82 Cost estimation essentially uses 
the plan of a project and maps it to a dollar value by applying appropriate costs to the 
quantities identified in the plan, and in this case, gives insight into how much a lead ship 
would cost.  However, it must be noted that figures derived via this process are predictions at 
best due to the fundamentally uncertain nature of cost estimation. This uncertainty stems 
from the following two categories:
83
 
Requirements Uncertainty: This refers to the variability in cost estimates due to 
changes in the configuration of the system being estimated. As an example, suppose that, at 
present, the analysis of system configurations for each ship suggested an optimal loading 
capacity of 1,000 troops. While valid under present day circumstances, this requirement may 
change further down the acquisition/manufacturing process, thereby rendering cost estimates 
incorrect.  While the example cited specifications of the ship, this uncertainty may also apply 
to hardware characteristics and/or operational concepts. 
Cost-Estimating Uncertainty:  This refers to variations in cost estimates of a system 
even though the original configuration remains unchanged. This variation may arise from 
errors in the data base, errors or inappropriateness of cost estimating techniques, insufficient 
data for building the costing model, and the inherent uncertainty of the cost model, as 
identified, for example in the statistics such as Standard Error of the Estimates (SEE).  
The relationship between the system cost uncertainty and its sources can be depicted 
as shown in Figure 63.   
                                                 
82
 (AACE International, 2011) 
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Figure 63.   Relation of System Cost Uncertainty to Source Uncertainty (From 84) 
 
Associated with each cost input is a probability distribution to reflect its uncertainty. 
Given that each input parameter is described with a probability distribution, the distribution is 
then treated as a theoretical population from which random samples are taken, and are used to 
develop an aggregated LCCE distribution. This is technique is referred to as Monte Carlo 
simulation.
                                                 
84
 (Dienemann, 1966) p. 6 
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G. LSD(X) AND LSD(XB) ALTERNATIVES’ COST 
 
 
Table 79. LSD(X) and LSD(XB) Costs 
Yr O&S Procurement Annual Cost  Cumulative LCCE  O&S Procurement Annual Cost Cumulative LCCE
1 $60,966,020 $1,010,022,200 $1,070,988,220 $1,070,988,220 $67,062,622 $1,177,882,000 $1,244,944,622 $1,244,944,622
2 $60,966,020 $0 $60,966,020 $1,131,954,240 $67,062,622 $0 $67,062,622 $1,312,007,244
3 $121,932,040 $633,021,090 $754,953,130 $1,886,907,370 $134,125,244 $795,207,900 $929,333,144 $2,241,340,388
4 $121,932,040 $0 $121,932,040 $2,008,839,410 $134,125,244 $0 $134,125,244 $2,375,465,632
5 $182,898,060 $617,828,659 $800,726,719 $2,809,566,129 $201,187,866 $776,816,685 $978,004,551 $3,353,470,183
6 $182,898,060 $0 $182,898,060 $2,992,464,189 $201,187,866 $0 $201,187,866 $3,554,658,049
7 $243,864,080 $607,310,036 $851,174,116 $3,843,638,304 $268,250,488 $764,080,305 $1,032,330,793 $4,586,988,842
8 $243,864,080 $0 $243,864,080 $4,087,502,384 $268,250,488 $0 $268,250,488 $4,855,239,330
9 $304,830,100 $599,296,812 $904,126,912 $4,991,629,296 $335,313,110 $754,375,828 $1,089,688,938 $5,944,928,268
10 $304,830,100 $0 $304,830,100 $5,296,459,396 $335,313,110 $0 $335,313,110 $6,280,241,378
11 $365,796,120 $592,842,407 $958,638,527 $6,255,097,923 $402,375,732 $746,558,047 $1,148,933,779 $7,429,175,156
12 $365,796,120 $0 $365,796,120 $6,620,894,043 $402,375,732 $0 $402,375,732 $7,831,550,888
13 $426,762,140 $587,449,564 $1,014,211,704 $7,635,105,747 $469,438,354 $740,025,276 $1,209,463,630 $9,041,014,518
14 $426,762,140 $0 $426,762,140 $8,061,867,887 $469,438,354 $0 $469,438,354 $9,510,452,872
15 $487,728,160 $582,825,134 $1,070,553,294 $9,132,421,181 $536,500,976 $734,422,762 $1,270,923,738 $10,781,376,610
16 $487,728,160 $0 $487,728,160 $9,620,149,341 $536,500,976 $0 $536,500,976 $11,317,877,586
17 $548,694,180 $578,782,005 $1,127,476,185 $10,747,625,525 $603,563,598 $729,524,049 $1,333,087,647 $12,650,965,233
18 $548,694,180 $0 $548,694,180 $11,296,319,705 $603,563,598 $0 $603,563,598 $13,254,528,831
19 $609,660,200 $575,193,575 $1,184,853,775 $12,481,173,481 $670,626,220 $725,175,901 $1,395,802,121 $14,650,330,952
20 $609,660,200 $0 $609,660,200 $13,090,833,681 $670,626,220 $0 $670,626,220 $15,320,957,172
21 $670,626,220 $571,970,268 $1,242,596,488 $14,333,430,169 $737,688,842 $721,269,889 $1,458,958,731 $16,779,915,903
22 $670,626,220 $0 $670,626,220 $15,004,056,389 $737,688,842 $0 $737,688,842 $17,517,604,745
23 $670,626,220 $0 $670,626,220 $15,674,682,609 $737,688,842 $0 $737,688,842 $18,255,293,587
24 $670,626,220 $0 $670,626,220 $16,345,308,829 $737,688,842 $0 $737,688,842 $18,992,982,429
25 $670,626,220 $0 $670,626,220 $17,015,935,049 $737,688,842 $0 $737,688,842 $19,730,671,271
26 $670,626,220 $0 $670,626,220 $17,686,561,269 $737,688,842 $0 $737,688,842 $20,468,360,113
27 $670,626,220 $0 $670,626,220 $18,357,187,489 $737,688,842 $0 $737,688,842 $21,206,048,955
28 $670,626,220 $0 $670,626,220 $19,027,813,709 $737,688,842 $0 $737,688,842 $21,943,737,797
29 $670,626,220 $0 $670,626,220 $19,698,439,929 $737,688,842 $0 $737,688,842 $22,681,426,639
30 $670,626,220 $0 $670,626,220 $20,369,066,149 $737,688,842 $0 $737,688,842 $23,419,115,481





H. LPD-17 ALTERNATIVES’ COST: PROCUREMENT OF 11 AND 19 ADDITIONAL LPD-17S 
 
 
Table 80. LPD 17 Costs 
 
Continued Procurement of 11 Additional LPD-17
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
LPD Hull # 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Procurement Cost 1539.38 1522.54 1505.88 1489.41 1473.12 1457.00 1441.06
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58
Annual Cost 1588.96 49.58 1621.70 99.16 1654.62 148.74 1687.73 198.32 1721.02 247.90 1754.48 297.48 1788.12 347.06




Table 81. LPD 17 Costs (continued) 
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
19 20 21 22
1425.30 1409.70 1394.28 1379.03
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
1821.94 396.64 1855.92 446.22 1890.08 495.80 1924.41 545.38 545.38 545.38 545.38 545.38 545.38 545.38 545.38 545.38





Table 82. LPD 17 Costs (continued) 
 
Continued Procurement of 19 Additional LPD-17s (Part 1)
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
LPD Hull # 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 18 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Procurement Cost 1539.38 1522.54 1505.88 1489.41 1473.12 1457.00 1441.06 1425.30 1409.70 1394.28 1379.03 1363.94 1349.02 1334.26 1319.67
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58




Annual Cost 1588.96 1621.70 1654.62 1687.73 1721.02 1754.48 1788.12 1821.94 1855.92 1890.08 1924.41 1958.90 1993.56 2028.38 2063.36




Table 83. LPD 17 Cost (continued) 
 
  
Continued Procurement of 19 Additional LPD-17s (Part 2)
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
27 28 29 30
1305.23 1290.95 1276.83 1262.86
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
2098.51 2133.81 2169.27 2204.88 942.02 942.02 942.02 942.02 942.02 942.02 942.02 942.02 942.02 942.02 942.02








Table 84. LPD(17) Flt X Costs 
Procurement of 11 Additional LPD-17 Flt (X) (70% Legacy)
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
LPD Hull # 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Procurement Cost 2028.47 1518.44 1511.41 1499.88 1545.42 1503.86 1450.04
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58
2078.05 49.58 1617.60 99.16 1660.15 148.74 1698.20 198.32 1793.32 247.90 1801.33 297.48 1797.09 347.06
Cumulative LCCE 2078.05 2127.63 3745.23 3844.39 5504.54 5653.28 7351.47 7549.79 9343.11 9591.01 11392.34 11689.82 13486.92 13833.97
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
19 20 21 22
1471.46 1492.20 1459.45 1472.47
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58 49.58
1868.10 396.64 1938.41 446.22 1955.24 495.80 2017.85 545.38 545.38 545.38 545.38 545.38 545.38 545.38 545.38 545.38




J. LHA-8 ALTERNATIVE COST 
 
Table 85. LHA-8 Costs 
SEA-18A Plan for 10 LHA-8s
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
LPD Hull # 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Procurement Cost 2210.24 2201.36 2194.49 2188.90 2184.18 2180.10 2176.51
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
157.77 157.77
Annual Cost 2368.01 157.77 2516.90 315.54 2667.81 473.32 2819.99 631.09 2973.04 788.86 3126.73 946.63 3280.91 1104.40
Cumulative LCCE 2368.01 2525.79 5042.69 5358.23 8026.04 8499.36 11319.34 11950.43 14923.47 15712.33 18839.07 19785.70 23066.61 24171.02
Current Shipbuilding Plan 6 LHA-8s
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
LPD Hull # 8 9 10 11
Procurement Cost 2210.24 2201.36 2194.49 2188.90
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
157.77 157.77
Annual Cost 2368.01 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 2516.90 315.54 315.54 2667.81 473.32 473.32 473.32 2819.99 631.09
Cumulative LCCE 2368.01 2525.79 2683.56 2841.33 2999.10 5516.01 5831.55 6147.09 8814.90 9288.22 9761.54 10234.85 13054.84 13685.93
Cost of LHA-8's Option
Difference between SEA-18A and Current Plan 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Annual Cost 0.000 0.000 2359.131 157.772 2510.036 -2043.586 2504.442 315.544 305.231 315.544 2653.416 473.316 460.926 473.316




Table 86. LHA-8 Costs (continued)
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
15 16 17
2173.30 2170.40 2167.76
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
3435.48 1262.18 3590.35 1419.95 3745.48 1577.72 1577.72 1577.72 1577.72 1577.72 1577.72 1577.72 1577.72 1577.72 1577.72 1577.72
27606.49 28868.67 32459.02 33878.97 37624.45 39202.17 40779.89 42357.61 43935.33 45513.06 47090.78 48668.50 50246.22 51823.94 53401.66 54979.38
Million FY12$
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
12 13
2184.18 2180.10
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77 157.77
631.09 631.09 2973.04 788.86 788.86 788.86 3126.73 946.63 946.63 946.63 946.63 946.63 946.63 946.63 946.63 946.63
14317.02 14948.10 17921.14 18710.00 19498.86 20287.72 23414.46 24361.09 25307.72 26254.36 27200.99 28147.62 29094.25 30040.89 30987.52 31934.15
Million FY12$
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
2804.388 631.088 617.311 631.088 2956.620 788.861 -1549.011 631.088 631.088 631.088 631.088 631.088 631.088 631.088 631.088 631.088
13289.478 13920.566 14537.877 15168.966 18125.586 18914.446 17365.435 17996.523 18627.612 19258.700 19889.789 20520.877 21151.966 21783.054 22414.143 23045.231
Million FY12$
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K. RISK CARDS 
 
Alternative 1: LPD-17 Option 
  PERFORMANCE 
 Weighting Factor 0.9 
Risk Factor CF PL 
P1 




RISK OF LOSING 1 SHIP TO MEET THE MISSION OBJECTIVES (BASED ON 
MAINTENANCE) 
0.3 0.3 
P3 RISK OF NOT BEING ABLE TO CONDUCT DIVERSE MISSION SETS 0.7 0.3 
P4 RISK OF NOT BEING ABLE TO COMPLETE MULTIPLE MISSIONS 0.5 0.4 
P5 
RISK OF MISSION / FORCE PROJECTION DELAYS DUE TO ENEMEY ACTIONS 
(BASED ON # OF SHIPS) 
0.5 0.4 
P6 
RISK OF NOT HAVING ADEQUATE LOGISTICAL CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT 
MISSION OBJECTIVES 
0.7 0.4 
Overall Performance Risk Value: 0.21 
        
SCHEDULE 
  Weighting Factor 0.3 
Risk Factor CF PL 
S1 RISK OF NOT MEETING DELIVERY SCHEDULE 0.3 0.7 
S2 RISK OF DELAY 0.3 0.7 
S3 INSUFFICIENT TIME TO TEST SYSTEMS THOROUGHLY 0.5 0.5 
S4 RISKS OF NOT HAVING MATURE TECHNOLOGY 0.3 0.1 
S5 INSUFFICIENT FACILITIES AVAILABLE 0.3 0.1 
S6 INSUFFICIENT NUMBER OF SHIPBUILDERS  0.3 0.1 
S7 RISK OF EXCEEDING APPROVED ANNUAL SHIP CONSTRUCTION ALLOCATION 0.3 0.1 
Overall Schedule Risk Value: 0.11 
        
COST 
  Weighting Factor 0.5 
Risk Factor CF PL 
C1 RISK OF COST OVERRUN 0.7 0.3 
C2 PRODUCTION PROCESS NOT PROVEN 0.3 0.3 
C3 
SUFFICIENT FACILITIES ARE NOT READILY AVAILABLE FOR COST-EFFECTIVE 
PRODUCTION 
0.5 0.3 
C4 RISK OF FLUX IN PERSONNEL / MAINTENANCE / FUEL COSTS 0.5 0.3 
C5 RISK OF INFRASTRUCTURE CHANGES (I.E. PORT FACILITIES) 0.5 0.3 
Overall Cost Risk Value: 0.15 
Table 87. Option 1 Risk Card 
  
 186 
Alternative 2: LSD(X) Option 
  PERFORMANCE 
  Weighting Factor 0.9 
Risk Factor CF PL 
P1 




RISK OF LOSING 1 SHIP TO MEET THE MISSION OBJECTIVES (BASED 
ON MAINTENANCE) 
0.3 0.3 
P3 RISK OF NOT BEING ABLE TO CONDUCT DIVERSE MISSION SETS 0.7 0.3 
P4 RISK OF NOT BEING ABLE TO COMPLETE MULTIPLE MISSIONS 0.5 0.3 
P5 
RISK OF MISSION / FORCE PROJECTION DELAYS DUE TO ENEMEY ACTIONS 
(BASED ON # OF SHIPS) 
0.5 0.3 
P6 
RISK OF NOT HAVING ADEQUATE LOGISTICAL CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT 
MISSION OBJECTIVES 
0.7 0.5 
Overall Performance Risk Value: 0.26 
        
SCHEDULE 
  Weighting Factor 0.3 
Risk Factor CF PL 
S1 RISK OF NOT MEETING DELIVERY SCHEDULE 0.5 0.7 
S2 RISK OF DELAY 0.5 0.7 
S3 INSUFFICIENT TIME TO TEST SYSTEMS THOROUGHLY 0.5 0.5 
S4 RISKS OF NOT HAVING MATURE TECHNOLOGY 0.3 0.7 
S5 INSUFFICIENT FACILITIES AVAILABLE 0.3 0.5 
S6 INSUFFICIENT NUMBER OF SHIPBUILDERS  0.3 0.1 
S7 
RISK OF EXCEEDING APPROVED ANNUAL SHIP CONSTRUCTION 
ALLOCATION 0.3 0.1 
Overall Schedule Risk Value: 0.20 
        
COST 
  Weighting Factor 0.5 
Risk Factor CF PL 
C1 RISK OF COST OVERRUN 0.7 0.7 
C2 PRODUCTION PROCESS NOT PROVEN 0.7 0.7 
C3 
SUFFICIENT FACILITIES ARE NOT READILY AVAILABLE FOR COST-
EFFECTIVE PRODUCTION 
0.5 0.4 
C4 RISK OF FLUX IN PERSONNEL / MAINTENANCE / FUEL COSTS 0.5 0.5 
C5 RISK OF INFRASTRUCTURE CHANGES (I.E. PORT FACILITIES) 0.8 0.2 
Overall Cost Risk Value: 0.32 
Table 88. Option 2 Risk Card 
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Alternative 3: LSD(XB)  Option 
  PERFORMANCE 
  Weighting Factor 0.9 
Risk Factor CF PL 
P1 




RISK OF LOSING 1 SHIP TO MEET THE MISSION OBJECTIVES (BASED 
ON MAINTENANCE) 
0.3 0.3 
P3 RISK OF NOT BEING ABLE TO CONDUCT DIVERSE MISSION SETS 0.7 0.3 
P4 RISK OF NOT BEING ABLE TO COMPLETE MULTIPLE MISSIONS 0.5 0.3 
P5 
RISK OF MISSION / FORCE PROJECTION DELAYS DUE TO ENEMEY ACTIONS 
(BASED ON # OF SHIPS) 
0.5 0.3 
P6 
RISK OF NOT HAVING ADEQUATE LOGISTICAL CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT 
MISSION OBJECTIVES 
0.7 0.2 
Overall Performance Risk Value: 0.18 
        
SCHEDULE 
  Weighting Factor 0.3 
Risk Factor CF PL 
S1 RISK OF NOT MEETING DELIVERY SCHEDULE 0.5 0.7 
S2 RISK OF DELAY 0.5 0.7 
S3 INSUFFICIENT TIME TO TEST SYSTEMS THOROUGHLY 0.5 0.5 
S4 RISKS OF NOT HAVING MATURE TECHNOLOGY 0.3 0.7 
S5 INSUFFICIENT FACILITIES AVAILABLE 0.3 0.5 
S6 INSUFFICIENT NUMBER OF SHIPBUILDERS  0.3 0.1 
S7 RISK OF EXCEEDING APPROVED ANNUAL SHIP CONSTRUCTION ALLOCATION 0.3 0.1 
Overall Schedule Risk Value: 0.20 
        
COST 
  Weighting Factor 0.5 
Risk Factor CF PL 
C1 RISK OF COST OVERRUN 0.7 0.7 
C2 PRODUCTION PROCESS NOT PROVEN 0.7 0.7 
C3 
SUFFICIENT FACILITIES ARE NOT READILY AVAILABLE FOR COST-
EFFECTIVE PRODUCTION 
0.5 0.4 
C4 RISK OF FLUX IN PERSONNEL / MAINTENANCE / FUEL COSTS 0.5 0.5 
C5 RISK OF INFRASTRUCTURE CHANGES (I.E. PORT FACILITIES) 0.8 0.2 
Overall Cost Risk Value: 0.32 
Table 89. Option 3 Risk Card 
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Alternative 4: LPD(17) FLT X Option 
  PERFORMANCE 
  Weighting Factor 0.9 
Risk Factor CF PL 
P1 




RISK OF LOSING 1 SHIP TO MEET THE MISSION OBJECTIVES (BASED 
ON MAINTENANCE) 
0.3 0.3 
P3 RISK OF NOT BEING ABLE TO CONDUCT DIVERSE MISSION SETS 0.7 0.3 
P4 RISK OF NOT BEING ABLE TO COMPLETE MULTIPLE MISSIONS 0.5 0.3 
P5 
RISK OF MISSION / FORCE PROJECTION DELAYS DUE TO ENEMEY ACTIONS 
(BASED ON # OF SHIPS) 
0.5 0.3 
P6 
RISK OF NOT HAVING ADEQUATE LOGISTICAL CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT 
MISSION OBJECTIVES 
0.7 0.3 
Overall Performance Risk Value: 0.18 
        
SCHEDULE 
  Weighting Factor 0.3 
Risk Factor CF PL 
S1 RISK OF NOT MEETING DELIVERY SCHEDULE 0.5 0.7 
S2 RISK OF DELAY 0.5 0.7 
S3 INSUFFICIENT TIME TO TEST SYSTEMS THOROUGHLY 0.5 0.5 
S4 RISKS OF NOT HAVING MATURE TECHNOLOGY 0.3 0.7 
S5 INSUFFICIENT FACILITIES AVAILABLE 0.3 0.5 
S6 INSUFFICIENT NUMBER OF SHIPBUILDERS  0.3 0.1 
S7 
RISK OF EXCEEDING APPROVED ANNUAL SHIP CONSTRUCTION 
ALLOCATION 
0.3 0.1 
Overall Schedule Risk Value: 0.20 
        
COST 
  Weighting Factor 0.5 
Risk Factor CF PL 
C1 RISK OF COST OVERRUN 0.7 0.5 
C2 PRODUCTION PROCESS NOT PROVEN 0.5 0.5 
C3 
SUFFICIENT FACILITIES ARE NOT READILY AVAILABLE FOR COST-
EFFECTIVE PRODUCTION 
0.5 0.4 
C4 RISK OF FLUX IN PERSONNEL / MAINTENANCE / FUEL COSTS 0.5 0.5 
C5 RISK OF INFRASTRUCTURE CHANGES (I.E. PORT FACILITIES) 0.8 0.2 
Overall Cost Risk Value: 0.24 
Table 90. Option 4 Risk Card 
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Alternative 5: Big Deck Option 
  PERFORMANCE 
  Weighting Factor 0.9 
Risk Factor CF PL 
P1 




RISK OF LOSING 1 SHIP TO MEET THE MISSION OBJECTIVES (BASED ON 
MAINTENANCE) 
0.9 0.2 
P3 RISK OF NOT BEING ABLE TO CONDUCT DIVERSE MISSION SETS 0.7 0.4 
P4 RISK OF NOT BEING ABLE TO COMPLETE MULTIPLE MISSIONS 0.5 0.5 
P5 
RISK OF MISSION / FORCE PROJECTION DELAYS DUE TO ENEMEY ACTIONS 
(BASED ON # OF SHIPS) 
0.5 0.5 
P6 
RISK OF NOT HAVING ADEQUATE LOGISTICAL CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT 
MISSION OBJECTIVES 
0.7 0.6 
Overall Performance Risk Value: 0.29 
        
SCHEDULE 
  Weighting Factor 0.3 
Risk Factor CF PL 
S1 RISK OF NOT MEETING DELIVERY SCHEDULE 0.3 0.3 
S2 RISK OF DELAY 0.3 0.3 
S3 INSUFFICIENT TIME TO TEST SYSTEMS THOROUGHLY 0.3 0.3 
S4 RISKS OF NOT HAVING MATURE TECHNOLOGY 0.3 0.3 
S5 INSUFFICIENT FACILITIES AVAILABLE 0.3 0.3 
S6 INSUFFICIENT NUMBER OF SHIPBUILDERS  0.3 0.1 
S7 RISK OF EXCEEDING APPROVED ANNUAL SHIP CONSTRUCTION ALLOCATION 0.3 0.1 
Overall Schedule Risk Value: 0.07 
        
COST 
  Weighting Factor 0.5 
Risk Factor CF PL 
C1 RISK OF COST OVERRUN 0.7 0.3 
C2 PRODUCTION PROCESS NOT PROVEN 0.3 0.3 
C3 
SUFFICIENT FACILITIES ARE NOT READILY AVAILABLE FOR COST-EFFECTIVE 
PRODUCTION 
0.5 0.3 
C4 RISK OF FLUX IN PERSONNEL / MAINTENANCE / FUEL COSTS 0.5 0.9 
C5 RISK OF INFRASTRUCTURE CHANGES (I.E. PORT FACILITIES) 0.5 0.8 
Overall Cost Risk Value: 0.26 




Alternative 6: Small Deck Option 
  PERFORMANCE 
  Weighting Factor 0.9 
Risk Factor CF PL 
P1 




RISK OF LOSING 1 SHIP TO MEET THE MISSION OBJECTIVES (BASED ON 
MAINTENANCE) 
0.6 0.4 
P3 RISK OF NOT BEING ABLE TO CONDUCT DIVERSE MISSION SETS 0.7 0.5 
P4 RISK OF NOT BEING ABLE TO COMPLETE MULTIPLE MISSIONS 0.5 0.2 
P5 
RISK OF MISSION / FORCE PROJECTION DELAYS DUE TO ENEMEY ACTIONS 
(BASED ON # OF SHIPS) 
0.5 0.2 
P6 
RISK OF NOT HAVING ADEQUATE LOGISTICAL CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT 
MISSION OBJECTIVES 
0.7 0.1 
Overall Performance Risk Value: 0.16 
        
SCHEDULE 
  Weighting Factor 0.3 
Risk Factor CF PL 
S1 RISK OF NOT MEETING DELIVERY SCHEDULE 0.3 0.7 
S2 RISK OF DELAY 0.3 0.7 
S3 INSUFFICIENT TIME TO TEST SYSTEMS THOROUGHLY 0.3 0.5 
S4 RISKS OF NOT HAVING MATURE TECHNOLOGY 0.3 0.3 
S5 INSUFFICIENT FACILITIES AVAILABLE 0.3 0.3 
S6 INSUFFICIENT NUMBER OF SHIPBUILDERS  0.3 0.1 
S7 RISK OF EXCEEDING APPROVED ANNUAL SHIP CONSTRUCTION ALLOCATION 0.3 0.1 
Overall Schedule Risk Value: 0.12 
        
COST 
  Weighting Factor 0.5 
Risk Factor CF PL 
C1 RISK OF COST OVERRUN 0.7 0.3 
C2 PRODUCTION PROCESS NOT PROVEN 0.3 0.3 
C3 
SUFFICIENT FACILITIES ARE NOT READILY AVAILABLE FOR COST-EFFECTIVE 
PRODUCTION 
0.5 0.3 
C4 RISK OF FLUX IN PERSONNEL / MAINTENANCE / FUEL COSTS 0.5 0.3 
C5 RISK OF INFRASTRUCTURE CHANGES (I.E. PORT FACILITIES) 0.5 0.3 
Overall Cost Risk Value: 0.15 
Table 92. Option 6 Risk Card 
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